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This thesis sets out to evaluate whether innovative aid modalities have the ability provide 
more value for money than traditional aid modalities, and if so where? The aim of the 
research is to contribute to the literature on aid effectiveness and collective action which to 
date has largely ignored the emergence of innovative aid modalities. 
Making use of a case study evaluation the thesis demonstrates that innovative blending 
mechanisms have the ability to enhance the value for money of development assistance at 
various points, from initial mobilization to actual absorption. Here the thesis employed a 
reconstructed program theory to establish to what extent an innovative Risk Capital Facility 
funded by the European Union in South Africa provided more value than traditional aid 
delivery modalities. This involved testing both the process of channelling aid, as well as the 
results achieved.  
Although not a panacea to all problems of traditional aid, the results indicate that 
innovative aid modalities have the ability to translate into higher equilibrium allocations for 
the donor in terms of aid delivery. Hence from a political economy point of view, the ability 
of innovative blending to demonstrate value for money may help overcome some of the 
collective action problems with the traditional aid architecture. This primarily concerned 
insights into the ability of this innovative aid modality to address issues surrounding 












Für meine Eltern: 

































The completion of this work would not have been possible without the help of numerous 
dedicated and kind people. First I would like to thank my supervisors, Anthony Black and 
Haroon Bhorat, for their constructive support throughout this endeavour. I would also like 
to thank the University of Cape Town for its financial support and for leaving me with the 
memory of four fantastic years. I am especially grateful to Julie Norris and Paula 
Bassingthwaighte for helping me jump through all the necessary administrative hurdles, and 
Mark Ellyne for his insightful comments and feedback.  
With regard to the empirical research, my gratitude extends to all the people whom I had 
the chance to interview and meet over the course of my research. I would like to particularly 
thank the Industrial Development Corporation’s Risk Capital Facility unit for their 
cooperation. Regarding my work with the European Commission, I am very grateful to 
Torsten Ewerbeck, Konstantinos Berdos, and Richard Young. I am however especially 
indebted to Milly Chesire, who’s enthusiasm for my work made this research endeavour 
possible in the first place. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my wonderfully unique and loving family for all their 
encouragement and support. My brothers Elias and Luca for always putting a smile on my 
face. For the brilliant year I spent together with my dear sister Stella at UCT, who is a 
constant source of inspiration. And for the presence of my brother David, with whom I 
have truly spent the days of my youth living. Most of all, however, I have to thank my 
parents Sven and Astrid who have raised me with love and have whole-heartedly supported 













Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 1 
1 Domestic Politics and Aid: Why Are Donor Commitments Not Being Met? ..................... 5 
1.1 Commitments of Donor Community: The Elusive 0.7% Target ................................... 5 
1.2 What Determines Donor Aid Efforts? A Literature Review .......................................... 8 
1.3 Collective Action Problems of Aid ................................................................................... 11 
2 The Evolution of Aid Effectiveness and the Choice of Aid Modalities ............................. 26 
2.1 Origins of Aid Debate and Project Aid: 1950s – 1980s ................................................. 26 
2.2 Structural Adjustment Programs: 1980s ........................................................................... 29 
2.3 New Conditionalities, Ownership and Budget Support: 1990s .................................... 31 
2.4 Results Based Financing and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: 2000s ..... 33 
2.5 Growing Dichotomy in Aid Debate and Innovative Financing for Development: 
Current Aid Architecture .............................................................................................................. 37 
3 Innovative Financing for Development ................................................................................... 41 
3.1 Defining Innovative Finance for Development .............................................................. 41 
3.2 What Options do Donors Have? ...................................................................................... 44 
3.3 Tailor Made Assistance: Innovative Blending Mechanisms .......................................... 48 
4 Methodology: Measuring Value for Money ............................................................................. 54 
4.1 Research Problem and Research Questions .................................................................... 54 
4.2 Defining Value for Money .................................................................................................. 55 
4.3 What is being Evaluated? .................................................................................................... 58 
4.4 Methodological Framework ............................................................................................... 60 
5 Case Study Results: Value for Money of European Commission Blending in South Africa
 74 
5.1 Overview of Case Studies: Project Structures and Activities ........................................ 74 
5.2 Evaluation Questions and Results ..................................................................................... 81 
6 Overall Case Study Evaluation Findings ............................................................................... 125 
6.1 Value at the Input Level ................................................................................................... 125 
6.2 Value at the Output Level ............................................................................................... 127 
6.3 Value at the Results Level ................................................................................................ 131 
 
 v 
6.4 Value at the Outcomes Level .......................................................................................... 137 
6.5 Overall Value for Money ................................................................................................. 139 
7 Conclusions: Value for Money and Collective Action Problems ...................................... 141 
7.1 Financial Commitments: Ability to Provide More Assistance ................................... 141 
7.2 Ability to Provide Better Assistance .............................................................................. 145 
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................... 150 






















List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Net ODA for DAC Donors (1960-2014) ..................................................................... 6 
Figure 1.2: Proportion of DAC Aid Through Different Channels ............................................... 7 
Figure 1.3: EU Donors Falling Short of Commitments (ODA as a % of GNI) ...................... 14 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Aid Debate and Aid Modalities ............................................................ 28 
Figure 2.2: International Development Assistance Then and Now ........................................... 34 
Figure 2.3: Innovative Instruments Available ................................................................................ 40 
Figure 3.1: Defining Innovative Development Financing ........................................................... 42 
Figure 3.2: Sub-Sections of Innovative Finance Mechanisms ..................................................... 45 
Figure 3.3: Loan Grant Blending ..................................................................................................... 49 
Figure 4.1: Conceptualising Value for Money ................................................................................ 62 
Figure 4.2: Evaluation Process ......................................................................................................... 64 
Figure 4.3: Reconstructed Program Theory for the Risk Capital Facility .................................. 67 
Figure 4.4: Evaluation Questions for Measuring VfM ................................................................. 69 
Figure 5.1: Overview of Interventions ............................................................................................ 75 
Figure 5.2: EU PSD Distribution by Area of Intervention .......................................................... 77 
Figure 5.3: LED KZN Implementation Structure ........................................................................ 78 
Figure 5.4: RCF Implementation Structure .................................................................................... 79 
Figure 5.5: Crowding in IDC Funds - Overview of New IDC Funds ....................................... 87 
Figure 5.6: RCF2 Sector Distribution by Loan Volume ............................................................... 97 










List of Tables 
 
Table 5.1: Direct Financial Leverage Effect: RCF vs. LED KZN ............................................. 83 
Table 5.2 RCF Indicators in context of broader SME Support .................................................. 95 
Table 5.3 Comparative Indicators RCF and Global PSD Support ............................................. 98 
Table 5.4: RCF Portfolio June 30th 2011 (ZAR million) .......................................................... 105 
Table 5.5: RCF2 Portfolio September 30th 2011 (ZAR million) ............................................. 106 
Table 5.6: Blueberry Farm RCF Loan Deal Summary ............................................................... 108 
Table 5.7 Blueberry Farm Perfomance Targets Overview ........................................................ 109 
Table 5.8: Cement Company RCF Loan Deal Summary .......................................................... 111 
Table 5.9: Cement Company Performance Targets ................................................................... 112 
Table 5.10: Delays in Implementation: RCF vs. LED KZN .................................................... 119 





List of Acronyms 
 
ACP  African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
AMC  Advanced Market Commitment 
BSS  Business Support Services 
CTT  Currency Transaction Tax 
CSP  Country Strategy Paper 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
DC  Direct Channel 
DEDT  Department of Economic Development and Tourism 
DEVCO Directorate General for Development and Cooperation 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry  
EC  European Commission 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EQ  Evaluation Question 
EU  European Union 
FA  Financing Agreement 
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organisation 
FCU  Finance and Contracting Unit 
GBS  General Budget Support 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GIZ  Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GNI  Gross National Income 
HDP  Historically Disadvantaged Person 
IDC  Industrial Development Corporation 
IFM  Innovative Financing Mechanism 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IRR  Internal Rate of Return 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ODA  Official Development Assistance 
OOF  Other Official Flows 
 
 ix 
LED KZN Local Economic Development Support Programme in Kwazulu-Natal  
MDG  Millennium Development Goal 
MIC  Middle Income Country 
MIP  Multi-annual Indicative Programme 
MOA  Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MTR  Medium Term Review 
NFC  Niche Fund Channel 
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation 
NIF  Neighbourhood Investment Facility 
PCM  Project Cycle Management 
PCU  Programme Co-ordinating Unit 
PDMT  Project Development and Management Team 
PPP  Public Private Partnership 
PSC  Programme Steering Committee 
PSD  Private Sector Development 
RCF  Risk Capital Facility 
ROM  Results Oriented Monitoring 
SABS  South African Bureau of Standards 
SBS  Sector Budget Support 
SBU  Strategic Business Unit 
SEFA  Small Enterprise Financing Agency 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprises 
TPC  Third Party Channel 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
VfM  Value for Money 








Since the early 1970s, industrialised countries comprising the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) donor club have repeatedly made promises to increase Official 
Development Assistance (ODA)1 to eradicate global poverty. Yet the story for the last 40 
years has been one of broken promises. This begs the question: why are aid commitments 
not being met? Moreover, why is most aid still provided via bilateral channels, rendering 
coordination efforts more difficult?  
According to the literature, foreign aid is determined by a number of different factors. 
International obligations like the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) criteria or 
European Union commitments to scale up aid have had an impact. The wealth, economic 
conditions, and welfare state size of the donor country matter too. That’s why richer 
European countries usually spend more on foreign aid measured by share of GDP than 
poorer donor countries. Power relations and geo-political and economic actors shape the aid 
effort as well. However, instead of looking at these factors individually, this thesis invokes a 
political economy approach to elucidate the aid budgeting process.  
The starting point of our discussion lies with the premise that donor aid is constrained 
by entrenched political and economic interests. We argue that there has been one constant in 
the history of aid, namely that aid has been distorted by vested interests and institutions of 
donor countries. Consequently predictions concerning donor aid efforts depend on the state 
of donor interests. It is within this context that the literature surrounding institutions and 
collective action problems provides an excellent framework to explain the problems of an 
intricate global aid architecture that is characterised by strategic interactions.  
As will be discussed in detail in chapter one, the collective action literature provides us 
with the analytical tools to explain that the problems with the current aid architecture are 
systemic and bound to produce sub-optimal results. Here we look at how collective action 
problems such as free riding and institutional turf fighting affect ODA allocations. In doing 
                                                 
1 Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list 
of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of 
economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (OECD 2014a). 
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so the thesis intends to unpack the perverse incentive structures which throw up sizeable 
barriers to solving many of the deficiencies of development aid. What is more, it explains 
that, depending on their actions, international development agencies can exacerbate these 
obstacles or help to reduce them.  
The aim of this thesis is therefore to address the central question of how development 
finance can be made more efficient and effective primarily from the donor perspective. 
Traditional aid2 is one aspect of development finance at the disposal of the DAC members. 
While there is no panacea to the problems of the aid architecture, donors are constantly in 
search of aid delivery mechanisms that nod to countervailing domestic interests in donor 
countries as well as which deliver support transformative change at the recipient level from 
the outside. Most notably in this context, an increasing number of studies have recently 
highlighted the role of innovative finance mechanisms for development (Lui and Van Steres 
2012; Maxwell 2013). Indeed, persistent development problems in social service delivery and 
private sector involvement warrant the need for innovative financial solutions. Moreover, 
developing countries too have been demanding better financial solutions, i.e. risk mitigation 
efforts with a view to generating private investments, partnerships that mobilise private 
money for public service delivery, as well as increased support for carbon trading. 
To many observers, this development highlights an important shift in the approach of 
development partners and the way they do business. The context of 2014 is not only hugely 
different from that of the 1990s, it is even fundamentally changed from the pre-2008 context. 
The dual challenge of increased financing needs in developing countries coupled with public 
deficits in donor countries calling for fiscal consolidation and restraint has led to a rethinking 
of donor aid strategies. While it is clear that in the face of new global challenges large donor 
institutions such as the European Commission (EC) will increasingly need to evolve, it 
remains unclear what role innovative aid delivery mechanisms can play. What is more, it is 
uncertain whether these new forms of aid delivery would ameliorate or exacerbate some of 
the collective action problems of aid. 
Indeed there are queries regarding the ability of new funds to be effectively and 
coherently allocated in the context of global aid efforts. Issues such as harmonisation and 
alignment with other donors, as well as country ownership of funding are still a major 
                                                 
2Budget disbursements from traditional sovereign donors via traditional aid channels such as project and 
program aid, or budget support. 
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concern. What is more, it remains unclear whether new forms of aid delivery have the ability 
to abate free riding between donors, and second, the incidence of turf fighting in national 
budget allocations within donor countries. Consequently the research conducted in this 
thesis will allow us to consider the potential of innovative finance mechanisms in the context 
of the collective action discussion. While the literature has researched free-riding and 
institutional problems of aid, thus far the role of innovative financing in this context has 
been overlooked. Yet if new forms of aid delivery were to demonstrate greater value for 
money (VfM), then these mechanisms could play a role in spurring aid efforts. Consequently 
the research will build on the political economy literature surrounding aid effort, and 
examine issues surrounding aid effectiveness and the legitimacy of the existing aid 
architecture.  
The core objective of this thesis is thus to examine whether innovative aid modalities 
have the ability to provide more value for money than traditional aid. While the cornerstones 
for measuring value for money (VfM) will be defined in chapter four, VfM is generally 
understood to describe an explicit commitment to achieve the maximum impact possible 
with the resources that are at the disposal of donor agencies. It is about outcomes and results 
and requires a plausible causal relationship between money that is spent and outcomes that 
are achieved. It is not about focusing on the cost only, or choosing the cheapest possible 
development intervention. 
With a view to answering this research question, this thesis conducts an empirical case 
study evaluation of an innovative Risk Capital Facility financed by the EC in South Africa. 
While the case study approach is limited as it provides a “snapshot” and is not representative 
of all innovative blending facilities, it is a very useful approach when the objective is to gain 
in-depth understanding of a process, especially when the intervention is innovative or 
experimental or not well understood (Imas, Morra, and Rist 2009).  
The aim of the case study was to demonstrate what gains were made that would not have 
been possible without the innovative RCF. In doing so, it is imperative to understand that 
the evaluation required an assessment of both the degree of achievement of the donor’s 
objectives with regard to aid delivery, as well as the process of channelling aid. Hence the 
evaluation focuses on objectives in terms of both the delivery of aid to the beneficiaries, as 
well as the effectiveness of the process itself, i.e. what the transaction costs of this innovative 
aid delivery mechanism were. Here the case study approach was vital in demonstrating the 
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value of innovative blending at various levels of aid delivery compared to the traditional aid 
delivery mechanisms. 
Finally, the line of argument of this thesis essentially follows an inductive approach. 
Chapter one will examine the literature on the factors that determine the amount of aid that 
donor governments give before drawing on the modern literature on institutions and 
collective action to explain why business as usual, via traditional ODA channelling, faces 
systemic shortcomings. Next, chapter two will provide an overview of the evolution of the 
different aid modalities and their discontents, while chapter three will consider the role of 
innovative finance mechanisms in general, and innovative blending in particular. Ultimately, 
new aid modalities need to be evaluated and tested to establish their added value and 
complementarity, hence chapter four introduces the concept of value for money and the 
methodology for evaluating it. Chapter five will discuss the results of the case study 
evaluation, while chapter six will offer some key findings before highlighting a number of 
ways to expand on this research. Finally, chapter seven will draw on the evaluation results 













1  Domestic Politics and Aid: Why Are Donor 
Commitments Not Being Met? 
 
With a view to highlighting the state of the current aid architecture, this chapter commences 
with a brief overview of the status of donor commitments, demonstrating that foreign aid is 
consistently under-provided and constrained by high negotiation and transaction costs. With 
a view to explaining this phenomenon, this chapter first examines the disparate literature on 
what factors determine the amount of aid that donor governments give. Here we identify the 
different streams of thought with regard to why donors are falling short of their 
commitments and what determines donor aid allocations. While this literature explores 
various cultural, political and economic factors to explain why aid budgets are constrained 
we have to look beyond these isolated factors. Consequently this chapter will introduce the 
political economy literature surrounding collective action problems of aid to analyse the 
decision-making procedures and institutional arrangements constraining the traditional aid 
architecture. This will serve to elucidate the aid budgeting process and better explain why 
commitments are not being met. In doing so this chapter will demonstrate that the 
traditional aid architecture consists of complex aid delivery systems which are prone to 
creating sub-optimal outcomes and perverse incentives. 
 
1.1 Commitments of Donor Community: The Elusive 0.7% Target 
 
In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly set a target for donor countries to scale up 
their ODA to 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) by the middle of the decade. Since 
then over 40 years have passed, yet only Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands have kept their promise and met this target. Indeed, the story of donor aid 
efforts since that initial commitment is one of broken promises.  
While aid volumes did not increase in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s saw aid falling 
both in nominal and real terms (see Figure 1.1). At the turn of the millennium, a new set of 
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development targets (the Millennium Development Goals) agreed by world leaders reignited 
discussions surrounding the old 0.7% target.3 
 
Figure 1.1: Net ODA for DAC Donors (1960-2014) 
 
Source: OECD (2014). 
 
Riding on the wave of optimism following the Millennium Summit in 2000, the first 
international conference on financing for development was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 
2002. Between 2002 and 2006, Monterrey spawned increased ODA commitments, new 
initiatives in Gleneagles and Barcelona, debt relief, and the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. In 2008, the follow up conference on Financing for Development was held in 
Doha. What is more, as part of the public pressure, EU heads of state and government 
confirmed the 0.7% commitment in 2010, making the EU the only DAC donor to formally 
subscribe to the 0.7% target by 2015 (Council of the European Union 2010). 
Since Monterrey there have been some encouraging developments. In particular debt 
relief measures have helped, and the 2008 financial crisis had only a marginal impact on 
African growth figures (World Bank 2014). Donor approaches have become less intrusive 
with more aid being given in the form of budget support, directly financing the national 
budgets of partner countries. Additionally, following the drop in aid efforts in the 1990’s, 
DAC ODA more than doubled between 2002 and 2010, reaching the nominal value of 
                                                 
3For an overview of individual aid commitments by DAC member countries and the composition of DAC aid 









































































































US$ 129 billion, representing 0.32% of members’ combined gross national income (OECD 
2014).  
A more nuanced analysis, however, tells a far less optimistic story. Indeed, the increases 
in aid over the last decade have been far too small to reach the 0.7% target and post financial 
crisis ODA commitments are declining in real terms (OECD 2013). When measured against 
the proportion of the donor countries’ GNI, ODA is now at 0.32%, which is roughly the 
same level it was in 1990. Moreover, in 1960 ODA represented 0.56% of GNI. This means 
that in relation to their national income, donor countries are giving almost half of the 
amount of aid they were giving in the early 1960s, a time when they were not nearly as rich 
as they are today (Hirvonen 2005).  
At this stage, most DAC donors are thus falling short of their commitments and as we 
have illustrated above, historical evidence suggests that promises to scale up ODA are very 
ambiguous. Moreover, aid continues to be given predominantly via bilateral channels rather 
than multilateral ones. As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, bilateral development projects continue 
to dominate the overall aid channelled by DAC donors, thus incurring high negotiation and 
transaction costs for both donors and recipients alike (Mascarenhas and Sandler 2006). 
 
Figure 1.2: Proportion of DAC Aid Through Different Channels 
 



































1.2 What Determines Donor Aid Efforts? A Literature Review 
  
While the 0.7% target is an arbitrary number and has been criticized by some development 
experts, it allows for comparison between donor aid efforts and represents a commitment to 
prevent donors from cutting development assistance. Indeed, scaling up aid efforts together 
with improving coordination is important as many developing countries today still lack 
finance to foster economic growth and development. 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of the literature surrounding 
determinants of donor aid efforts. So far the empirical research on aid has primarily focused 
on aid implementation. However the focus of this thesis surrounds the fact that aid 
commitments are not being met and that aid continues to be given via bilateral channels. 
While much less attention has been given to the determinants of donor aid efforts, several 
studies do exist. According to these studies, there are a number of causes that may account 
for the amount of aid and its variation across donor countries. With a view to addressing 
these, the literature can generally be divided into two broad categories of explanatory factors: 
economic and political (Tingley 2010).  
With regard to political factors, one place to start is to recognise that historically aid was 
first used as a foreign policy tool (Morgenthau 1962; Lancaster 2007). As will be discussed in 
detail later, since the advent of modern development assistance, much aid has been given out 
of strategic self-interest. In some cases foreign aid may even be used to systematically 
disadvantage other countries. For instance, during the cold war, the United States provided 
its aid predominantly to strategic partners in Europe and the Middle East. Furthermore 
motives for giving aid in the United States have ranged from concerns over communist 
governments in Central America, to strategic interests in the Middle East, as well as the need 
to secure military presence in South East Asia. As a result a number of authors have focused 
on geo-strategic features which affect donor aid efforts (Liska 1960; Morgenthau 1954; 
Hoadley 1980; Griffin 1991; White 2001; Round and Odedokun 2004).  
In other cases the motive was overtly diplomatic. France, for instance, has been 
providing development aid primarily as a tool to maintain its sphere of influence in former 
colonies following their independence. Similarly, British aid was borne out of the colonial 
legacy of the United Kingdom. While aid certainly continues to act as a tool for strategic 
interests, the extent to which this is the case remains open to empirical question.  
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Apart from strategic and diplomatic interests, another stream of research has examined 
whether there is a link between the political culture of a donor country and the amount of 
aid it gives? Another way of putting it is to say that we expect that a government’s general 
orientation toward redistribution will influence the level of foreign aid that it provides. 
According to Noel (1995, 2000) and Lumsdaine (1993) this is the case. Indeed, both 
demonstrate that donors with a large welfare state at home tend to be more generous when 
re-distributing money abroad. 
Adding to the debate, another set of authors focused on the role of domestic political 
ideologies in determining donor government aid efforts (Fleck and Kilby 2001; Milner and 
Tingley 2010). While there are some studies which point out that left wing governments give 
more aid (Lumsdaine 1993; Chong and Gradstein 2008; Tingley 2010), others suggest that 
right wing governments are more generous (Goldstein and Moss 2005; Round and 
Odedokun 2004; Bertoli, Cornia, and Manarosi 2008). What is more, one study finds that 
political orientation has no significant effect on aid efforts (Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2009). 
Consequently there is no real consensus on how political ideology affects donor aid 
commitments.  
Concerning economic factors, economic theory dictates that any pressure on donor 
government budgets is likely to decrease donor government aid efforts (Beck, Clark, Groff, 
Keefer, and Walsh 2001). As with political factors, the literature considers a number of 
different economic factors in the context of this discussion. For instance, one stream looks 
at the role of increasing trade related inter-dependence between donor and recipient 
countries with regard to aid efforts (Haggard and Moravcsik 1993; Van der Veen 2011). 
These studies suggest that donor countries which are engaged in more trade with recipient 
countries are more likely to maintain or increase aid levels. Indeed, commercial self-interest 
seems to be a powerful determining factor in the provision of aid. According to Lancaster 
(2007) and Cumming (2001), both France and England have used their development aid to 
advance the commercial interests of French and British industry via tied aid and non-
competitive bidding. 
Other authors focus on the role of government debt in donor countries on aid spending 
(Faini 2006; Bertoli, Cornea, and Manarsi 2008). They find that growing debt constrains aid 
efforts. Conversely, Round and Odedokun (2004) find that fiscal imbalance has little or no 
 
 10 
effect on aid spending, but find that as real per capita income increases in donor countries, 
so does aid.  
Examining the effect of financial crises on aid efforts, Frot (2009) examined six empirical 
cases over the last forty years and finds that aid by donor countries fell on average by 13% 
following the crises. Moreover, Dang, Knack and Rogers (2009) find that the effects of 
banking crises’ are especially adverse on aid levels, estimating that the 2008 financial crisis 
will depress aid by 20-30% over the next decade.  
Looking at these factors individually adds to the discussion. However, any 
comprehensive account of what determines aid levels needs to consider both political and 
economic factors in tandem. One cannot cast these as alternative explanations. To give an 
example, Bertoli et al (2008) try to explain Italy’s consistently low record of ODA spending 
by looking at specific macroeconomic characteristics. The authors find that even though 
macroeconomic factors play a significant role in donor aid spending, they did not fully 
account for the poor Italian aid record. In fact, even when controlling for these determining 
factors, Italy was still lagging behind the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) average, challenging the claim that the poor Italian aid effort can be 
fully explained by binding fiscal constraints. 
Hence it seems that foreign aid is determined by a number of different factors. 
International obligations like the MDG criteria have an impact. The wealth, economic 
conditions, and welfare state size of the donor country matter too. That’s why richer 
European countries usually spend more on foreign aid as a share of GDP than poorer donor 
countries.  Power relations and geo-political and economic actors shape the aid effort as well. 
However, to elucidate the aid budgeting process and better explain why commitments are 
not being met, this thesis invokes a political economy approach, emphasizing the collective 
action problems of aid. In particular, the role of vested interests, free riding, and bureaucratic 
inertia will be emphasized. In doing so the following section will look at how decision 
making processes of donor aid institutions affect ODA allocations, and what role selective 






1.3 Collective Action Problems of Aid 
 
Following a brief overview of the political economy literature surrounding collective action 
problems of aid, this literature will provide us with an analytical framework to explain why 
donor commitments are falling short and why various actors fail to contribute to the 
production of joint benefits. This approach integrates both the question as to how and why 
aid is given, identifying several types of obstacles under the concepts of public goods 
problems, institutional turf fighting, prisoner dilemma implications, and principal agent 
problems. On the basis of this discussion, the following section will discuss the evolution of 
the various aid modalities and their discontents before invoking the role of innovative 
financing and its ability to overcome some of these collective action problems. 
 
1.31 Collective Action Problems of Aid: A Literature Review 
 
In this thesis, we use the modern literature on institutions and collective action problems to 
explain the process of aid giving. While the literature on this topic is limited, earlier 
theoretical work by Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), Mosley (1985), and Hatzipanayotou 
and Michael (1995), emphasize the public good aspect of aid. This is echoed by more recent 
works, including Steinwand (2012), who states that: 
  
In this uncoordinated and non-hierarchical international environment, 
developmental policies exhibit classic public goods properties. Any donor 
can benefit if others do the work, and there is no rivalry in enjoying the 
benefits.4 (Steinwand 2012 p. 3) 
 
According to Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action, individuals in groups working to 
provide public goods are confronted with incentives to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others. 
The underlying premise of Olson’s theory is that non-cooperation in the common pursuit of 
a public good will lead to the undersupply of the good in question; in this case aid. As with 
                                                 
4A pertinent example could be one donor country’s efforts to create peace and economic security in a given 




other public goods, there is no rivalry of consumption, nor any way of excluding other 
donors from enjoying the benefits of development through aid delivery. Consequently 
Olson’s theory suggests that the rational donor has no interest in the absence of selective 
incentives in voluntarily contributing to a collective action that is to produce public or 
collective goods since any gain goes to everyone in the group. 
In applying Olson’s work, a number of political economy studies have been released in 
recent years making the case that traditional aid efforts are constrained by free-riding 
problems. This existing work can be divided into several streams of research. First, this 
thesis draws from the limited literature strongly influenced by the new economics of 
institutions. One of the key scholars in this field is Ostrom who has examined institutional 
solutions to common pool resource problems (Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom and Shivakumar 
2005). Ostrom describes how asymmetric information, principal agent problems, and 
additional structural factors constrain the choices of aid providers and recipient governments. 
Second, the more recent debate surrounding the fragmentation of aid efforts deals 
primarily with the lack of coordination in aid policy implementation, however not with 
regard to aid allocations. Easterly (2007) as well as Frot and Santiso (2010) point out 
recipient authorities are overburdened with administrative requirements due to the increase 
in aid providers. Maxwell explains this phenomenon by making use of the ‘Prisoners 
Dilemma theory’ (Barder, Gavas, Maxwell, and Johnson 2010). Here collective action 
problems arise which could only be overcome by increased cooperation between donors.  
Finally, a third stream investigates strategic interactions between donor countries as well 
as turf fighting within donor countries (Vaubel 1986; Steinwand 2012). Steinwand (2012) 
makes the case that due to the scarcity of resources in donor countries, donor agencies face 
powerful incentives to free ride in the aid system as well as inter agency rivalry.  
In building on these streams of research, the next section will discuss collective action 
problems such as free riding, turf fighting, principal agent problems, and prisoner dilemma 
implications to explain that the problems with the current aid architecture are systemic and 
bound to produce sub-optimal results. In doing so we predict that the political and 
economic factors arising from the economic downturn in donor countries are likely to 





1.32 Collective Action Problems of Aid: Systemic Problems    
 
In a perfect world, promises would be kept and aid untied from vested interest. However, as 
mentioned above, donors are increasingly falling behind their commitments. As the literature 
on aid determinants demonstrates, economic and strategic interests are key determinants of 
aid flows. However the literature also points to a number of additional factors which help 
explain variations in aid efforts between donor countries. These include cultural 
characteristics, national identities, domestic political institutions, power status, as well as the 
existence of a welfare state within the donor country. Indeed, these factors help explain why 
countries such as Sweden and Denmark have such high ODA commitments, while the 
United States provides relatively little in official aid.  
The aim of this thesis, however, is not to explore the individual interests of donors when 
giving aid. Rather it seeks to provide a framework to explain how much and what kind of aid 
donors give in a context that is characterised by strategic interactions and collective action 
problems. In doing so the literature outlined above helps elucidate why aid continues to be 
given in a non-cooperative manner.  
In the context of Olson’s (1965) theory of collective action problems, this section starts 
by looking at what determines the amount of aid that donors give. Here the incidence of free 
riding between donors, and second, the incidence of turf fighting in national budget 
allocations within donor countries serve as analytical tools. With regard to the first point, 
individuals in groups working to provide public goods are confronted with incentives to ‘free 
ride’ on the efforts of others. As mentioned above, the starting point of this approach is to 
recognise that under certain circumstances ODA and poverty alleviation efforts are 
fundamentally considered public goods. In economic theory, public goods are characterized 
by non-rivalry and non-excludability in consumption. Indeed, the provision of aid by one 
donor has a positive effect on all donors: if one donor provides more aid it has a positive 
non-excludable/non-diminishable effect that other donors can take advantage of. Hence 
while donor countries recognize the benefits of maintaining close economic and political ties 
with one another, some countries may take advantage of the generosity of others (Barder et 
al 2010). This form of non-cooperation among DAC donor countries ultimately leads to the 




Figure 1.3: EU Donors Falling Short of Commitments (ODA as a % of GNI) 
 
Source: OECD (2014). 
 
Based on an empirical evaluation of 15 OECD donors between 1970 and 2001, 
Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) find that aid is predominantly given in a non-cooperative 
manner and is subject to free riding. A prime example is that of Italy. While most EU 
member states have been maximising their efforts to reach 0.7% of ODA/GNI in 
accordance with their international commitments, Italy has been maintaining its current level 
of less than 0.2% (see Figure 1.3). 
This phenomenon is perhaps easier to understand when considering free riding 
predictions in the context of donor utility functions. Different actors have different interests 
in different countries, and therefore different rationales for development. 5  As Manning 
(2012) writes: 
 
Humanitarian situations apart, official bilateral international concessional 
transfers normally reflect a mixture of what might be called ‘direct national 
interest’, ‘broader national interest’ and a more altruistic ‘developmental’ 
concern with deep and chronic poverty … restraint on direct national 
                                                 
5 This holds both for nation states as well as supranational institutions with their own development budgets 
















interest is easier to sell in relation to countries which are far poorer than the 
donor and present minimal political or commercial opportunities.  (Manning 
2012 p. 22) 
 
While commercial and strategic interests persist, one could argue that two decades after 
the end of the cold war, aid has increasingly been targeted at the promotion of democracy 
and with a genuine interest in development objectives.6 Consequently progress in terms of 
taking aid policies and the pursuit of democratic objectives serious have strengthened the 
public good nature of aid, and thus increased temptations for donors to free ride on the 
efforts of others.  
However DAC donors also share economic and geo-political interests (Steinwand 2011). 
As early as the 1950s the United States argued that since the efforts to stave off communism 
via aid would benefit all members of the Free World, there should be an equal sharing of the 
burden amongst those countries (Hjertholm, Laursen, and White 2000). Today traditional 
donor countries increasingly share interests. France for instance gives a large share of its 
bilateral aid to its former African colonies. Yet promoting stability and economic growth in 
the former French colonies of northern Africa is a shared interest for all European Union 
countries, and thus constitutes a public good.  
Similar to Europe’s relationship with northern Africa, shifting global patterns of wealth, 
poverty, trade, and geopolitical power are constructing new opportunities and challenges for 
donors in MICs. For instance, the EU continues to provide a substantial amount of aid to 
South Africa, a country with a higher GDP per capita than Bulgaria (Herbert, 2013).7 EU 
member states have suggested that the EU and South Africa share common values:  
 
South Africa and the EU share many common values and beliefs, making 
them natural partners to promote development, socio-economic and political 
progress, as well as stability in a globalising world (Council of the EU 2007e 
p. 1). 
                                                 
6What is more, according to Steinwand (2012), aid data confirms that the new challenges with international 
terrorism have not led donors to simply revert to the old ways of unconditional support for authoritarian 
regimes. 
7 With an indicative grant-based bilateral aid budget of EUR 980 million for the period 2007-2013, the EU 




Additionally South Africa has become a launch pad for development initiatives in the 
region, providing a safe and comfortable location for development agencies to be based to 
pursue regional activities. More importantly, however, South Africa and its neighbouring 
countries are becoming increasingly important for trade, access to natural resources, as well 
as security and diplomatic relations (European Commission 2012). Here development 
assistance has the ability to serve as a tool to secure and consolidate relationships with 
recipient governments. 
While the variation in free riding could be explained by a mere variation in preferences, 
Steinwand (2012) provides important insights into this discussion. He clarifies that, first, the 
differences in free riding can be explained by the fact that donors face different marginal 
costs of aid delivery, and, second, that there is a path dependency related to donor aid 
efforts.8 He cites the work of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) who show that differentials in 
marginal cost of providing a public good will lead to asymmetrical contributions. Here the 
marginal costs of aid delivery concerns not only the cost of aid delivery, but the overall 
cost/benefit analysis of the donor’s utility function9 when providing development assistance. 
As Steinwand (2012) notes: 
 
Donors face varying marginal costs of providing aid. For example, there is 
evidence that former colonial ties make aid provision less costly in political 
terms. Sources of this are notions of historic responsibility and support for 
co-nationals that remain settled in the former colony. The same cost 
reduction logic applies to aid that furthers economic goals of the donor. 
(Steinwand 2012 p. 5) 
 
Consequently Steinwand argues that donors with a low marginal cost of providing aid 
give more, while those with a high marginal cost free ride on the contributions of others. 
Moreover, high cost donors may further adjust their contributions downwards since they 
benefit from higher contributions of low cost donors, thereby further increasing free-riding 
                                                 
8As an example he cites evidence that aid to former colonies ties is less costly in political terms (Steinwand 2012 
p. 5). 
9 The donor’s interests, which can broadly include strategic, economic, and altruistic motives.  
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losses. As mentioned above, the repeated nature of aid giving implies that this dynamic is 
reinforced over time. 
The concept of diverging marginal costs in the provision of aid provides an intellectual 
framework to integrate the expansive literature on aid determinants outlined earlier in this 
chapter. What is more, Steinwand (2012) adds another important consideration to the 
discussion. Namely that one would expect the presence of self-interested goals by the donor 
to lead to positive spill ins and a reduction of free riding behaviour by the benefitting donor. 
Indeed, Olson’s theory suggests that the rational donor has no interest in the absence of 
selective incentives to voluntarily contribute to a collective action. As will be discussed later 
in this thesis, understanding if and when selective incentives can help to overcome these 
tendencies therefore provides an important building block for a better aid system. 
While free riding is part of the answer as to why donors are falling short of their financial 
commitments, the literature identifies a second collective action problem in the provision of 
aid. This problem surrounds the existence of turf fighting in national budgetary allocations 
which prevent development agencies in donor countries from scaling up aid efforts. With a 
view to explaining this, a logical point of departure is to look at the institutional process by 
which aid is allocated.  
Within donor governments, ODA amounts are decided in national budget allocations 
which fall under majority voting in national parliaments. Here the process of donor aid 
allocations can be characterized as a "compulsory negotiating system" (Scharpf 2006), or as a 
multiple-veto system (Tsebelis 2002) in which policy choices are shaped by the institutional 
self-interests and policy preferences of key decision makers in governments. Consequently, 
competing interests in budgetary decisions prevent those actors interested in reform from 
reaching agreement while leaving others the opportunity to opt out (Scharpf 2006). Such a 
situation is likely to arise when fundamental economic interests must be sacrificed, policy 
change requires an ideological commitment, or when institutional conflict exists. In the wake 
of exploding budgetary deficits throughout the developed world, we are witnessing all three 
phenomena on a magnified scale.   
In the G-20 countries, overall deficits increased by 4.7 and 3.9 percentage points of 
GDP respectively in 2012 and 2013, both in comparison to 2007 pre-crisis levels and 
discounting losses from financial sector support (IMF 2013). Many of these economies 
continue to implement strategies to contain public debt and cut deficits where possible. This 
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development is bound to intensify ideological differences between ministries with 
fundamentally different objectives. 
Development agencies in donor countries are traditionally constrained by other 
lawmakers and ministries higher up in government (Steinwand 2012). To give a concrete 
example, the House of Lords’ Economic Affairs Committee in the UK recently called for 
the government to abolish its promise to increase ODA to 0.7% of gross national income by 
2015. Similarly, Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives put forward concrete 
plans in the 2011 budget negotiations to drastically cut foreign assistance.  
Altruism tends to begin – and often ends - at home, especially in times of fiscal pressure. 
According to the literature on determinants of foreign aid, however, there is “no evidence of 
an association between the generosity ratio (ODA/GDP) and domestic pro-poor 
government spending, or that right-wing governments are more parsimonious than left-wing 
ones” (Round and Odedokun 2003 p. 20). Rather the role of institutional conflict in the 
form of vested bureaucratic interests in maintaining budget allocations presents a major 
challenge to reaching aid commitments.  
Bureaucracies tend to defend the status quo and, by definition, their turf (Vaubel 1986). 
Here aid agencies are at a perennial disadvantage compared to other government agencies, 
given foreign aid has no natural domestic constituency. Indeed there is abundant evidence 
that aid agencies are constrained by inter agency rivalry and actors higher up in the 
government (Steinwand 2012). This is all the more the case given that donor resources are 
scarce and providing aid is costly. In the United States, Germany and Japan different aspects 
of ODA assistance are constantly being shifted from one government agency to another 
(Lancaster 2007). As a result, agencies compete for resources. Congleton (1982) maintains 
that bureaucratic inertia becomes a self-perpetuating process and complicates dramatic 
changes from one budget year to another.10 
This implies little room to manoeuvre for development agencies which are constantly 
constrained by more powerful domestic interests claiming government resources. Given that 
objectives are fundamentally different, aligning calls for larger ODA budgets with fiscal 
conservatism in parliamentary budget decisions is therefore more than likely to end in hold 
                                                 
10 Similarly, Imbeau (1989) makes the case that institutional inertia is the key explanation for aid levels. 
Building on these findings, Breuning and Ishiyama (2003) confirm this view and argue that it is also the reason 
for the dispersion of aid. 
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up problems. Given the magnitude of public deficits in donor countries, fiscal austerity and 
competing interests at the national level are likely to intensify in the coming years. As a result, 
reaching the agreed ODA figure of 0.7% of GDP by 2015 is almost certainly not going to be 
achieved via traditional development finance channels. 
While free riding and institutional turf fighting make it difficult to scale up aid, 
Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) argue that aid is also given in a non-cooperative manner and 
thereby incurs high transaction costs. This is backed by the figures, which indicate that there 
is little evidence of cooperation. The starting point of our discussion therefore rests on the 
assumption that donors do not coordinate their aid efforts. Despite limited academic work 
on the topic, there exists a general consensus that much more needs to be done to improve 
coordination and counter the continued bilateralisation of aid (Steinwand 2010; Easterly 
2007; Frot et al 2010). 
Maxwell (2004) argues that the benefits of multilateral aid over bilateral aid include 
economies of scale, cost-effective procurement, less political interference, greater credibility 
in developing countries, as well as more democratic governance. Conversely, Djankov, 
Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2006) and Knack and Rahman (2007) demonstrate that the 
continued bilateralisation of aid has led to lower economic growth and poor institutional 
performance in recipient countries. What is more, with the increasing number of donor 
platforms and aid providers, administrative requirements are increasing, making it ever more 
difficult for local authorities to implement donor demands (Steinwand 2012). 
With a view to explaining the continued bilateralisation of aid, the underlying problem of 
vested interests also explains why aid continues to be so uncoordinated. Indeed, here free 
riding leads to the continued bilateralisation of aid efforts in the pursuit of own economic 
and strategic interests. Maxwell (2004) invokes the Prisoners Dilemma theory to help explain 
this phenomenon. Originally framed by Flood in 1948, the Prisoners Dilemma can be used 
to explain that for reasons of increasing coherence between donor approaches, reducing 
transaction costs and market failure, as well as assuring accountability one would expect that 
governments would want to channel aid multilaterally rather than bilaterally. However, given 
strong incentives for maintaining their bilateral modus operandi, this is not the case. Not 
only does the decision whether or not to provide aid depend on the context of donor 
interests, but so does the composition of the aid that is provided. Indeed, while the 
eradication of global poverty may be a shared moral endeavour and constitute a public good, 
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the previous sections highlighted that donors also provide foreign aid in the pursuit of their 
own national interest, i.e. to win commercial contracts, claim mineral resources, or gain 
strategic advantage over other countries. 
Both Germany and Japan used commercially oriented aid policies to assist their export 
driven economic recoveries following the end of World War II (Steinwand 2012). In 
Germany aid financing infrastructure projects benefitting the export of German products 
were given strong policy support throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In Japan a combination 
of oil shocks and agricultural shortages led to aid efforts targeted at securing access to raw 
materials. For instance, Japan targeted its bilateral aid towards infrastructure projects in oil 
producing countries such as Brazil (Lancaster 2007). This served both to gain access to raw 
materials as well as benefitting the competitive position of Japan’s industries and service 
providers via infrastructure and equipment purchases. 
Ultimately, entrenched political and economic interests in donor countries prevent an 
optimal use of development resources. Barder et al (2010 p. 12) maintain that “Everyone is 
better off when aid is untied from commercial interests...but each individual agency has an 
incentive to tie their own aid”. This leads them to conclude that “A system of coordination 
among the donors is needed to ensure that their actions are aligned with their collective 
interest in poverty reduction, and this is not undermined by pursuit of individual national 
interests” (Barder et al 2010 p. 12). 
In addition to free riding, institutional turf fighting, and prisoner’s dilemma problems of 
aid, the traditional aid architecture also suffers from legitimacy problems due its institutional 
arrangements. The concept of legitimacy in social sciences is indivisible from the work of the 
sociologist Weber who defined the term as “the phenomenon that people are willing to 
accept domination on normative grounds” (Steffek 2000 p. 5). It is the acceptance of a 
government as an authority. According to Franck (1988), the legitimacy of a ruler derives 
from the perception of the governed that the former has come to power through a fair 
process. For his part, Steffek emphasizes the requirement of justice in the outcomes. 11 
Skogstad amalgamates these two dimensions by introducing the distinction between input 
and output legitimacy (Skogstad 2002). 
                                                 




On the one hand, the ‘output’ legitimacy of a system defines its capacity to achieve the 
goals defined in its mandate and to solve citizens’ problems (Horeth 1999). In most cases 
these results are difficult to appreciate, implying that ‘output’ legitimacy can only address a 
narrow range of policy domains (Skogstad 2003). For instance, technocratic delegation 
within the EU (to the Commission or the European Central Bank) is viewed as legitimate if 
and to the extent that power is delegated to independent actors who have no incentive to do 
other than deliver the EU goals (as defined by the polity) with maximum efficiency.  
On the other hand, the ‘input’ legitimacy raises the question of the process by which 
authorities have come to power that is acceptable to the polity. The most common form of 
input legitimacy is the democratic election of representatives. Majone states that this form of 
legitimacy cannot be transferred from politically accountable principals to non-majoritarian 
institutions.12 Yet he adds that legitimacy can be considered as ‘indirect’ if it is subject to 
some substantive and procedural criteria, such as reporting obligation or the establishment 
of controls of the agent’s work (Majone 1999). 
The source of legitimacy plays an important role in the aid architecture too, providing 
important insights into the operational existence of bilateral and multilateral development 
actors. As it stands, the global aid architecture is often criticised for an apparent lack of 
output and input legitimacy (Najam 2002). For instance, while bilateral institutions are 
generally more accountable to national parliaments, 13 the output legitimacy of bilateral 
institutions invariably suffers from direct political pressures and national interests, reflected 
in inefficient practices such as tied aid (Barder et al 2010). Conversely, while some 
multilateral institutions are deemed to be efficient, they face problems of input legitimacy 
and trust because they are democratically unaccountable and dominated by G-7 countries 
(Lele, Sadik, and Simmons 2006). Consequently Barder et al (2010) maintain that in some 
aspects of aid governance there is a common trade-off between accountability and 
effectiveness. To give an example, while the DAC is recognized for its competent work in 
the area of statistics and reporting, it essentially remains a rich country club and, in part as a 
consequence, is more effective at keeping score than driving change. 
                                                 
12For instance, national development banks and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and European 
Commission. 
13Either via the democratic elections by which national development ministries are appointed or via indirect 
legitimacy and accountability of national development banks to national parliaments. 
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Empirically, however, Barder’s notion is not always true. Indeed, some of the major 
specialized UN organizations such as World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), and programs such as the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), enjoy indirect input legitimacy but their effectiveness is often questioned 
(DfID 2011). In addition, there has been a growing concern surrounding fiduciary 
responsibilities in development finance of late. One example is the European Court of 
Auditors criticism regarding Commission-managed budget support programs (EPHA 2009). 
Consequently it would be an oversimplification to analyse the traditional aid architecture 
along the lines of bilateral and multilateral sources of legitimacy. With the exception of the 
direct democratic legitimacy that nationally elected development ministries enjoy, both 
bilateral and multilateral institutions involve elements of delegated authority. While some 
represent classical agency relationship, others act in almost total independence (Majone 
2001). The key question here is the way in which authority is delegated. Indeed, transferring 
power from a democratically elected government (as is the case with most donor countries) 
to a non-majoritarian entity (i.e. bilateral or multilateral) has to do with the expected 
outcomes of such an operation.  
According to Majone, there are ‘two logics of delegation’. These logics differ in terms of 
the benefits researched by the delegating entity and lead to particular forms of relationship 
between the two bodies (Majone 2001). When the purpose of the delegation is mainly led by 
cost-reducing concerns, Majone refers to a principal-agent relationship. The main concern of 
the principal will be in that case to limit the agent’s autonomy by designing an adequate 
institutional framework with a balanced system of incentives and controls (ibid). The 
fiduciary relationship is an extreme case of the agency relationship theory. According to 
Majone: 
 
A fiduciary relationship exists where one person (the trustee) is obliged, or 
has undertaken, to act in relation to a particular matter in the interests of 
another and is entrusted with a power to affect those interests in a legal and 
practical sense, and where there is a special vulnerability of those whose 




It implies a total commitment of the agent – called the ‘trustee’ – to the goals of its 
principal – the ‘beneficiary’. All delegation of authority (that is, every principle-agent 
relationship) potentially invokes legitimacy issues.  
Consequently, various sources of legitimacy coexist, from the democratic legitimacy of 
parliaments to the indirect legitimacy of the World Bank or IMF, as well as hybrid cases. The 
European Commission, for instance, is deemed a hybrid case. The source of its legitimacy 
varies depending on the task it is completing. In areas where its power is delegated by the 
Council and controls are conducted by the ‘comitology committees’,14 the Commission can 
be considered as an agent of the Council. When it exercises its monopoly of initiative and 
enjoys its independence derived from the Treaties, the Commission can be viewed as the 
European Parliament’s and Council’s ‘trustee’ (Majone 2001). This is the case for the 
European Commission’s development policy, with the Directorate General for 
Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) operating as a largely independent body.15 While 
the output legitimacy of the EC is rather streamlined, there is an unambiguous lack of direct 
democratic legitimacy in the European Commission’s development practices (DfID 2011). 
Other bilateral and multilateral institutions face a similar set up: efficient in its results, 
however invariably lacking input legitimacy. This is particularly true for bilateral institutions 
such as the German Gesellschaft fuer Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and multilateral ones 
such as the World Bank of IMF. However, contrary to Majone, Longo (2004) holds that 
even if the concept of ‘legitimacy’ tends to take place in terms of democracy (i.e. via the 
democratic election of representatives) some decisions taken by non-elected bodies are still 
deemed as legitimate. This is the case when populations and governments accept to be 
regulated by a non-democratic institution as long as it respects its founding treaty, is 
controlled by a system of checks and balances, is successful in providing its outcomes, and 
complies with the rules of democratic accountability. 
                                                 
14The EU’s Comitology Committees oversee the delegated acts, which are implemented by the European 
Commission. 
15 EU development assistance is disbursed via multi-annual programmes which are coordinated by the 
European Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) Development and Cooperation (DEVCO). Since June 
2011 the old Development and Aid Cooperation DGs were merged into the new DEVCO/EuropeAid, and 
DG External Relations (RELEX) for the rest of the world. DEVCO is responsible for policy formulation at a 
global and sectoral scale, formulating development policy applicable to all developing countries, conducts 
forward looking studies to this end, and implements the programs funded under the budget. Finally, the 
Council plays an important role in approving allocations and strategies. 
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Hence whether democratic accountability and political independence may in fact be 
reconciled depends critically on the way in which non-majoritarian institutions, electorally 
accountable principals, and the general public are organized. Furthermore, because universal 
challenges are increasingly cutting across national, sector and donor agency boundaries, a 
more integrated view needs to consider the legitimizing elements that non-traditional, that is 
innovative fundraising and financial solutions bring to the table. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, new donor partnerships as well as new development actors, such as the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, not only contribute substantial finance and convening 
power, they may also enhance the input legitimacy of development aid by increasingly 
involving recipient country institutions as well as civil society via multi stakeholder 
governance systems. 
 
1.33 Selective Incentives: Overcoming Collective Action Problems 
 
Ultimately this thesis seeks to go beyond the application of the collective action theory on 
the traditional aid architecture, examining whether and how excessive turf fighting, 
administrative costs, and legitimacy problems can be addressed by the pursuit of innovative 
finance mechanisms for development. According to North (1991), the increase in 
transaction costs in the provision of a collective action necessitates institutions that reduce 
the risks of being cheated, either by raising the benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs 
of defection. Indeed, just as North, Olson (1965) previously argued that individuals in a 
group need selective incentive to overcome collective action problems. According to Olson: 
 
Only a separate and “selective” incentive will stimulate a rational individual in 
a group to act in a group oriented way. In such circumstances group action 
can be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not indiscriminately, 
like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather selectively 
toward the individuals in the group. (Olson 1965 p. 51). 
 
A positive selective incentive is therefore any reward that leaves the individual part of the 
collective group on a higher indifference curve than previously. Steinwand (2012) used data 
on bilateral official development aid from 15 OECD donors and 96 recipient countries from 
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1973 to 2007 to explore if selective incentives can help to alleviate the negative welfare 
effects of free-riding losses that are common to developmental aid. According to this study, 
selective incentives can reduce free-riding losses in some cases. Consequently, Steinwand 
argues that: 
 
The ability to satisfy self-interested goals provides donors with selective 
incentives to provide more developmental aid. This is because selective 
incentives reduce the marginal costs of providing aid of all forms. In an 
anarchic environment in which developmental aid is subject to collective 
action problems, this translates into higher equilibrium allocations for the 
donor who has the lowest marginal costs of providing developmental aid. 
(Steinwand 2012 p. 2) 
 
In building on the work of Steinwand, the thesis sets out to explore whether innovative 
financing modalities have the ability to increase the equilibrium allocations of aid delivery for 
donors by providing more value for money than traditional aid, thus increasing the benefits 
of cooperation, as well as raising the costs of defection. First, however, the following chapter 
will discuss the evolution of the aid effectiveness debate and provide an overview of the 


















2 The Evolution of Aid Effectiveness and the 
Choice of Aid Modalities  
 
 
Development assistance is a constantly evolving field characterized by a multitude of 
approaches and aid modalities. Having outlined some of the collective action problems of 
the traditional aid architecture, the aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the 
evolution of the aid effectiveness debate and to highlight some of the main drivers of change 
in donor aid strategies. This will provide the basis for the discussion surrounding the role of 
new aid modalities, and where they fit into the aid effectiveness evolution. Indeed, the 
current rethinking of aid modalities stems from past experiences with different modalities, 
changing priorities in donor countries, as well the emphasis on aid effectiveness and its role 
in development. With a view to understanding the relationship between aid, economic 
growth and poverty, this chapter will thus set out by looking at the research literature on aid 
effectiveness. The emerging consensus of this literature review suggests that aid can have a 
positive impact on growth and poverty alleviation, but that there are a multitude of factors 
which drive the evolution of aid modalities. Ultimately it finds that there is a potential to 
pursue new aid modalities to increase the harmonisation and coordination of aid, as well as 
to increasingly leverage private finance to enhance the effectiveness of donor assistance.  
 
2.1 Origins of Aid Debate and Project Aid: 1950s – 1980s 
 
The origin of modern development assistance has to be seen in the context of Post-World 
War II and the Cold War. Launched after the war in 1948, the U.S. funded Marshall Plan 
was a large-scale aid project which sought to strengthen links with Western European 
countries, creating market based democracies, and containing Soviet influence in the region. 
Soon thereafter a wave of decolonisation swept across the world. Notions of a ‘developed’ 
and ‘developing world’ emerged given marked differences in the levels of industrialisation 
between former colonial countries and the newly independent states. Colonial countries 
sought to maintain their sphere of influence in former colonies via economic and political 
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relations. At the same time international institutions created to support post-war European 
reconstruction shifted their focus to developing countries.  
Development aid became both a foreign policy tool as well as a way of supporting 
industrialisation in developing countries. The early literature on aid was thus strongly 
influenced by the experiences of post war European reconstruction projects such as the U.S. 
funded Marshall Plan. The general view that the early growth models supported was that aid 
has the ability to foster economic development by relaxing savings and foreign-exchange 
constraints, thereby allowing for capital formation and economic growth (Papanek 1972; 
Chenery and Strout 1966; Meier and Stiglitz 2001). According to these theories, capital 
scarcity was regarded as a key impediment to economic growth. Accordingly ODA was seen 
as a tool to escape economic stagnation and poverty by allowing for the necessary 
investments that would permit recipient countries to create a virtuous circle of productivity 
and growth.  
In line with these theories, it was believed that by simply calculating the financing gap 
required for targeted economic growth, donors could subsequently fill it with aid (Meier and 
Stiglitz 2001). Consequently a number of growth models were developed which came to be 
known as ‘gap theories’, the most well known of which was the Harrod-Domar growth 
model (Harrod 1948; Domar 1947). According to Harrod-Domar, filling the savings gap in 
developing countries with foreign aid was crucial for investment and fostering economic 
growth.16 
Based on this prevailing view, the “gap theories” prompted development agencies to 
provide credits and grants predominantly in the form of project aid (see Figure 2.1). 
Financed by the governments of donor countries and multilateral development agencies, 
project aid is a form of aid to finance specific activities with a limited objective, budget and 
timeframe to achieve specific results. Here donors identify a specific area of intervention for 
their involvement, and subsequently direct their funds for these activities. In line with the 
theory, the underlying assumption was that by financing projects such as roads, hospitals, or 
schools, donor agencies would free up savings in these countries, allowing for more 
investments and domestic financing to push economic growth. 
 
                                                 
16Additionally, Chenery and Strout (1966) recognised a foreign exchange gap, and Bacha (1990) and Taylor 
(1990) highlighted the role aid could play in relieving fiscal gaps in recipient countries.   
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Source: Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) and author. 
 
While development policy was significantly influenced by the gap theories, the on going 
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programs (Hjertholm et al 2000). Much of this aid was tied aid, requiring the recipient to 
spend a proportion of the aid given on goods and services produced by the donor nation 
(Gillies 1986). 
Within this context a number of empirical studies in the 1970’s found that while aid was 
flowing in to close the anticipated ‘capital bottlenecks’, economic growth did not follow suit 
(White 1992). Consequently these studies suggested that aid had either been displaced or had 
no impact on domestic savings. These results generated significant controversy and divided 
the lines of thinking into two opposing schools of thought: one which believed aid had an 
impact and another that believed it did not (Papanek 1972; Papanek 1973; Mosley, Hudson, 
and Horrell 1987). 
 
2.2 Structural Adjustment Programs: 1980s 
 
Part of the problem with the confusion surrounding the early research on aid was the 
overwhelming optimism of the gap theories with regard to aid effectiveness. Papanek (1972) 
branded the highly optimistic approach of these growth models as “curiously naïve”. In a 
subsequent paper Papanek (1973) argued that the focus in the aid-effectiveness debate 
should shift away from the aid savings relationship to examining the effects of aid on the 
various elements of investment and growth. Simultaneously donors started moving away 
from their modus operandi of project aid at the micro level. This was brought about by three 
factors. First, project aid was constrained in terms of “scalability”, meaning that what 
worked in one environment did not necessarily work in another, making it hard to replicate 
development outcomes. Second, the grants and loans transferred were essentially “fungible”, 
meaning that they could be used by the recipient government for purposes other than what 
they were meant for. Third, donors increasingly lamented the poor quality of the overall 
policy environment in the recipient countries as an obstacle (Ohno and Niiya 2004).  
While donors found the issue of scalability hard to overcome, they attempted to address 
the issues of fungibility and poor policy environment with the tool of aid conditionality for 
qualifying loans and grants. Consequently in the 1980s, large donor institutions such as the 
World Bank and the IMF endorsed ‘structural adjustment’ lending, with the objective of 
guiding developing countries towards economic development by adjusting their economic 
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policies and structures. These institutions argued that aid had not worked over the last three 
decades given the unfavourable economic policies in the recipient countries. Consequently 
there was a need to attach conditionalities to aid with a view to extracting the desired policy 
changes, ultimately allowing for growth and development (Ohno et al 2004).  
Structural adjustment, however, was also driven by balance of payment and debt 
problems in donor countries in the 1980s. Consequently Hjertholm et al (2000) argue that 
the emergence of adjustment lending was not a response to a development crisis, but rather 
a response to the imminent risk of financial crisis in developed countries. The subsequent 
focus on macroeconomic policy gave the World Bank and the IMF a central role in driving 
their policy agenda, henceforth referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’. 
Conditioning aid in return for explicit negotiated commitments to reform meant that 
policy change was the price that recipient governments, in effect, paid in exchange for aid. 
Moreover, with the introduction of structural adjustment operations, the use of project aid 
decreased substantially while the share of program aid increased drastically. The share of 
project aid given by the World Bank declined from 82% to 48% during 1980-1996, while 
that of program aid rose from 2% to 23% over the same period (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000 
p. 132). However, while the World Bank and the IMF were drastically pushing this new aid 
modality, empirical research on the macroeconomic effects of aid remained ambiguous, as 
did the views expressed in the aid literature with regard to its effect on growth and 
development (Mosley et al 1987). Whereas many micro or project related studies found a 
positive impact of aid, most macro related studies found no clear evidence regarding the 
impact of aid on growth. This prompted Mosley et al (1987) coin the oft-cited term ‘micro-
macro paradox’ of aid.  
By the early 1990s the general consensus in the aid literature was that program aid 
released on the promise of policy change backed by the threat of withholding aid was 
ineffective. Even the World Bank recognized that structural adjustment did not bring about 
the growth it predicted (World Bank 1990, World Bank 1992). In hindsight, problems with 
failed policy conditionality are unsurprising. Donors and agencies presumed that heavy-
handed conditionality on a set of policies would ‘make development happen’. In reality, 
however, this approach severely undermined ownership of national development efforts. 
According to Collier, Guillaumont, and Guillaumont (1997), if donors “bought” reforms via 
program aid, they become the owners. This created incentive problems for the recipient 
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government to fully commit to an externally imposed development strategy. Indeed in many 
recipient countries the reaction was one of rejection rather than acceptance of the 
conditionalities (World Bank 2005). What is more, in several cases the pace and depth at 
which structural adjustment policies were pushed through did more harm than good (Herbst 
1990; Cornia and Helleiner 1994). The general objective of these policies was to reduce the 
recipient country’s fiscal imbalances in the short and medium term to adjust the economies 
to long-term growth. However the heavy cuts in social expenditure programs that were often 
a part of structural adjustment led to social unrest and political instability and did not 
unleash the economic growth it had promised. Ultimately this cemented the consensus that 
structural adjustment aid had been a failure and that a new approach to aid effectiveness was 
necessary. 
 
2.3 New Conditionalities, Ownership and Budget Support: 1990s 
 
The policy failure of structural adjustment lending in recipient countries in the 1980s led to 
significant changes in aid delivery in the 1990s. Indeed a number of new trends emerged. 
Initially the failure of structural adjustment programs led to a change in conditionality in the 
early 1990s. Donor institutions recognised that they would have to switch from “buying” a 
predefined set of policies on an ex ante basis, to an ex post conditionality based on a 
periodic assessment of government achievements (Collier et al 1997). 
The early 1990s also brought about the end of the Soviet Union and thus the end of the 
Cold War. Eastern European countries shifted from being aid donors to new recipients. Aid 
levels began to drop as donors were moving away from supporting ‘friendly regimes’ to 
focusing on governance (Hjertholm et al 2000). New interests and obligations as a result of 
the geopolitical reshuffling meant that recipients now had to compete for the financial 
resources of industrialised countries.   
By the mid 1990s, new studies in the aid literature and past experiences of donor 
agencies led to a number of profound shifts in aid modalities. First, donors moved from 
‘stand-alone’ projects to project ‘clustering,’ often in the form of pooling funds under sector 
development programs. According to Ohno et al (2004), stand-alone projects had largely 
fallen out of favour due to coordination problems, high transaction costs of aid delivery, 
under budgeting for re-current expenditures, and off-budget systems undermining the 
 
 32 
effectiveness of government systems and accountability. Consequently, under the new sector 
programs major donors provided support within an agreed sector framework, coordinated 
by the recipient government.  
The second shift was from structural adjustment operations to General Budget Support 
(GBS). The EU defines budget support as “the transfer of financial resources of an external 
financing agency to the national treasury of a recipient country, following the respect by the 
latter of agreed conditions for payment” (EC 2008b p. 10). 17  The monetary resources 
obtained are thus part of the global resources of the recipient country and consequentially 
used in line with the public financial management rules of that recipient country. Not only 
does this increase the partner countries’ resources, it also allows for budgetary 
implementation according to its own procedures.  
Boone (1996) was instrumental in setting off the aid-effectiveness debate that 
contributed to this shift. Using panel data of 91 countries between 1971-1990, Boone 
demonstrated that instead of increasing investments benefitting the poor, foreign aid had led 
to rise in government consumption. Consequently a series of studies found that aid 
effectiveness critically depends on the institutions and policies of recipient countries (World 
Bank 1998). In the years that followed, a newfound optimism emerged in the aid literature. 
The ensuing narrative was one which emphasized that aid works, but only if policies were 
right, highlighting the role of local institutions, selectivity, and ownership. For their part, 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) found that while aid had little effect on countries with poor 
policies, its impact on growth in countries with healthy monetary, fiscal, and trade policies 
was positive. Not only did this represent a fundamental change in the aid debate, but these 
findings also helped address the “micro-macro paradox”, explaining why aid can be effective 
at the project level, while leaving no impact at the macro level (Robinson and Tarp 2000).  
In terms of donor policy, structural adjustment was thus seen to increasingly isolate aid 
efforts from local realities, undermining local ownership and capacity, and ultimately 
obstructing development progress. The subsequent shift was therefore an effort to 
overcome the weaknesses of structural adjustment programs, moving towards more 
                                                 
17There are variations of budget support, such as general budget support and sector budget support. While 
both represent a transfer to the national treasury of a partner country, the former supports a national 
development or reform strategy and the latter supports a sector policy or strategy. Contrary to general budget 
support, sector budget support typically concerns one particular sector, and can address in a more focused 
manner the specific needs of this particular sector or reform. These different objectives are consequently 
reflected in the conditions and negotiations between the Commission and its partner countries. 
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progressive aid modalities in the form of budget support and sector development programs. 
Nonetheless, questions remained in the aid literature and among policymakers about the 
quality, value for money, impact and fiduciary risk of budget support (Ohno et al 2004). 
Often considered the “gold standard” of aid modalities, budget support is also the most 
demanding for both partner countries and donors alike and is highly contested in 
parliaments of donor countries. What is more, for donor agencies the impact of budget 
support is difficult to measure and it creates inherent contradictions between the incentives 
that agencies face in promoting ownership by recipients and the incentives they face in 
retaining control of their development interventions (Ohno et al 2004). These concerns 
together with a shift in the aid effectiveness literature prompted an entirely new 
development agenda to emerge at the turn of the millennium. 
 
2.4 Results Based Financing and the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness: 2000s 
 
The ambiguity regarding the impact of aid on growth and poverty alleviation in the 1980s 
and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s led donors to scale down the volume of their 
commitments. However in the year 2000 a global event brought about a significant reversal 
of this trend. Riding on the wave of strong economic growth throughout the 1990s, the 
Millennium Development Goals saw world leaders agreed to a new set of development 
targets and commitments. The MDGs comprised a common set of development goals to be 
achieved by the year of 2015. According to Amprou and Guillaumont (2007), the aid debate 
subsequently became dominated by the ‘big push’ thesis. As part of his work for the United 
Nations Millennium Project, Sachs (2005) became the key advocate of this approach, 
emphasizing the need to scale up aid commitments to fill the financing gap to achieve the 
MDGs. 
Sachs’ campaign became instrumental to the renewed level of commitment of donors to 
scale up aid. Following the Millennium Summit in 2000, the first international conference on 
financing for development was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002. The Monterrey 
Consensus was a milestone in development policy. Between 2002 and 2006, Monterrey 
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spawned increased ODA commitments, new initiatives in Gleneagles and Barcelona, debt 
relief, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
The momentum created by these events set off a number of fundamental changes in the 
aid architecture. Most notably, two main features have begun to take shape (Bourguignon et 
al 2007). First, one line of research on aid effectiveness increasingly emphasized the need for 
more alignment and harmonization of aid, as the MDG campaign contributed to a rapidly 
growing institutional aid architecture (see Figure 2.2). Since the advent of international 
development assistance, resources had predominantly been channelled from donor states to 
recipient governments through bilateral aid programs. A portion of these resources were 
pooled between donor countries, and delivered via a few multilateral organisations. Since the 
early 2000s, however, a large variety of public, private and hybrid actors have come on the 
scene, each delivering a growing variety of public goods.  
 
Figure 2.2: International Development Assistance Then and Now 
 
Source: Severino and Ray (2009) and author. 
 
The fragmentation of aid efforts led to a surge in compliance costs for recipient 
governments and increased aid volatility. Balogun (2005) argued that aid harmonisation 
between donors needs to be considered a major requisite for aid effectiveness, reducing 
transaction costs and increasing efficiency of aid delivery for donors and recipients alike. 
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According to Bigsten (2006), the cost of aid delivery in particular had become a hot topic. 
Moreover, Bourguignon et al (2007) emphasized that:  
 
Aid flows are more volatile than public revenues, which, with imperfect 
credit markets, undermine long-term investment planning. The need to 
improve aid quality and redesign delivery systems to improve aid 
‘harmonization and alignment’ is now widely recognized. (Bourguignon et al 
2007 p. 7)18 
 
Against this backdrop the harmonization of procedures came to the forefront of the aid 
debate. In order to ensure the maximum impact of aid, policymakers and academics 
highlighted the need for donor efforts to be aligned and harmonized. Consequently, the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness saw over one hundred ministers, heads of 
development agencies and other senior officials commit their countries and organizations to 
increasing efforts on aid effectiveness. The outcome included the commitment to twelve 
indicators of progress on ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and 
mutual accountability.19 This included commitments to harmonise ODA, adapt it better to 
the recipient country's development strategy, reduce transaction costs and bureaucratic 
procedures, untie aid, as well as grant ODA increasingly as direct budget support.20 
Almost a decade after the formulation of the twelve indicators, progress on the Paris 
Declaration has been subject to considerable criticism by academics and policymakers. Not 
only has progress been slow, however, the lack of compliance mechanisms meant that policy 
goals could be overruled by organisational goals of donor institutions. What is more, Lackert 
(2009) believes that commercial interests of donor countries have prevented donors from 
fully implementing the Paris principles. Finally, the original methodology has also been 
subject to criticism. A recent UNDP (2014) press release argues that the targets look more at 
the bureaucratic process of aid rather than the actual impact it has on reducing poverty.  
                                                 
18 With regard to aid volatility, Lensink and Morrissey (2000) examine the relationship between volatile aid and 
aid effectiveness. According to their study, aid can contribute to higher growth, however aid effectiveness is 
adversely affected by volatile aid flows. 
19 See Part II of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005).  
20 A follow-up conference to the Paris Declaration was held in Accra, Ghana, in September 2008, vowing to 
adopt further steps to improve the quality of ODA. 
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The second feature which began to take shape following the Millennium Summit in 2000 
was that donors began putting an increasing emphasis on allocation of ‘performance based 
aid’. Due to the disillusionment with policy conditionality of previous aid modalities, donors 
sought a new form of performance based (or outcome-based) conditionality. Consequently 
aid was tied to pre-defined performance indicators which aimed to address numerous 
aspects of development effectiveness. The idea was to make aid dependent on measurable 
development outcomes such as child mortality, poverty reduction, and literacy rates, as well 
as on the discernible quality of development policies. This approach promised to avoid many 
of the pitfalls of policy conditionality and was consistent with the desire for development 
assistance to show results in the lead up to the 2015 MDG targets. In keeping with the Paris 
principles of aid effectiveness, aid was increasingly aligned with country performance targets, 
thus promoting ownership and aid predictability. Furthermore, more aid was channelled via 
budget support rather than tying it to specific projects or policies. 
Yet performance based aid modalities come with their own set of potential problems 
(Bourguignon et al 2007). First, both recipients and donors face a time consistency problem. 
If the targets are defined over too short of a period, then successful projects may be seen as 
a failure. What is more, aid volatility and unpredictability make long run planning of public 
expenditure a daunting task. This is particularly true for interventions that require recurrent 
expenditures (i.e. health and education). Conversely if the targets are defined over too long a 
period, then the recipient government may not be inclined to perform well, given the lack of 
incentive to do so. Second, deciding how to balance the allocation of aid on a performance 
basis or needs basis is a problem. While rewarding good performance provides the right kind 
of incentives to recipients, it could potentially lead to a situation in which a limited number 
of countries which are already doing well receive the assistance. On the other hand 
addressing the greatest need would use donor assistance in countries with corrupt and poor 
policy environments, most probably rendering it ineffective. Therefore Bourguignon et al 
argue that while a balance is necessary, “incentive constraints may impose limits on 




2.5 Growing Dichotomy in Aid Debate and Innovative Financing for 
Development: Current Aid Architecture 
 
The current aid landscape has seen traditional development aid come under increasing 
pressure. In the wake of the recent financial crisis, donor countries have seen renewed fiscal 
pressures which may have long-term effects on their ability and willingness to provide aid 
(Dang, Knack, and Rogers 2009). Simultaneously the aid effectiveness debate remains 
contentious. Since the inception of development assistance in the 1950s the focus has been 
on whether more aid leads to better outcomes, particularly in terms of higher growth. Yet in 
a meta-analysis survey of 97 different studies in the literature, Bourguignon (2007) finds that 
the impact of aid on growth appears to be small, if not insignificant.  
Given the multi-dimensionality of development objectives and the trouble of measuring 
the counterfactual of aid (i.e. no aid), opinions remain divided. Hence, while Easterly (2006) 
holds that aid has had no impact on growth for its largest recipient, Africa, Collier (2006) 
believes that growth would have been far worse in the absence of aid. Consequently there 
has been a growing dichotomy in the current aid architecture regarding the role of aid in 
development and growth. Severino and Ray (2009) argue that traditional ODA is an 
outdated concept which is not suited to the current metamorphosis of the development 
cooperation landscape. Even more radically, Moyo (2009) presents her book as the story of 
the failure of post-war development policy, and proposes an alternative in the form of aid-
free market-based solutions to development problems. She strongly criticises the current aid-
based approach, highlighting the vicious cycle of corruption, market distortions and poverty 
it has fuelled in aid-dependent countries. Moyo believes that in order to succeed and escape 
the mire of poverty and despair, African countries need to put an end to their aid 
dependency, shifting to an alternative strategy. 
Conversely, Riddell (2007) argues the fundamental question in the current aid discourse 
is not ‘Does aid work?’, but much rather ‘How can aid be made more effective?’. He goes on 
to argue that if enhancing the effectiveness of aid were to become the principal question in 
the aid discourse, then the justification for providing development aid will be considerably 
enhanced if its effectiveness is improved. In analysing the current architecture, Riddell 
classifies three categories of problems with aid caused by donors. First, distortions caused by 
the political, strategic and commercial interests of donors. Second, aid volumes, volatility and 
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voluntarism in the provision of aid, and third, the multiplicity of donors and aid funds 
programs and projects. On the recipient end he identifies problems of commitment, capacity, 
ownership and governance.  
While the literature generally agrees that there is a need to increase the effectiveness of 
aid and restructure aid delivery mechanisms to improve aid harmonization and alignment, it 
seems highly unlikely that traditional aid channels will be able to do so. A number of studies 
highlight that foreign aid is focused heavily on a few countries, highly fragmented and 
volatile, inconsistent with other policy areas, and suffers from legitimacy concerns (OECD 
2008; Lele et al 2006; Barder 2010). Furthermore, as outlined above, Bourguignon et al 
(2007) and Riddell (2007) argue that both donors and recipients suffer from high negotiation 
and transaction. For donors this implies time and resources spent in reaching compromises, 
while for recipients it entails coping with an increasingly complex and challenging system.  
In the wake of the financial crisis and the global economic recession, aid needs to play an 
important countercyclical role, ensuring that financial flows to developing countries are 
somewhat balanced. Indeed ODA and FDI have successfully provided countercyclical 
financing during previous financial crises.21 Yet Bulir and Hamann (2005) find that aid is 
pro-cyclical with both donor and recipient incomes and conclude that rather than cushioning 
economic shocks, aid often represents another element of instability.22 
Driven by poor economic growth and resource shortages in donor countries, the period 
following the 2008 financial crisis has thus seen a new focus in donor aid strategies: 
innovative financing for development. The concept of innovative finance and its current 
terminology is relatively recent. While certain mechanisms, such as a tax on international 
financial transactions, had been suggested as early as the 1970’s, the broadly defined concept 
of innovative finance in the context of development coordination originated in the mid 
1990s (United Nations 1995). Yet the emphasis on traditional ODA remained overwhelming. 
Only after the UN conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (Mexico) in 
2002 did donor governments first recognize the need for additional financial resources in the 
conference outcome document (United Nations 2002). 
                                                 
21One example is after the Mexican debt crisis in 1982. While commercial lending had substantially dropped for 
about a decade, aid flows had risen slightly over the same period, thereby playing an important countercyclical 
role and maintaining financial flows to Latin America.  
22This is consistent with the findings of the OECD (2012), who highlight that aid to developing countries 
dropped by 3% in 2011 largely as a result of the economic crisis in donor countries. 
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Following the Monterrey Conference, the development community set out to find 
‘innovative’ or alternative sources of development finance with a view to furthering 
development efforts. Yet innovative financing as realistic policy tools only received 
significant attention following the financial crisis in 2008. In the wake of ballooning fiscal 
deficits in donor countries, sovereign and private donors started supporting a large variety of 
innovative initiatives with the aim of leveraging additional development finance. 
Development banks increasingly issued novel bonds that tie resource mobilisation to 
development objectives, while new foundations and private actors were entering the stage 
too (Maxwell 2013).23 
Simultaneously recipient countries have been changing too. Rapid economic growth in 
the developing world has transformed formerly poor countries such as Indonesia, China, and 
Brazil into Middle Income Countries (MICs).24 While these countries have largely outgrown 
traditional aid, they are home to 72% of the world poorest people and face persistent social 
problems (Lalatta-Costerbosa, Schetelig, and Gomez 2013). Consequently MICs have been 
pursuing financial solutions that better meet their needs, i.e. risk mitigation efforts that 
promote private investment, partnerships that mobilize private money for public service 
delivery, as well as support for carbon trading (see Figure 2.3). 
Certainly, on the whole, the emergence of new donors and creditors, both public and 
private, was a welcome development. Indeed, one of the positive aspects resulting from the 
emergence of new actors has been an increase in funding available for environmental and 
social protection arrangements in the event of exogenous shocks. What is more, the relative 
importance of private financial flows to developing countries has changed considerably in 
last thirty years, having grown substantially. The figures speak volumes. Alone between 1998 
and 2010, net private flows to the developing world increased from US$ 193.4 billion to 
US$ 659 billion (United Nations 2010a p. 72). Yet as new options are being explored, 
questions regarding the value and complementarity of these modalities are being raised. 
Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent innovative aid modalities can be reconciled with the 
                                                 
23Emerging donors are also becoming more active. Particularly China is becoming increasingly involved. In fact 
they provided more loans (predominantly in Africa) than the World Bank between 2008 and 2010. 
Furthermore, the Heritage Foundation estimated that about 14% of China’s investment abroad between 2005 
and 2010 went to Sub-Saharan Africa (Scissors 2011).  
24Defined by the World Bank as countries whose annual per capita gross national income ranges from $1,026 
to $12,475 (Lalatta-Costerbosa et al 2013). 
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aid effectiveness criteria as established by the Paris Declaration. It is within this context that 
the next chapter will introduce the role of innovative finance mechanisms for development. 
 
Figure 2.3: Innovative Instruments Available 
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3 Innovative Financing for Development 
 
 
To many observers, the way development partners do business has undergone an important 
shift following the emergence of innovative financing mechanisms and vertical development 
funds. Here, however, a reality check may be in order. Indeed it is worth noting that the 
term ‘innovative financing’ has become a popular ‘catch-all’ phrase which should be used 
with caution. As will be discussed below, what exactly constitutes innovative financing is still 
poorly defined and could potentially be ‘old wine in new bottles’. Consequently some of 
these instruments may have existed for some time, but have simply grown in importance 
over the last years. Nonetheless, even if some of the instruments had been previously 
discussed, it is only now that their full potential is being considered. The aim of this chapter 
is thus to introduce the concept of innovative finance in general, and innovative blending in 
particular. Following a brief overview of the heterogeneous mix of innovative finance 
mechanisms that exist, the chapter will outline the evolution of catalytic aid and define the 
main drivers behind the emergence of innovative blending.  
Ultimately the resurgence of catalytic aid in the form of blending mechanisms raises a 
key question: do these mechanisms actually provide more value for money for donor aid 
spent? Although preliminary analysis of blending mechanisms exists, more in depth 
empirical evaluation is necessary to determine their benefits and risks. 
 
3.1 Defining Innovative Finance for Development 
 
Given innovative financing only emerged as a credible policy tool in the last decade, there is 
still no consensus concerning its definition. Depending on whom one asks, innovative 
financing for development can mean different things. That being said, the World Bank 
(2009) has laid out a definition which defines innovative finance as any financing approach 
that helps to:   
 
i. Generate additional development funds by tapping new funding sources or by 
engaging new partners; 
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ii. Enhance the efficiency of financial flows, by reducing delivery time and/or costs, 
especially for emergency needs and in crisis situations; 
iii. Make financial flows more results-oriented, by explicitly linking funding flows to 
measurable performance on the ground. 
With a view to promoting a comprehensive understanding of innovative financing, this 
thesis adopts the World Bank’s definition (see Figure 3.1 for examples). 
 
Figure 3.1: Defining Innovative Development Financing 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) and author. 
  
As the definition above indicates, what makes these instruments innovative is not only 
financial originality in itself. What sets them apart is their departure from the traditional 
approach to development finance. First, in terms of mobilising, traditional aid is typically 
generated via budget disbursements from sovereign donors or the issuance of bonds by 
national and multilateral development banks exclusively. Innovative financing in contrast 
seeks to tap into new funding sources either from new levies or by engaging new partners 
for development. Potential contributors include citizens, corporations, equity funds, 
governments (in industrialised, emerging and developing countries), and multilateral 
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through government channels as they have the capacities to implement meaningful 
development aid programs. Consequently new sources of financing should ideally 
complement, rather than substitute, government funding.  
Second, in terms of channelling, most government aid is channelled via traditional aid 
channels such as project aid and budget support. This is often a cumbersome process 
characterised by a lack of coordination between stakeholders involved and a heavy handed 
donor approach in terms of implementation and oversight (Maxwell 2004). Innovative ways 
of channelling assistance may thus involve new forms of multi-stakeholder governance 
structures, increasing the efficiency of financial flows by reducing delivery time and/or costs. 
As noted by Lui, Byiers, and Steres: 
 
In some cases the ‘innovative’ element in current thinking reveals itself most 
is in an apparent willingness to move largely beyond traditional conceptions 
of the different sources of development finance working largely in isolation 
from each other, to how they might be combined to greater effect. (Lui, 
Byiers, and Steres 2012 p. 9) 
 
Third, in terms of targeting, donors could find powerful ways to unlock the value of 
their money by examining particular market inefficiencies of specific sectors that can benefit 
from development aid. Innovative solutions in this context surround ways to better target 
assistance to meet the needs of recipients. For instance, small and medium-size enterprises in 
developing economies are often underfunded because they typically are too small for 
commercial lending but too large for microcredit financing. There could be an opportunity 
for multiple players to collaborate in the creation of a set of financial instruments to target 
and serve this segment. 
As will be outlined in a brief overview below, the World Bank (2009) goes on to 
distinguish between financial solutions on the ground and innovative fund-raising efforts. 
Here innovations offer a wide range of financial instruments, products and services via 
financial engineering efforts.25   
                                                 
25The selection of instruments by the donor community includes cash instruments (such as loans, grants, and 
securities), risk mitigation mechanisms (such as swaps, guarantees, loans and securities), conditional/results 
based instruments, as well as advisory services (World Bank 2009).   
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Finally, while some define innovative finance as being complementary to ODA (i.e. the 
Leading Group),26 others advocating the ODA plus approach see it as a part of the wider 
ODA category. Yet there is still some confusion surrounding what the range of innovative 
financial resources mean in terms of recording flows. Within the OECD’s recording of 
‘official’ development flows, statistics now show a category for ‘Other Official Flows’ 
(OOF). These figures, which include non-concessional loans from bilateral and multilateral 
donors and fall outside the strict criteria for defining aid, already represent a significant 
source of development finance. That being said, this thesis advocates the emergence of 
mechanisms that can become a complementary form of assistance to traditional donor 
institutions and ultimately can be considered part of the wider ODA category. Nonetheless, 
whether innovative mechanisms can be classified as ODA depends on the instrument and 
ODA accounting guidelines in question. 
 
3.2 What Options do Donors Have? 
 
As was mentioned above, this thesis distinguishes between financial solutions on the ground 
and innovative fund-raising efforts. Within these, the international landscape is made up of 
broadly four types of innovative finance mechanisms: private, solidarity, public-private, and 
catalytic mechanisms (World Bank 2009). Of these four instruments, solidarity, public-
private and catalytic mechanisms rely on official flows and/or regulatory arrangements 
undertaken by public authorities. These Innovative Finance Mechanisms (IFMs) are then 
employed to support global or country efforts via financial engineering (see Figure 3.2).  
Here it is worth noting that not all of these innovative mechanisms are relevant to every 
context. Indeed, institutional development and depth of financial sectors are key in 
determining the feasibility of innovative fundraising and financial solutions. As outlined 
above, some MICs have established well functioning financial markets and financial 
institutions, allowing for donor organisations to work with established financial 
intermediaries. In theory this should allow for a broader range of aid delivery mechanisms 
                                                 
26The Leading Group was created following the Paris Conference on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. It is a global 
inter-agency platform made up of 55 member countries, international organisations and NGOs. Coordinated 
by the French Foreign Ministry, the Leading Group seeks to promote the implementation and definition of 
innovative financing for development. 
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with a view to attracting foreign capital and driving productive investment projects. This is 
consistent with the work of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2004), and Honohan (2005), 
who have shown that countries with more complex and developed financial intermediaries 
experience faster declines in measures of poverty and income inequality, highlighting that the 
development of financial markets and institutions is helpful in reducing poverty. On the 
contrary, political economy theories of financial development highlight that in countries 
where a narrow elite controls the political processes, financial access and development will 
be obstructed (Girma, Greenaway, and Kneller 2004). 
 
Figure 3.2: Sub-Sections of Innovative Finance Mechanisms 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) and author. 
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While the aim of this thesis is not to review the various IFMs in use, nor to determine 
the institutional preconditions for each mechanism under proposal, Appendix B provides a 
comprehensive overview of innovative aid delivery mechanisms. Furthermore, in line with 
the delineation mentioned above, the following is an overview of the IFM landscape. First, 
private mechanisms are made up of private-to-private flows in civil society and the markets. 
Two examples of purely private fundraising initiatives include traditional philanthropy 
(voluntary contributions) and blended value investing (mixing profit maximising with 
philanthropic objectives). While philanthropy offers only a small tax return for the donor, 
private giving has generated considerable development sources over recent years, with 
estimates ranging from US$17 billion from DAC donors in 2001 to US$ 34 billion by the 
United States only in 2007 (Girishankar 2009 p. 82). Given these trends, it is suggested that 
charitable giving holds great potential to contribute to socially or environmentally beneficial 
causes in member countries of the OECD.27 
Second, solidarity mechanisms involve sovereign-to-sovereign transfers and represent 
the main pillar of bilateral and multilateral ODA. With a view to generating new solidarity 
funds, donors are increasingly looking to new global development levies. The idea behind 
global taxes is to allow for additional and predictable long-term funding to donor 
governments and institutions. Most global tax proposals are designed to produce a “double 
dividend”: generate added finance and, simultaneously, offset a global public bad. Over 
recent years a variety of global taxes have been suggested. This includes environmental taxes 
such as carbon and aviation taxes, as well as a Currency Transaction Tax (CTT). Further 
examples include charity lotteries, debt swaps, and counter-cyclical lending.  
Third, public-private mechanisms mobilize or leverage private money for public service 
delivery as well as other government functions. Over the last 30 years there has been a vast 
increase in the range of options for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). PPPs for both new 
and existing services nowadays come in a variety of shapes and forms. These may range 
from service or management contracts, where a private company receives compensation for 
providing a public service, to privatization and outright sale of government assets to a 
private company. Another prevalent option is outsourcing, where a private company may be 
responsible for handling an aspect of the service. More recently, however, the emergence of 
                                                 




a wide variety of investors and operators in emerging markets with local expertise has 
prompted an explosive growth in the field of hybrid PPP models. Such models are 
frequently based on simple contractual agreements and generally blend private and public 
finance to spread risks. One example of an innovative PPP solution is Future Flow 
Securitization. Securitization of future receivables has the ability to improve a developing 
countries’ access to international capital markets, using securitization of future-flows to raise 
significant bond financing. In theory such a transaction works on the basis of the borrower 
pledging future foreign-currency receivables as collateral to a special purpose vehicle (Ratha 
2008). These future receivables may include remittances, oil, or airline ticket receivables. On 
the basis of a legal agreement between the borrower and correspondent customers and 
banks, this special purpose vehicle then issues the debt while the future receivables are 
directly deposited in an offshore collection account handled by a trustee. Ultimately the debt 
is serviced from this account, and any additional/surplus collections are channelled to the 
borrower.28 
Fourth, catalytic mechanisms aim to drive private sector development by providing 
public support, i.e. by reducing risks to private entry. One particularly relevant example is 
that of Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs). Advanced market commitments are 
innovative in the sense that they join market-based financing tools with public intervention. 
An AMC is essentially a multi-stakeholder agreement to guarantee a viable market for the 
development of a product that has social benefit, i.e. a vaccine or medicine. It works on the 
basis of a binding contract offered by a government or other financial actor. As such, AMCs 
tackle an enduring development problem: consistent private sector failure to research and 
develop products which are needed in developing countries owing to perceptions of 
insufficient demand and risk. AMCs may also promote multilateral policy coherence. By 
making use of the AMCs global governance body, the decision making process effectively 
circumvents national interest and lobbying powers, while simultaneously bringing together 
parties with opposing interests (pharmaceutical firms, donors, recipients, as well as Non 
Governmental Organisations). By promoting interest accommodation, this multi stakeholder 
                                                 
28 Further examples of innovative PPPs include indexed bonds, ODA frontloading, as well as sovereign 
catastrophe risk financing. 
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approach may strengthen multilateral coherence and help escape the usual agency 
competition logic.29 
Ultimately, while several innovations demonstrate potential, uncertainties remain about 
others. For example, intricate financial engineering and new governance structures could 
incur high costs which would directly offset the benefits that some mechanisms promise. 
Innovative fundraising initiatives should therefore be evaluated in terms of their capacity to 
generate suitable financing in a predictable manner at the minimum risk and cost. 
Furthermore, financial solutions on the ground should be analysed with regard to their 
ability to efficiently and effectively deliver development outcomes or targets. 
 
3.3 Tailor Made Assistance: Innovative Blending Mechanisms 
 
According to the UNDP’s 2010 International Assessment on the MDG progress, the next 
years will serve as a test run for ideas that work, and those that do not (UNDP 2010). While 
there are many innovative mechanisms that show great potential, the benefits vary 
depending on the instrument in question and the context in which they are used. 
Furthermore, some mechanisms operate outside the sphere of sovereign donors, limiting the 
ability of traditional donors to adopt these instruments as complementary policy tools. Other 
mechanisms may also confront donor institutions with numerous challenges, i.e. fungibility 
of funds, 30  complex administrative set-ups, inter-temporal choice problems, as well as 
possible market distortions. Hence, rather than exploring the potential of each of the 
mechanisms under discussion, the aim of this thesis is to focus on one specific innovative 







                                                 
29 Further examples of catalytic mechanisms include innovative patent solutions, as well as carbon funds and 
blending mechanisms. 
30Funds that are not earmarked and can be redirected to non-developmental purpose. 
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3.31 Functioning and Scope: What is Blending? 
 
Blending mechanisms refer to the practice of blending loans and grants to increase the 
volume and impact of development finance.31 Blending arrangements are essentially catalytic 
aid mechanisms allowing donor institutions to push their development objectives via new 
financing channels (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Loan Grant Blending 
 
 
Keeping in line with the World Bank definition of innovative development financing, 
Blending is in theory innovative in a number of ways. First, it aims to generate additional 
development funds by tapping new funding sources or by engaging new partners. As will be 
discussed in the empirical evaluation, these innovative structures should allow donors to 
offer a wide variety of financial instruments which would otherwise be pursued by donors or 
Development Finance Institutions (DFI) individually, or not at all. Second, blending seeks to 
enhance the efficiency of financial flows, by reducing delivery time and/or costs, especially 
for emergency needs and in crisis situations. And third, blending mechanisms seek to make 
financial flows more results-oriented by explicitly linking funding flows to measurable 
performance on the ground (Ferrer and Behrens 2011). Whether this is also true in practice 
will be analysed in detail by the empirical case study. 
                                                 
31Grants are transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment from the recipient is required. 
Loans are transfers for which repayment of principal and interests by the recipient is required (ECDPM 2011). 
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Blending allows donors to push their development objectives via the private sector by 
making use of the multi-stakeholder governance structures which typically involve lending 
institutions and private investors. By combining donor grants with loans and channelling 
these via international or local lending institutions, donor agencies address a long standing 
market failure: the unwillingness of private lending institutions to lend to certain projects or 
a certain segment of the market due to risk perception. Here donor grant finance shoulders 
some of the initial risk which lenders would not have been willing to take on in the first 
place. Thus blending reduces the risk of projects, allowing sub-investment grade projects to 
become bankable. 
In terms of financing structure, Blending typically follows one of the following two 
arrangements:  
 Parallel co-financing, when funding partners contribute separately to a given project 
or programme; 
 Joint co-financing, when funding partners contribute in a joint pooled structure for a 
given project or programme. 
It is via the associated financing structure which includes funding from third parties 
(public, private, and the beneficiary) that blended instruments are distinguished from 
concessional loans, which may be provided by a given DFI outside this structure. This is also 
what sets innovative blending mechanisms apart from previous financial intermediation 
efforts as well as traditional development assistance such as project and program aid. 
Blending structures allow donors to offer a wide variety of financial instruments, ranging 
from more traditional forms such as direct investment grants and performance based grants, 
to more unconventional support such as interest rate subsidies, loan guarantees, structured 
finance, as well as risk capital financing. Additionally these blending instruments may be 
complemented by technical assistance. Depending on the project context, the different 
financing structures create different advantages and disadvantages for the donor. Here the 
objective is to adapt the level of concessionality of finance to best suit the recipients’ needs, 
as well as scale up resources for development purposes to create a form of ‘market based’ aid 
(Ferrer et al 2011). 
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Finally, the emphasis in this thesis is on blended finance which provides risk capital 
financing to SMEs in the context of private sector development. Risk capital comprises 
equity and quasi-equity investments that typically carry high risks, i.e. previously unbankable 
SMEs in partner countries. This form of blended finance aims to fill a market void that was 
previously ignored: projects which typically generate a return if successful, but which are 
unable to attract an investor or financier who is ready to participate in developing the project 
due to its risk level. As a result risk capital has a significant potential to be used as a private 
sector development tool, given underdeveloped markets are usually characterized by higher 
risk premia than developed markets.32 
Risk capital may either be offered with other investors, or on a non pari passu basis.33 In 
case there are other market operators willing to take on the underlying risk on a limited scale, 
the first financing approach is better suited. Conversely, in situations where market operators 
are reluctant to bear a certain type of risk, the second approach is most suitable. Here the 
donor support element may also be used to carve out part of the risk. In both cases donors 
need to avoid excessive support as this has the potential to crowd out private sector 
financing, bias investment incentives, as well as impede financial market integration.  
 
3.32 History of Catalytic Aid and Drivers of Blending 
 
Blending is not novel as such. Financial intermediary lending (i.e. lending to either individual 
banks or wholesaling to multiple banks) as a way of reaching end users was a relatively 
prominent approach in the 1980s. While loans were the dominant aid instrument until the 
1980s, the ensuing debt crisis in developing countries called into question their role in 
development. Consequently, development finance experienced a general shift from loans to 
grants.34 Hence by the 1990s this type of lending was very much on the defensive, being 
replaced by broader efforts at financial sector reform. Today a new form of financial 
intermediary aid is making a comeback. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the dual challenge of increased financing needs in 
developing countries coupled with public deficits in donor countries calling for fiscal 
                                                 
32In particular risk capital made available to infrastructure projects and SMEs has great added value, given these 
projects often face very high-risk premia or no access to finance at all. 
33Meaning on a separate basis. Pari passu is latin for “on equal footing”. 
34Grants still constitute the largest share of traditional ODA channeling.  
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consolidation and restraint has led to a rethinking of donor aid strategies. The key issue for 
donors today is how to use scarce financial resources in the most effective and efficient way. 
There was thus a need to find new alternatives to increase the volume of development 
financing as well as increase its efficiency and effectiveness.  
According to Rogerson (2011) “Catalytic aid has long been associated with graduation 
from aid, in two once-again fashionable ways” (Rogerson 2011 p. 3). First, development 
agencies are increasingly acknowledging that private financial flows are now dwarfing aid 
efforts and are the main driver behind growth in developing countries (Kharas, Jung, and 
Makino 2011). This is especially true in the case of countries which have graduated into the 
ranks of middle-income country status and now account for three fourths of the words 
absolute poor (Summer 2010). Within this context, the idea surrounding ‘leveraging’ 
financial resources for development purposes has gained increasing popularity over the last 
couple of years.  
An increasing number of studies point to the logical conclusion that the future of 
development cooperation will see a heightened interaction with the private sector (Gates 
2011). At the MDG Summit in 2010 the UNDP argued that the private sector needed to 
play a significant role in the attainment of the MDGs. The private sector is an engine for 
economic growth. Furthermore, pro-growth and pro-development policies can overlap; 
particularly when growth is broad based and inclusive. As with financial leverage, blending 
mechanisms are particularly relevant instruments in this context. For instance, giving people 
and small enterprises better access to finance and markets via risk capital financing 
contributes to growth by making better use of the countries resources. What is more, it 
allows poor people to take part in and benefit from the growth process by changing the 
distribution of relative incomes in their favour.  
The second driver behind the resurgence of catalytic aid has to do with the ability of 
these mechanisms to use scarce grant resources as effectively as possible. According to Bilal 
and Kratke (2013): 
 
The economic downturn in Europe and resulting increased budget 
constraints on donors has put pressure on European spending on 
development -- leveraging developing financing through blending is often 
 
 53 
perceived as a means to partly address the requirement to do more with less. 
(Bilal and Kratke 2013 p. 4) 
 
This notion has been reinforced by the fact that the cost of aid in many donor countries 
is high (Steinwand 2012). As will be explored later in this thesis, demonstrating the benefits 
of blending may thus be a way of nodding to countervailing domestic interests in donor 
countries. As chapter two explained, donor aid is constrained by collective action problems 
which will persist in the absence of selective incentives. With fiscal consolidation in donor 
countries putting downward pressure on aid budgets, donor governments are increasingly 
starting to care about the costs of aid provision too. Against this backdrop the thesis seeks to 
explore whether catalytic aid actually provides more value for money for donor aid spent? 
Answering this question will allow the thesis to analyse the role of innovative finance 






















4 Methodology: Measuring Value for Money 
 
 
Donors give money for a variety of reasons. As detailed in chapter one and two, these can 
broadly be categorized under commercial, strategic, and altruistic reasons. The amount and 
composition is determined by the donor’s utility function as well as the institutional 
arrangements which govern the aid allocation process. The aim of this thesis is not to 
quantify all these varying interests, as these are vast and often vague. Rather, this thesis 
concentrates on a specific and measurable objective of donor agencies, which many 
researchers believe will continue to grow in importance in the provision of aid: value for 
money (Emmi, Ozlem, Maka, Ilan, and Schatz 2011).  
 The aim of this chapter is to outline the methodology that was used to evaluate whether 
innovative blending provides more value for money to donor agencies than traditional aid. 
This chapter begins by reiterating the research question before providing a brief overview of 
the concept of value for money. This will be followed by a short overview of the aid 
interventions which served as the case study. Next the chapter will discuss the 
methodological procedure that will provide us with the analytical framework by which the 
research question can be empirically evaluated. Finally this chapter will present the data 
collection methods and outline any possible methodological limitations as well as further 
research opportunities.   
 
4.1 Research Problem and Research Questions 
 
The central research question that this thesis seeks to address is whether innovative blending 
can provide more value for money than traditional aid, and if so, where? Answering this 
question will allow us to consider the potential of innovative finance mechanisms in the 
context of the collective action discussion, subsequently formulating a number of 
conclusions concerning their ability to create selective incentives to help overcome the 
collective action problems highlighted above. 
With a view to measuring VfM, this thesis invokes a case study evaluation of an 
innovative blending intervention compared to traditional aid interventions. The aim of the 
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case study was to demonstrate what gains were made that would not have been possible 
without the innovative intervention. In doing so the thesis makes use of a methodological 
approach known as the program theory approach (Kusek and Rist 2004; Imas, Morra, and 
Rist 2009; Emmi et al 2011). This methodological approach will allow the thesis to formulate 
some conclusions surrounding the strengths and weaknesses of blending mechanisms at 
various levels of the development intervention compared to traditional aid interventions. 
Furthermore, answering this research question will serve as a basis on which future decisions 
can be made about shaping donor aid strategies with a view to enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their development assistance. Finally, it should add to the academic literature 
surrounding collective action problems in development assistance.  
 
4.2 Defining Value for Money 
 
Value for Money is generally understood to describe an explicit commitment to achieve the 
maximum impact possible with the resources that are at the disposal of donor agencies 
(Emmi et al 2011). The procedure for demonstrating value for money is based on an 
economic appraisal that compares the economic costs and benefits of alternative funding 
decisions. To maximise the impact of aid donors need to be aware of the costs associated 
with giving and whether their intended results were in fact achieved. 
While there are varying interpretations of how to measure value and for whom it should 
matter, the literature agrees that it is generally concerned with a combination of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of the development intervention (Emmi et al 2011). Here 
economy relates to efficient procurement, efficiency to the delivery of outputs, and 
effectiveness to achieving the intended outcomes. Thus VfM entails both a quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. 
Over recent years VfM has become an established term, with several donors building 
VfM estimates into their log frames of policy impact and evaluation (Kusek et al 2004; 
Emmi et al 2011). It is about outcomes and results and requires a plausible causal 
relationship between money that is spent and outcomes that are achieved. It is not about 
focusing on the cost only, or choosing the cheapest possible development intervention.  
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While VfM has emerged as a much-discussed topic in the development debate, the 
demand for development agencies to prove their effectiveness and efficiency is far from new. 
Already in the 1980s and the 1990s development agencies were discussing the need to 
demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness as well as the best way to achieve outcomes. The 
proliferation of new development actors over the last decade, however, intensified the 
scrutiny of donor’s efforts in the provision of aid (Lucas, Eyben, and Srodeki 2010). Indeed 
this can be seen in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda and the push for results-based 
aid management. Most recently the backlash of the financial crisis underlined this trend. 
As a result of the wide-ranging budget cuts that were pronounced by most of the OECD 
donor countries following the financial crisis, taxpayers have become increasingly sceptical 
of how the government is spending its money (Emmi et al 2011). Consequently VfM has 
gained wide currency in the formulation of economic policy imperatives in general. As 
discussed in chapter one, this is particularly true for development aid, which is typically 
constrained by actors higher up in government and lacks a natural domestic constituency. 
Consequently Andrew Harris, the UK’s Secretary of State for International Development, 
made the following pledge to the taxpayers: 
 
Our aim is to spend every penny of every pound of your money wisely and 
well. We want to squeeze every last ounce of value from it. We owe you that. 
And I promise you as well that in future, when it comes to international 
development, we will want to see hard evidence of the impact your money 
makes. Not just dense and impenetrable budget lines but clear evidence of 
real effect. (Emmi et al 2011 p. 13) 
 
With regard to the new aid delivery mechanisms there is thus a need to demonstrate 
whether these can provide more value for money than traditional aid delivery mechanisms. 
Yet this also raises the question to what extent VfM and the internationally agreed aid 
effectiveness principles can be reconciled? As discussed in the earlier in this thesis, together 
with the desire to demonstrate results, the last decade has witnessed donor organisations and 
academics increasingly considering whether aid as a whole works, and if so under which 
conditions. This wide ranging interest in aid effectiveness led to the formulation of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, which defined aid effectiveness along the lines of 
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five principles: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability. 
Together these principles aimed at influencing donor agencies’ allocation of aid and the 
creation of more transparent and homogenous monitoring procedures.  
Against the backdrop of the international principles of aid effectiveness, some aid 
practitioners classify VfM as being a subset of the aid effectiveness agenda, particularly with 
regard to the managing for results pillar of the principles (Emmi et al 2011). Yet there are 
also aspects of the broadly defined aid effectiveness principles which may not reconcile with 
the VfM debate. According to Melamed (2011):  
 
In some senses, effectiveness and value can be synonymous to each other. 
But Aid Effectiveness is broader, and tackles institutional and political issues 
and relationships which VfM doesn’t really address. VfM is a subset of Aid 
Effectiveness. Aid Effectiveness is about deciding what you want to do. VfM 
is about how to do it best. (Melamed 2011 p. 2) 
 
Hence while VfM can be seen as a subset of aid effectiveness, it is important to 
understand that effectiveness (in terms of the successful achievement of outcomes) and 
value for money are not at odds with one another. To put this in other terms, the successful 
attainment of outcomes is an important component of value for money. Consequently, if the 
effectiveness of an aid intervention is reduced due to a small cost saving effort, value for 
money is also reduced.  
Ultimately value for money is a tool which is immensely relevant to the development 
cooperation context. That being said, donors must also be aware of the complexities of the 
overall development assistance process and the limitations of the value-for-money 
methodology. It is important that agencies realise that value for money cannot be the only 
factor in the decision to pursue one form of aid delivery over the other; aside from what 
value may have been demonstrated in one particular context, they must evaluate what works 
best on a case by case approach and also consider their own capacity to replicate favourable 
outcomes. Nonetheless, VfM frameworks enable agencies to put forward a powerful 
narrative of the real impact and value of their work. As will be discussed below, in relation to 
the collective action problem donor agencies face, demonstrating VfM may thus play a role 
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in spurring aid efforts if new delivery mechanisms are perceived as providing better value for 
money than traditional ODA.  
 
4.3 What is being Evaluated? 
 
One way of evaluating the VfM of blended finance is to review an innovative, pilot project 
in a recipient country and to compare it to traditional aid delivery instruments. While this 
case study approach is limited as it provides a “snapshot” and is not representative of all 
innovative blending facilities, it is a very useful approach when the objective is to gain in-
depth understanding of a process, especially when the intervention is innovative or 
experimental or not well understood (Imas et al 2009).  
Initiated and financed by the European Commission, the Risk Capital Facility (RCF) is 
an innovative blending facility in the form of a revolving investment fund designed to 
support SME financing in South Africa by providing equity or quasi equity financing to 
businesses that are non-commercially bankable due to their risk profile. To compensate for 
such risk, the RCF aims to support Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) with i) Business 
Support Services (BSS), ii) low pricing, and iii) a favorable equity nature of the financing.35 
In existence since 2002, the multi-stakeholder RCF has an overall lifespan of twelve 
years and is a part of the Private Sector Development (PSD) Strategy as defined by the 
European Community Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the Multi-annual Indicative 
Programme (MIP) of the EC. These documents identify the promotion of economic growth, 
equity and employment as a priority area for cooperation. The main objective of the PSD is 
to support South Africa in accelerating employment growth in the small and medium 
enterprise sector. Consequently, the RCFs stated objective is the following:  
  
The overall objective of the Programme is to contribute to the economic 
growth of South Africa and to promote the participation of Historically 
Disadvantaged People in its economy. More specifically, its programme 
purpose aims at job creation, through the provision of financial assistance in 
                                                 
35The pricing was usually lower than the market based rate of interest payable monthly in arrears, plus a 
sweetener, most often calculated as a percentage of the budgeted turnover. For a comprehensive overview of 
the financing structure see Appendix E. 
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the form of equity and quasi-equity to small and medium enterprises. It 
supports its investments by supplying low or interest-free loans to enable 
SMEs to acquire technical assistance and training. (RCF Financing 
Agreement 2000 p. 2) 
 
From the donor perspective, the instrumental objective of this innovative approach is to 
use traditional grant finance for the nontraditional practice of risk capital financing, 
leveraging additional development finance and taking advantage of the financial expertise 
and lending capacities of two DFIs in the process: the Industrial Development Cooperation 
(IDC) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Its core objective is to spur human 
development and poverty alleviation, as well as supporting the empowerment of Historically 
Disadvantaged Persons (HDPs) within the context of the EC’s Private Sector Development 
Strategy for South Africa.36 
Part of the evaluation is to compare the innovative aid modality of risk capital financing 
to the Commission's traditional interventions. As such, the benefits and complementarity of 
the RCF to more established aid modalities will be considered. With a view to doing so, this 
evaluation invokes two counterfactuals for the RCF. First, the evaluation compares the RCF 
to a traditional EC project grant in South Africa: the Local Economic Development Support 
Programme in Kwazulu-Natal Province (LED KZN). 
For the LED KZN, the financing agreement between the EC and South Africa was 
signed in 2003 (one year after the implementation of the RCF). It seeks to promote equitable 
economic growth throughout the KZN province by supporting the provincial Department 
of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDT), as well as a wide range of other 
stakeholders involved in the promotion of local economic development. In terms of 
financing activities, the LED KZN targeted four broad areas of support. First, to assemble 
stakeholders in a partnership and implement sustainable employment generating investments, 
as well as enterprise growth plans with pro-poor results. Second, to increase public sector 
stakeholders engaging in LED relates processes. Third, to assist in sustainable mechanisms 
for learning, knowledge exchange, information dissemination, and training. And fourth, to 
create effective LED management functions at the provincial and regional level.  
                                                 
36Given the EC aligns itself with the partner countries’ development strategies, the RCF is thus supporting the 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy of the South African. 
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The EUR 37 million grant support programme was designed to be implemented over a 
six-year period and to be completed by July 2009. While this serves as a counterfactual with 
regard to the aid delivery process, its final results in terms of outcomes cannot be compared 
given there is no comparable control group for the two.  
Second, the evaluation will compare the outcomes of the SMEs supported by the RCF 
to the overall EU private sector support in all recipient countries over the period 2004-2010. 
The EU provided EUR 2.4 billion in grant funding for PSD over the given period, of which 
EUR 2 billion was contracted under direct interventions and EUR 400 million was 
contracted under Sector Budget Support (SBS). This made PSD an important area of aid 
delivery for the EU, covering a broad range of activities. Among others, these include 
creating more quality jobs for the economically marginalised, improving business-enabling 
environment, as well as increasing capacity and skills in the productive sectors of the 
economy. Additionally it included support for SMEs as well as support for private sector 
representative organisations. Ultimately it included fostering partnerships and 
knowledge/technology transfer between enterprises to improve enterprise competitiveness 
and supporting institutional and regulatory reform and legal/tax frameworks, to enhance the 
business environment. This broad range of activities will serve as a counterfactual to the 
RCF where possible.  
 
4.4 Methodological Framework 
 
4.41 Measuring Value for Money 
 
The first myth we need to deconstruct is that value for money is synonymous with 
monetising everything and applying cost-effectiveness analyses across the board. While these 
are tools which may be relevant to assessing value for money in some cases, value for money 
is a much broader concept. Measuring VfM depends largely on the context with which it is 
being addressed. Here it is important to concede that the VfM of innovative mechanisms 
such as blending is particularly difficult to measure given their transformative nature, 
implying that the process of aid delivery played a central role. Consequently real VfM 
reporting implies institutional knowledge and understanding as well as accountability for 
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results delivery. From a methodological perspective a case study approach was therefore 
invaluable as this requires an in depth understanding of the theory of change of the 
development intervention. According to Kusek and Rist (2004) this entails a representation 
of how an intervention is expected to lead to desired results.  
Theory of change models typically have five main components: inputs, activities, outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts. The foundations for this approach lie with the work of the 1930s 
sociologist Mannheim (1935, 1967), who appealed for the construction of underlying 
assumptions when evaluating “social planning”. Later, in the 1950s, Van Doorn came up 
with the term “policy theory”, which in the field of evaluation gave rise to the term 
“program theory” (Rogers, Hacsi, Petrosino, and Huebner 2000). According to Rogers et al 
(2000), a program theory defines an explicit theory or model of how a development 
intervention is to achieve its intended outcomes.  
In 1969 a version of the program theory, the logical framework approach, was developed 
by Practical Concepts Incorporated (1979). This approach was subsequently developed 
further for project planning and evaluation by the Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ),37 the German international development agency. In the methodological log frame, 
the causal chain was standardized into four components: activities, outputs, purpose 
(rationale for producing outputs), and goal (a higher level objective to which the project was 
to contribute). For each of these stages a number of aspects were developed: a narrative 
description, objectively verifiable indicators, means of verification, as well as assumptions.  
This log frame served as the basis for the program theory approach which gained wide 
currency in the 1980s. A number of publications contributed to the development and 
popularization of this approach. Chen and Rossi published several books and articles on 
theory driven evaluations (Chen and Rossi 1980, 1983, 1987). In 1989 Chen served as a guest 
editor for a special edition of the journal ‘Evaluation and Program Planning’, which 
discussed key issues, different types of models (Lipsey and Pollard 1989), ways to address 
validity (Scott and Sechrest 1989) and barriers to use (Bickman 1989). Furthermore, in 
response to the economic challenges during the 1980s, many donor countries adopted the 
use of program theory to focus on managing for results. 
                                                 
37Society for Technical Cooperation. 
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The most recent economic challenges faced by donor countries have prompted a 
renewed use of this evaluation methodology with a view to measuring VfM. Using a results 
chain as depicted in Figure 4.1 below, Emmi et al (2011 p. 7) stress that many policymakers 
and academics define value in terms of the process of aid delivery, i.e. “the causal logic or 
pathway through which a set of interventions is expected to lead to a long-term goal”. 
According to the literature, the value of the development intervention can be measured at 
different stages from inputs through to impacts of the program theory. 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptualising Value for Money 
 
Source: Adapted from Binnendijk (2000). 
 
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, VfM is generally concerned with the 
economy relating to efficient procurement, efficiency of the delivery of outputs, and the 
effectiveness in achieving the intended outcomes (Emmi et al 2011). As will be discussed 
below, in order to demonstrate the value for money of the RCF, the evaluation provides an 
assessment of both the process and the ultimate outcomes of the aid delivery compared to 
respective counterfactuals. This also includes a rigorous assessment of the relationship 
between the RCF and its intended objectives. Ultimately, this evaluation methodology 
facilitates an empirical evaluation of the relative benefits and weaknesses of two different 
forms of aid delivery in the context of the donor’s development assistance objectives.  
 
4.42 Evaluation Methodology 
  
With a view to measuring the VfM of the RCF against its counterfactuals, the evaluation 
reconstructed the underlying program theory and the operational logic of the donor when 












providing development assistance. Specifically this meant reconstructing the European 
Commission’s objectives in terms of aid delivery as well as the process of channelling aid via 
a single hierarchy of donor objectives. This allowed the thesis to define VfM and formulate a 
number of evaluation questions and indicators to measure it. 
While there is no one size fits all approach to determining value, using a reconstructed 
program theory allows us to measure what matters, to measure comparably, and to 
determine whether value for money has been secured and specifically where. The assessment 
of VfM thus involves examining the driving factors of VfM, identifying the links between 
them and drawing conclusions based on evidence about how well they perform together.  
While defining outcomes and impacts is not easy, the reconstructed program theory 
provides the basis for doing so by providing a better understanding of the causal 
mechanisms at play in a development intervention (Brouselle et al 2011). In doing so, it is 
imperative to understand that the evaluation required an assessment of both the degree of 
achievement of the donor’s objectives with regard to aid delivery, as well as the process of 
channelling aid. Hence the evaluation focuses on what can be described as a two-
dimensional reconstructed program theory. 
The reconstructed program theory consists of an explicit articulation (graphic display) of 
the different levels or linkages of expected results from the development intervention. 
According to Kusek and Rist (2004), defining cause-effect linkages lays the foundation for 
the reconstructed program theory. Once the linkages between these components has been 
established, the evaluation is able to determine the main drivers of VfM and formulate cause 
and effect questions with regard to the objectives that the donor pursued with the innovative 
RCF. The aim of these questions was to demonstrate what gains were made that would not 
have been possible without the RCF. Using baseline indicators (quantitative or qualitative) 
and by using comparative case study data, the evaluation measured against counterfactuals 
where possible.  
Hence, in terms of specific outputs, this evaluation aimed to: 
1. Reconstruct the donor’s program theory on the basis of overall donor objectives in 
question; 
2. Identify the driving factors of VfM at the various levels of the intervention and 
formulate Evaluation Questions (EQs); 
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3. Assess the delivery of this innovative facility against its counterfactuals and formulate 
answers to the Evaluation Questions.  
On the basis of these outputs, the thesis will be able to formulate conclusions on the 
core research question at hand, consequently highlighting the VfM of blending mechanisms 
vis a vis traditional aid modalities. 
 
4.43 Overview of Evaluation Process 
   
With a view to providing evidence-based answers to the research question, this thesis 
employed a methodological approach consisting of carefully structured stages (as shown in 
Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Evaluation Process 
 Identification Phase Field Phase Assessment Phase 
Tasks 1) Creation of reconstructed 
program theory 
 
2) Identification of 
evaluation questions and 
judgment criteria 
 
3) Selection of case studies 
 




5) Identification of 
information gaps 
 
6) Data collection 
 
7) Interviews with IDC, EC 
and EIB. 
1) Focused research 








3) Consultation with 









1) Responses to evaluation 
questions 
 




3) Feedback/Consultation with 
IDC, EC and EIB 
 
The first stage was the identification stage, which served to provide a broad overview of 
the evaluation subject. Consequently a detailed overview of innovative funds channeled by 
the European Commission was constructed, on the basis of which the RCF was selected. 
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Following the overview of innovative funding efforts and identification of the RCF, the next 
step was to determine the manner in which VfM was to be measured. Here the evaluation 
framework relied on two key elements. First, the reconstructed program theory of the EC 
when channelling development assistance to the RCF, and second, the determination of 
evaluation questions on this basis. At this stage two counterfactuals were selected, notably 
the EC’s LED KZN for measuring the cost efficiency and leverage effect of the innovative 
RCF as well as a basket of EU interventions in the area of private sector development for 
comparing the outcomes related to employment creation and SME financing. Hereby it was 
possible to determine the exact data necessary for answering the evaluation questions by 
specifying the judgement criteria and indicators.  
Following the identification stage, the field phase consisted of data collection and was 
conducted in three phases. The first phase included a desktop review, which was based on 
an analysis of documents and data, as well as interviews at EIB, EC and IDC headquarters. 
The second phase involved visits to IDC, EC and EIB headquarters in South Africa and 
Belgium. Finally, the third phase involved a survey questionnaire for RCF task managers. 
Based on preliminary findings from the desk study and headquarters visit, the survey 
questionnaire included targeted questions to fill information gaps. 
The last step involved constructing answers to the evaluation questions based on the 
analysis of the data collected. Using the indicators and judgment criteria as building blocks 
the thesis formulated balanced answers for each evaluation question. The evaluation used 
triangulation, which is the use of three or more sources, types of information, or types of 
analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment by crosschecking results (Imas et al 2009). 
Hence information gathered from interviews, reports, and the survey was pooled and 
crosschecked, serving as a foundation for formulating the findings.  
Since data analysis should stem from the evaluation questions, the evaluation followed 
this analytical framework. The first step of this process includes reading through the data 
and identifying potential themes. Here analysing qualitative data allowed for insights into 
processes that quantitative data could not. Hence using the qualitative interviews to 
complement the quantitative data obtained from the IDC and the EIB was crucial for 
examining causality and trends witnessed throughout the implementation of the 
development intervention. With a view to testing the findings obtained in this manner, 
representatives of the IDC, EC and the EIB were consulted on the factual accuracy. 
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Ultimately, conclusions were formulated on this basis and an overall assessment of the VfM 
was provided. 
 
4.44 Building the Reconstructed Program Theory 
  
With a view to identifying and measuring the value of the development intervention at 
different stages from inputs through to outcomes, the evaluation first had to reconstruct the 
underlying program theory of the innovative instrument to be evaluated (see Figure 4.3). 
This subsequently allowed the evaluation to formulate a number of evaluation questions, 
judgement criteria, and indicators to compare and measure the VfM for the innovative RCF 
against its counterfactuals. 
Based on the work of Imas et al (2009), the reconstructed program theory starts with 
considering the research question and desired outcomes. Here the evaluation had to ask 
itself what the starting point of the intervention is and what results it wants to achieve. 
Simultaneously, the evaluation had to consider several factors, including the broader context 
of the evaluation, previous research and evaluation on the area to be studied, as well as the 
assumptions concerning the development interventions. Given the innovative nature of the 
intervention, the reconstructed program theory can only draw on existing experiences to a 
certain extent and is therefore exploratory by nature.  
After the initial identification phase, the next step involved specifying the linkages, or 
results chain, and presenting it in a graphic display. According to Patton (2002), the 
intervention model must portray a reasonable, defensible, and sequential order of linkages. 
Here the evaluation followed a number of steps to identify causal links between inputs, 
activities, outputs, outcomes and global impacts with the aim of creating a visual 
representation of the reconstructed program theory. Here the arrows in the diagram show 
the specific links with the lower level. For instance, simplifying the management of complex 
interventions and allowing for more flexible financing instruments is an operational objective 




Figure 4.3: Reconstructed Program Theory for the Risk Capital Facility 
 
Source: Imas et al (2009) and author. 
 
The reconstructed model consists of five distinct layers: inputs (modalities), outputs 
(operational objectives), results (specific objectives), outcomes (intermediate objectives) and 
impacts (overall objectives). At the lowest level of the diagram we identify the input of the 
intervention, notably the innovative modality under assessment. The RCF is associated with 
specific activities which are the inputs of the process. The resulting outputs of these 
activities thus relate to the operational objectives, which make up the first level of the 
objectives diagram. These operational objectives were identified on the basis of the RCF’s 
project programming documents (i.e. financing proposals) accompanying the identification 
and implementation of the innovative modality.   
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With a view to constructing this model, a number of “if-then” statements comprise the 
linkages. Here the evaluation had to work backwards, starting with the identification of the 
overall objectives (impacts) for the intervention to achieve, i.e. the overarching goals pursued 
by all the external aid activities of the European Commission. Next, determining whether the 
inputs and the operational objectives (outputs) contribute to overarching goals (impacts) of 
the highest level in the objectives diagram was determined through a string of intermediate 
(outcomes) and specific objectives (results). These linkages were derived from a number of 
mutually supporting and interlinked EU strategy documents as well as documents governing 
the channelling of the donor grant.38 
Ultimately the reconstructed program theory was important in the sense that, firstly, it 
defined the hierarchy of objectives of the donor, and secondly, it demonstrated how this 
innovative aid delivery process was to contribute to the EU’s development cooperation 
policy objectives. This allowed for a visual representation of the causal links between the 
innovative RCF and how it is to achieve the objectives for the donor. The model therefore 
provided both the benchmark against which to evaluate this innovative facility and its 
counterfactuals, as well as the basis for identifying drivers of VfM and formulating 
evaluation questions and indicators on that basis. 
 
4.45 Determining Value for Money: Evaluation Questions 
  
As demonstrated in Figure 4.3 above, addressing the EC’s objectives in terms of aid delivery 
as well as the process of channelling aid via a single hierarchy of donor objectives served as 
the basis for the underlying program theory. This allowed the thesis to define VfM and 
formulate a number of evaluation questions and indicators to measure it (see Figure 4.4). 
Based on the assumptions and linkages identified in the reconstructed model, the evaluation 
was able to formulate cause and effect questions with regard to the objectives that the donor 
pursued with the innovative RCF. The aim of these questions was to demonstrate the VfM 
for the RCF and whether gains were made that would not have been possible without the 
RCF.39 
                                                 
38See Appendix C for detailed overview of documents consulted in the construction of the underlying program 
theory. 
39The Evaluation Questions address the three principles of  VfM: Economy, Effectiveness and Efficiency. 
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Figure 4.4: Evaluation Questions for Measuring VfM 
Evaluation Question 1 on Scaling Up 
 
Did channelling aid to the innovative RCF facilitate the scaling up of development resources 
for the European Commission compared to the traditional LED KZN? 
(Effectiveness and Economy) 
 
Evaluation Question 2 on Follow Up and Coherence 
 
Did the donor ensure coherence of development objectives pursued and was he capable of 
following up on results when providing grant finance to the innovative RCF? How did this 
compare to the provision of the EU’s global private sector development interventions? 
(Effectiveness and Efficiency) 
 
Evaluation Question 3 on Results/Impacts 
 
To what degree did channelling to this innovative facility contribute in a sustainable manner 
to achieving the intervention objectives the donor targeted when channelling its funds? How 
do the results compare to broader SME support in South Africa as well as the EU’s global 
PSD financing? 
(Effectiveness and Efficiency) 
 
 
Evaluation Question 4 on Expertise 
 
To what degree did channelling to the innovative RCF enable the European Commission to 
offer a broader range of instruments and expertise to the recipients compared to the 
traditional LED KZN? 
(Effectiveness and Efficiency) 
 
Evaluation Question 5 on Cost Reduction/Implementation 
 
To what degree did the channelling of funds to the innovative RCF contribute to swifter 




Based on the reconstructed donor objectives, this evaluation aims to measure value for 
money of the RCF against counterfactuals at various points of the intervention based on the 
 
 70 
criteria defined in the evaluation questions above. These include the ability to leverage 
additional development finances, results and outcomes at the beneficiary level, the provision 
of financial expertise, and the cost of aid delivery. With a view to formulating answers to the 
evaluation questions and thus the overarching research question, the evaluation questions are 
further broken down into judgment criteria and performance indicators.40 
With regard to defining the indicators, they were targeted to be as specific, measurable, 
and relevant as possible. By comparing actual results of the RCF and its counterfactuals 
against indicators it was possible to measure the performance of the innovative facility. 
Additionally, the evaluation considers data and results other than predefined indicators. On 
this basis the evaluation was able to formulate evidence-based answers, overall findings and 
key lessons learnt with regard to the assessment of the delivery of the programme and 
achievement of VfM. 
 
4.46 Data Collection Tools 
 
Throughout the evaluation, the thesis employed a number of data collection tools, including 
donor reports, interviews, and a survey questionnaire. For the overview of funds channeled, 
data collection aimed at being as comprehensive as possible and consequently covered the 
IDC, EC and the EIB reports solicited. This included the Medium Term Reviews and 
Results Oriented Monitoring reports of the RCF and its counterfactuals. These were made 
available by the EC staff and provided information complementary to the other sources. In 
addition to specific project related documents, additional information was identified via a 
review of crosscutting strategic documents by the EC, IDC and the EIB.41 
With regards to interviews, two forms of interviews were conducted during this 
evaluation, notably face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews. Face-to-face interviews 
were held in two phases: initially at the start of the evaluation in order to have a 
comprehensive view of the channeling of funds through the IDC and EIB, and 
subsequently, during the desk phase to gain information and insights on the RCF and its 
counterfactuals. Prior to some of the interviews, a letter sent by the PhD supervisors 
introduced the research. The interviews were either open, allowing for a broad 
                                                 
40Please refer to Appendix C for further details on Evaluation Questions.  
41See the Bibliography for a complete overview of the RCF documents consulted.  
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understanding and to identify the major topics and issues, or semi-structured, using a 
questionnaire based on information gaps identified. 
Telephone interviews were carefully prepared on the basis of specific questions 
addressing issues under investigation. They were carried out throughout the evaluation 
process for specific topics (i.e. EC management time, IDC pricing issues, etc.), as well as 
after the analysis of the survey results so as to clarify and deepen some specific aspects of the 
answers to the survey. 
In total over 40 interviews were organized (most interviewees were met in person). 
Meetings were for the most part recorded and the main findings noted after each interview. 
The interviews were carried out with the following persons: 
1. Commission staff in Pretoria Delegation over the course of three visits;  
2. Commission staff at headquarters in Brussels (Belgium); 
3. EIB staff in South Africa; 
4. IDC staff at headquarters in Johannesburg over the course of three visits; 
5. Managing Directors of two SMEs funded by the RCF;  
6. Key stakeholders such as representatives of other donor agencies and DFI’s (e.g. 
KfW Development Bank), as well as private sector representatives (i.e. INVESTEC, 
ABSA).42 
Finally, a comprehensive survey questionnaire was sent to Commission staff in South 
Africa and Brussels, IDC staff in Johannesburg, as well as to the EIB task manager in 
Luxembourg. The questionnaire identifies the four overarching Evaluation Questions, which 
are broken down into Judgment Criteria and Indicators. The purpose was to tackle, for each 
Evaluation Question, the main issues identified throughout the identification phase.43 The 
survey also consisted of a short explanatory note and a clarification note on specific terms 
used in the questions. Several re-launches of the questionnaire were undertaken to increase 
the number of responses. Furthermore, on the basis of the survey responses, several 
telephone interviews were carried out to clarify and deepen some of the responses. 
  
                                                 
42ABSA (the Barclays Africa Group Limited) is one of Africa’s major financial services providers offering 
personal and business banking. Investec is an international specialist banking and asset management group.  
43See Appendix F for a sample survey questionnaire and responses. 
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4.47 Possible Methodological Limitations and Further Research Opportunities 
  
It is not straightforward to evaluate blending facilities. The following is an overview of 
common sources of bias and potential methodological problems with this evaluation. First, 
when comparing traditional aid delivery to innovative blending there exists a limited 
counterfactual in terms of the ultimate beneficiary. While the RCF directly supports a 
segment of the SME sector in South Africa via a local DFI, its counterfactuals support the 
development of the private sector via support for national reform strategies through budget 
support or working with local government institutions and stakeholders via project aid. 
Consequently it is difficult to identify a comparable control group for the two forms of aid 
delivery at the beneficiary level. That being said, the evaluation does invoke a counterfactual 
with regard to access to finance and employment creation at the results level, as well as a 
counterfactual comparing the efficiency and effectiveness of the aid delivery process. 
Second, there is a lack of data with regard to the impact in terms of economic and social 
effects of the blended project over time. While the results provide an indication of possible 
impacts, a proper impact assessment was not possible given the recent nature of the RCF 
and the lack of monitoring data collected by the implementing institutions. As a result of 
these information gaps the evaluation does not allow for comprehensive impact analysis. To 
get a real picture of the socio-economic impact of the facility in South Africa, the 
development of the investees needs to be closely monitored over time. This would thus be 
an interesting point of departure for future research on the topic.  
Third, the evaluation was confronted with limited pre-existent knowledge and research 
on the topic of donor driven risk capital financing. As a result, there may be various ways to 
build on this evaluation in the future.   
Fourth, there is some risk of bias in working with qualitative data as evaluators and 
interviewees may see what they want to see and miss things that do not conform to their 
expectations. Nonetheless, given the multi-stakeholder approach to this development 
intervention, the evaluation covered information from a number of different perspectives, 
which allowed for the identification of themes as well as a comprehensive understanding of 
the data.  
Fifth, the case study approach is limited as it provides a “snapshot” and is not 
representative of all blending facilities. Nonetheless, it is a very useful approach when the 
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intervention is innovative or experimental and the objective is to gain in-depth 
understanding of a process (Imas et al 2009). Case studies emphasize more than 
descriptions; they also include interpretations of situations by those most knowledgeable 
about them. Consequently this approach could be used to evaluate more innovative 
mechanisms beyond blending in the future. In particular catalytic mechanisms and public 
private partnerships merit further study as they allow for the private sector to play a role in 
development. This would involve analysing the strengths and weaknesses of these 
mechanisms, what governance structures work best, and whether they can increase the 
effectiveness of aid delivery. 
Sixth, as outlined above, there is no one size fits all approach to measuring value. This is 
all the more true when it comes to measuring innovative development interventions against 
established development aid instruments. Nonetheless, while measuring VfM for the 
innovative RCF requires a largely qualitative approach, this also poses an opportunity to 
demonstrate what else represents ‘value’ and to improve the ways of measuring it. 
Finally, the reconstructed program theory does not measure commercial and strategic 
interests that may be at play in the provision of EU aid. This is in part due to the difficulty in 
reconstructing these in the donor’s underlying program theory, but also due to the fact that 
the research question chose to focus on a specific and measurable donor objective in the 
form of value for money.  Rather than to building a ‘catch all’ model of donor interests, this 
approach allowed us to build our reconstructed program theory on mutually supporting and 
interlinked EU strategy documents as well as documents governing the channelling of the 
donor grant. That being said, expanding this model would be an interesting point of 











5 Case Study Results: Value for Money of 
European Commission Blending in South Africa 
 
 
Before presenting the results of this evaluation, this chapter provides a brief overview of the 
aid modalities which served as the case studies for this evaluation.44 Thereafter, the results of 
the five evaluation questions outlined in the previous chapter will be presented. These results 
will serve as a basis for answering the research question around whether innovative blending 
may provide more value for money than traditional aid. 
 
5.1 Overview of Case Studies: Project Structures and Activities 
 
5.11 Case Study Overview  
     
In terms of the aid interventions that were selected, the case study evaluation focused on one 
innovative blending facility and invoked two traditional forms of aid delivery as 
counterfactuals (see Figure 5.1). The counterfactuals included one project aid modality, as 
well as a basket of EU financed aid interventions. All aid modalities evaluated were financed 
in the context of private sector development.45 
The innovative blending modality evaluated consisted of the European Commission 
financed Risk Capital Facility in South Africa. Launched in 2002, the RCF is an associated 
financing structure consisting of a number of stakeholders. Grant funding in the amount of 
EUR 108 million was provided by the European Commission through South Africa’s 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) over two financing cycles. The Industrial 
Development Cooperation, South Africa’s oldest DFI, co-manages the fund with the 
European Investment Bank. Furthermore the RCF was set up in a way that includes the 
possibility for third parties to contribute. 
                                                 
44For more details on the Methodology, including a definition of South Africa’s SME sector, please refer to 
Appendixes C and D. 
45EU private sector development encompasses a multitude of activities, including efforts to promote SME 
development, access to financing, employment generation and poverty eradication. 
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The main agreement is a Financing Agreement (FA) between the EC and the Republic 
of South Africa. On the basis of this legal agreement between the EC and the DTI, the RCF 
was structured as a ring fenced entity within the IDC.46 Additionally, the EIB has been 
contracted to act as a co-manager of the RCF Programme. Its role is to provide support with 
regard to each investment decision, as well as provide the EC with an independent 
assessment of the performance of the facility. 
 
Figure 5.1: Overview of Interventions 




Program Kwazulu Natal 
EU Private Sector 
Support  
Project Type Innovative 
Blending 






Kwazulu Natal Department 





Grant Size EUR 108 million 
over two financing 
cycles 
EUR 37 million EUR 2.4 billion 
Duration Twelve years Six years Seven years 
Implementation 
Period 
March 2002 - 
January 2014 
January 2004 - December 
2009 




The first counterfactual to the RCF is the LED KZN support programme in KwaZulu-
Natal. Launched two years after the RCF, the LED KZN Financing Agreement committed 
the European Union to an amount of EUR 37 million. Additionally the LED KZN support 
programme was co-financed by national, provincial, and local government. 47  Like the 
                                                 
46On the basis of a separate MOA between the DTI and the IDC. Within the IDC a special structure was set 
up. This included the RCF unit, later transformed into the Strategic Business Unit (SBU) (to look after the 
SME financing.) 
47The total programme costs are estimated to be of EUR 473 million, with a contribution of EUR 436 million 
from the government and the remainder from the EC. 
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innovative RCF, it is part of the EC’s Private Sector Development Strategy for South Africa. 
Within the context of the evolution of aid modalities, the LED KZN represents a traditional 
project aid delivery modality. 
The core problem to which the LED KZN programme responds is market failures as 
well as human and institutional capacity shortcomings in the province of KwaZulu Natal. 
The key objective of the LED KZN is thus to improve local economic development. With a 
view to doing so, this aid intervention supports the provincial Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism and a broad range of other stakeholders to push for equitable 
economic growth in KZN. The target groups include local and district municipalities and 
partnership groups comprised of private companies, community based non-governmental 
organisations, as well as trusts and associations active within the local economy. 
Finally, the thesis invoked a second counterfactual to the innovative RCF in the form of 
a basket of EU interventions in the thematic area of private sector development over the 
period 2004 until 2010. This support totaled EUR 2.4 billion directly contracted by the 
Commission and covered support in all regions where PSD aid was implemented. EU 
private sector development encompasses a multitude of activities, including efforts to 
promote access to financing, employment generation, poverty eradication, as well as SME 
development and financing (European Commission 2003a). As the Figure 5.2 indicates, the 
majority of the EUR 2.4 billion was used for four intervention areas: facilitation of 
investment and access to finance, Sector Budget Support contracts, investment and inter-
enterprise cooperation, and non-financial support for SMEs. This comprised 80% (EUR 
1.92 billion) of total direct support. The remaining 20% (EUR 524 million) was divided 
among the remaining four intervention areas. About half of the EC’s private sector 
development support went to the European Neighborhood countries and Russia (EUR 1.2 
billion), with another third being contracted in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
regions (EUR 803 million). The remaining amount included interventions in Latin America 






Figure 5.2: EU PSD Distribution by Area of Intervention 
 
Source: ADE (2013). 
 
 
5.12 Implementation Structures   
 
Traditional EU PSD support consisted of a broad range of implementation structures. These 
include project support, regional and centralized program support, as well as general and 
sectoral budget support. Depending on the instrument in question, EU PSD support was 
either provided via government departments with resources to partner with provincial and 
local organisations, local or international DFIs, research centres, or via civil society.  
In the case of the LED KZN, donor aid was delivered via the EU’s project modality. In 
this case donor grant funds were committed to a local implementing institution, the 
provincial Department of Economic Development and Tourism, which was also the 
contracting authority of the intervention (see Figure 5.3). Concerning project management, 
the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) of the LED KZN held the function of 
overseeing the entire programme and acting as an advisory body to the Department of 
Economic Development and Tourism. Moreover, the day-to-day management of the LED 
KZN was assigned to a Programme Co-ordinating Unit (PCU), which was responsible for 





























supporting the implementing institution with the management of the project. The PCU was 
organized so as to ensure a separation of responsibility between two entities. First, the 
Project Development and Management Team (PDMT), which provided technical assistance 
to assist local authorities and their partners to identify projects for submission for grant 
financing. And second, a Finance and Contracting Unit (FCU), responsible for arbitrating, 
awarding and contracting grants. 
 
Figure 5.3: LED KZN Implementation Structure 
 
 
The implementation structure of the innovative blending modality differed from that of 
traditional aid modalities. The RCF consists of a ring fenced investment facility financed by 
the donor and various public and private entities within the recipient country. In contrast to 
the EUs traditional aid modalities, the RCF operated through a three-tiered governance 
structure involving the EU, the EIB, and the IDC. Here the EIB drove the project 
identification process, submitting project proposals to the EU. As the lead financier, the EU 
subsequently had to approve the intervention within the context of its PSD strategy in the 
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recipient country. Finally, the EU delegated the implementation and management of the 
facility to a local DFI and the European Investment Bank. 
The organizational structure of the RCF within the IDC has changed since its inception 
(see Figure 5.4). Initially, an RCF unit was in charge solely for the implementation of the 
multi-stakeholder facility.48 However, since 2009, the IDC transformed the RCF team into a 
larger, more far reaching unit called the Strategic Business Unit (SBU).  
 




With regard to project management and guidance in terms of policy direction, the main 
decision making entity is the Programme Steering Committee. Chaired by the DTI, the 
committee consists of representatives from various institutions, including the South African 
Banking Council, Business Partners (a South African private sector lending institution), as 
                                                 
48 Initially comprised of two, and later three Accounts Officers in charge of the pre-investment phase, as well as 
post-commitment follow-ups. The RCF unit was completed by two Assistant Officers and a Head of Unit. 
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well as civil society representatives.49 The PSC may also be attended by other government 
departments with a stake in SME development, as well as representatives of third parties 
contributing to the facility.  
Being the implementing institution, the IDC was central to the success or failure of the 
RCF. It acts as the secretariat of the PSC, preparing quarterly reports, reviewing portfolio 
developments, as well as progress towards the RCFs development goals. The EIB attends 
the PSC as a technical adviser, while the European Commission participates with an 
observer status. The IDC also provides assistance to the RCF via its various established 
departments, taking stock of its professional expertise in various fields of operation. This 
includes assisting with the analysis of risks, pricing guidance, sectoral expertise, business 
support, accounting, as well as monitoring support. 
 
5.13 Financing Instruments 
  
The financing instruments differed quite substantially between the aid modalities evaluated. 
General PSD support by the EU covers a wide set of instruments which allow it to address a 
comprehensive range of PSD needs in the different regions. However due to a lack of tailor 
made support systems, traditional PSD support has generally been unable to facilitate more 
direct involvement of the private sector. Indeed, traditional project aid modalities mostly 
provided grants through provincial partners in recipient countries. In the case of the LED 
KZN project financing was provided via the Department of Economic Development and 
Tourism KZN.50 Comparably, the RCF offers equity and quasi equity financing via shares, 
preference shares, subordinated loans, and convertible bonds to SMEs in South Africa. It 
also offers technical support via its Business Support Services.  
The RCF provides SME financing via three channels. First, a Direct Channel (DC) 
which runs along with the IDC’s conventional lending. This channel consisted of direct co-
financing with IDC funds and was targeted to provide between 50% and 60% of the RCF’s 
lending.51 Second, the RCF operates a Niche Fund Channel (NFC)52 which attracts venture 
                                                 
49 Civil society is co-opted to the PSC through institutions such as the Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission, National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and the Banking Council.   
50 Also some project financing was provided via Trade and Investment KZN (TIK) and Ithala (KZN’s 
provincial public development finance entity). 
51As stipulated in an EIB – IDC agreement defining the investment guidelines (EIB 2002). 
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capital funds that target sectors with a developmental focus. The maximum investment for 
the niche fund channel was determined at ZAR 30 million. Here the respective weighting of 
financing was targeted at 25% to 30% of the total RCF lending. Third, the RCF envisaged a 
Third Party Channel (TPC), which co-invests with other financial institutions. The respective 
weighting of this financing channel was deemed to be between 15% and 20% of the RCFs 
lending.53 
 
5.2 Evaluation Questions and Results 
  
5.21 Scaling Up Aid 
  
Evaluation Question 1: Did the RCF channelling facilitate the scaling up of development finance compared 
to the LED KZN? 
  
The aim of this evaluation question is to explore whether the RCF contributed VfM for the 
donor in terms of scaling-up of development finance. With a view to measuring this, the 
evaluation assessed the RCF’s ability to, first, use donor resources in such a way that takes 
advantage of the absorptive capacity of the local DFI, second, to mobilise additional 
financial resources, and third, to facilitate sector and policy leverage in the are of the donor’s 
Private Sector Development strategy.54 With a view to measuring this leverage effect against 
counterfactuals, the evaluation compared the RCF’s results with those of the traditional 
LED KZN. Consequently this question addresses the effectiveness and impact criteria in our 
reconstructed program theory, as it aims at verifying the transformation of outputs (i.e. value 
of absorption capacity/attracting financial resources) into results (realizing critical mass of 
funding) and finally intermediate impacts (scaling up development efforts). 
With regard to the first point, the evaluation explored whether the absorptive capacity of 
the IDC facilitated the disbursement of EC funds? Based on interviews and the survey 
questionnaire, the evaluation found that the Commission’s decision to channel its grant 
                                                                                                                                                 
52The maximum investment for the niche fund channel is ZAR 30 million. 
53For the Niche Fund financing and Third Party financing the RCF has to conduct its own direct marketing, 
while for the Direct Channel it is up to the IDC to market the RCF and identify potential SME projects. 
54 As defined by the European Community Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the Multi-annual Indicative 
Programme (MIP) of the EC. 
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finance to the innovative RCF was primarily linked to the absorptive capacity of the IDC. 
EU staff interviewed noted that the donor does not have the ability nor the expertise to 
directly lend to the private sector.55 Indeed, the IDC’s capability and experience as a lending 
institution in South Africa has given it the technical expertise in a wide range of sectors. As a 
result it had created the necessary infrastructure to implement such an operation as the RCF. 
What is more, channeling through the IDC offered access to significant country presence 
and experience, where the Commission was either not experienced enough or simply has too 
little critical mass in terms of human resources. 
As a result, the ability of the IDC to provide the EC with a private sector lending 
capacity and expertise played a key role. What is more, the partnership was seen as an 
instrumental objective to facilitate the attainment of the ECs objective to accelerate 
employment growth in the SME sector in South Africa. 
While the IDC allowed the EC to make use of an absorptive capacity that it could not 
facilitate by itself, the evaluation revealed that the absorptive capacity of the implementing 
DFI was constrained by various factors. First, the RCF unit responsible for managing the 
investment facility was overly reliant on the IDC's mainstream business units, particularly 
with regard to deal making and marketing to the target SMEs.56 Second, RCF lending was 
constrained by overly rigid criteria in the Financing Agreement and investment guidelines.57 
And third, the RCF never disbursed via the ‘Third Party Channel’, which envisioned working 
through other financial institutions. As will be explained below, this channel was not feasible 
due to trust and compliance issues. 
As a result of these constraints, the disbursement of donor aid in terms of processing of 
proposals to recipient SMEs (through-put) was delayed. To exemplify this, the evaluation 
found that the number of deals proposed by the IDC never reached its targeted 300 
proposals per annum, nor the revised downward target of 400 proposals over the duration 
of the four year implementation period of the RCF2. 58  Nonetheless, while there were 
disbursement problems at the beneficiary level, all EC funds for the two financing cycles of 
the RCF were fully disbursed. As will be discussed in the third evaluation question below, 
                                                 
55Interview with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
56 With the exception of the Niche Fund, which has marketed itself successfully. 
57See Evaluation Question 2 for examples.  
58  The evaluation was not able to compute the effective numbers of deals proposed through the Direct 
Channel, as the IDC does not maintain such statistics. 
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the reason for this was that the RCF generally attained most of its performance indicators. 
As the EC Project Officer pointed out, “The RCF is one of the highly performing EC 
programmes despite the delays in disbursement.”59 
The second indicator addressed by this evaluation question explored whether the RCF or 
the LED KZN facilitated a greater financial leverage effect of donor aid? The Commission 
made a binding promise to scale up development assistance at the Monterrey Conference in 
2002, followed up by a Communication on this commitment (European Commission 2004). 
As outlined in the reconstructed program theory, financial leverage was one of the key 
objectives behind the Commission’s decision to channel its funds. It is about attracting 
additional funding to combine with the donor grant to achieve larger development objectives. 
Based on data received by the implementing institutions, the RCF had a considerable 
impact in terms of financial leverage effect compared to the donor’s traditional aid modality. 
  
Table 5.1: Direct Financial Leverage Effect: RCF vs. LED KZN 
 
Assessment Area 
RCF LED KZN 
 







What was the direct financial 





Source: IDC (2011) and European Commission (2009a). 
 
As Table 5.1 indicates, the LED KZN project leveraged 28% of the donor’s original 
ODA grant in terms of additional public and private sector funds, as well as through 
technical assistance. Comparatively, the RCF was structured so as to guarantee that the 
donor funds would be leveraged by at least 100%. This was ensured by the IDCs 
commitment to co-finance deals on the basis of a 50/50 commitment through the Direct 
and Niche Fund Channels. In fact, this target was far surpassed: the EIB estimates that by 
                                                 
59 Interview with the RCF project officer, Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011.) The project officer was 
responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management of the innovative RCF at the donor level. 
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September 2011, EC funds had been leveraged by 529%, clearly exceeding the target by a 
wide mark (EIB 2011). Most of this additional finance came in the form of venture capital 
via the Niche Fund Channel. Not only do these figures highlight the significantly larger 
leverage effect of innovative blending vis a vis traditional aid, but also the ability of this 
innovative aid modality to address certain constraints to private sector development. As will 
be discussed below, this involved crowding in investments from the IDC and the private 
sector by mitigating the risks associated with SME financing. 
In terms of the various disbursement channels which comprised the RCF, while both the 
Direct and Niche Fund Channel have been a success, it must be stressed that the Third Party 
Channel was a failure. Based on interviews conducted with the RCF and a potential private 
third party investor, the reasons for its failure are three-fold.60 First, the evaluation found 
that the RCF unit and the potential investors got into disagreements over the division of 
responsibilities. In several cases the private investor backed away once they were faced with 
the heavy due diligence exercises required by the RCF, especially with regard to the follow 
up of the investees’ numerous socio-economic conditionalities. Furthermore, in one 
particular case, a private third party lending institution (Business Partners) complained about 
the delays incurred by the IDC in the deal making process, hence opting out of the process 
altogether.61 Second, interviews revealed that the failure was also a reflection of the limited 
incentive structure within the implementing institution to pursue this channel, given it 
represented the same amount of work as the IDCs direct lending without the benefit of 
promoting its own lending instruments.62 Lastly, the limited empowerment of RCF account 
officers meant that RCF staff was overly reliant on the IDCs throughput of deals. 
Furthermore, the unwillingness of the RCF staff to follow up on the third party investments 
demonstrated the weak empowerment of the RCF account officers. 63  Despite these 
problems, however, EC officials interviewed remain optimistic that in the future an 
agreement will be reached with another public investment institution in South Africa, 
                                                 
60Interviews conducted with Siyabonga Mahlangu from the IDC and Nazeem Martin from Business Partners 
(Johannesburg, October 2011). 
61Interview conducted with Nazeem Martin (Johannesburg, October 2011). 
62This issue was raised with one of the IDC sector departments, which was not interested to do a due diligence 
review of a third party proposed RCF operation, feeling it has no interest in the deal and therefore no 
motivation to do the due diligence required. Interview conducted with Kalvenie Raja from the IDC 
(Johannesburg, October 2011). 
63Based on interview conducted with Francois Xavier Parant in Cape Town (April 2011). 
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whereby investments will be channelled to investees via the Third Party Channel.  
Finally, apart from absorptive capacity and financial leverage effect, the evaluation also 
explored whether the RCF or the LED KZN facilitated greater policy leverage. Policy 
leverage here is defined in the context of the donor’s Private Sector Development strategy 
for South Africa which aims to reduce risks to private entry by providing public support. 
Indeed financial leverage was not the only and maybe not the most important leverage effect 
of the RCF. Interviews point to two forms of policy leverage facilitated by the RCF. First, 
EC funding itself facilitated the critical mass necessary for the SME support to take place in 
the first place. It therefore represents an added value per se. Second, EC channelling led to a 
crowding in effect of similar kind of funds targeted at SMEs within the IDC.  
With regard to the first point, numerous interviews with the stakeholders involved 
consistently reflected the view that the presence of the Commission's grants provided the 
critical mass necessary for facilitating SME support to previously unbankable projects in the 
recipient country.64 It therefore seems that the RCF filled a gap previously not covered by 
local DFIs or the commercial financial institutions in South Africa (who traditionally prefer 
senior secured lending and steered clear of high risk SME financing). This is backed up by a 
study by Foxcroft, Wood, Kew, Herrington, and Segal (2002) who reported that around the 
time of the launch of the RCF, 75% of new SMEs applying for bank credits in South Africa 
were rejected. Moreover, the IDC officials interviewed agreed that given their institution’s 
risk averse nature to non-traditional markets, the IDC would not have engaged in this kind 
of lending without the EUR 108 million of EC funding in the first place. Consequently, by 
providing the IDC with EC grant finance, the RCF was structured in a way which enabled 
the use of a wide range of risky financial instruments which allowed for sizeable investments 
in a previously unbankable sector (mostly via subordinate unsecured loans). 
With regard to the second policy leverage effect, the success of the RCF has facilitated a 
crowding in effect for SME financing worth ZAR 1.4 billion within the IDC itself. 65 
According to one EIB interviewee, this crowding in can be seen as a cultural shift in the 
evolution of the IDC towards SME financing, which was initially not part of its mandate.66 
Indeed, following the success of this innovative facility, the IDC launched a number of 
                                                 
64Interviews conducted over the course of two years (2010-2011). Please refer to the Bibliography for a 
complete list of persons interviewed.  
65At June 2011 exchange rates (the time of the evaluation) this represented approximately EUR 145 million.  
66Based on interview conducted with Francois Xavier Parant in Cape Town (April 2011). 
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similar facilities modelled on the RCF (see Figure 5.5). 
Like the RCF, these funds also target un-bankable and risky enterprises with a 
development output. To give an example, the Isivande Fund is a ZAR 100 million facility 
dedicated to the support of small projects by women in the range of ZAR 20,000 to ZAR 5 
million per investment. According to IDC sources, it was launched following the success of 
the RCF and was entrusted under the care of the RCF Strategic Business Unit, which proves 
the confidence that the IDC puts in the RCF delivery mechanisms.67 What is more, the IDCs 
new funds are far less demanding in terms of development conditionalities, making project 
uptake easier.  
Ultimately, the development of these similar funding programmes within the IDC 
demonstrates the crowding in effect facilitated by the RCF. Furthermore, the RCF 
introduced the culture of providing Business Support Services (BSS) which has now been 
mainstreamed in the IDC.68 Based on these results, the RCF did not only facilitate financial 
leverage on EC grant money, but it also facilitated sector and policy leverage in the context 
of the donor’s national development strategy. 
Comparatively, the traditional LED KZN exacted some policy leverage too. According 
to the LED KZN’s programme manager, “The European Union's injection of some ZAR 
400 million over the six years, along with the much needed technical expertise, gave the 
impetus to make the pursuit of local economic development possible in the first place.” 
Furthermore, he went on to argue that “The very presence of the LED KZN programme 
has propelled the notion of local economic development onto the agenda of provincial and 
local governments in KwaZulu-Natal.”69 This assessment suggests that the LED KZN has 
raised the broader profile of the issue of local economic development, thus acting as both a 
catalyst and an agent for the cause of local economic development in the province. 
Unfortunately, however, the evaluation could not identify concrete evidence of the 
interviewee’s assessment. Furthermore, in contradiction to the interviewee’s comments, the 
survey results indicated that the EC representatives did not have a shared view on the 
interventions added value in terms of policy leverage, nor what it should have been.  
                                                 
67Also noteworthy about the Isivande Fund is that it managed to receive a ZAR 50 million commitment from a 
private party, Old Mutual, alongside the DTI ZAR 50 million allocation. As such it succeeded in leveraging 
additional private finance to a previously disenfranchised segment of South Africa’s SME sector.  
68Business Support Services did not exist in the IDC prior to the RCF. Since June 2007 BSS function was 
transferred to the whole IDC client base and located under Operations Head Office. 
69 Interview conducted with Steven Pienaar (Johannesburg, October 2011). 
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Figure 5.5: Crowding in IDC Funds - Overview of New IDC Funds 
 
Source: IDC (2011). 
 
Ultimately, despite minor problems related to the absorptive capacity of the RCF, the 
evaluation found that the RCF provided the donor with substantial value for money in terms 
of financial and policy leverage. Here the country presence and thematic expertise of the 
IDC in the area of private sector lending played a key role. The RCF has a substantially 
higher financial leverage effect than the traditional LED KZN (529% compared to 28%). In 
terms of policy leverage, the RCF provided the catalyst for this funding to take place in the 
first place and subsequently crowded in SME support by the IDC (ZAR 1.4 billion). By 
doing so the RCF acted as a market-correcting element, allowing certain constraints to 
private sector development to be addressed. Despite these findings, however, it is important 
to underline the fact that loans, such as the ones made available by the RCF, are by nature 
debt obligations and need to be linked to revenues capable to recover the loan capital and 
interests. Hence they should be seen as a complementary tool to traditional grant based 
assistance. While this new form of aid delivery is clearly a highly effective instrument for the 
donor in terms of financial and policy leverage, there is a justified fear that necessary grant 
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assistance is reduced under the justification that blending instruments expand development 
aid at lower cost to the donor.  
 
 
5.22 Coherence of Development Objectives and Capacity to follow Up on Results 
 
Evaluation Question 2: Did the donor ensure coherence of development objectives pursued and was he capable 
of following up on results when providing grant finance to the RCF? How did this compare to the provision of 
the EU’s global PSD financing? 
 
An important element of demonstrating VfM in the provision of aid lies with evaluating the 
effectiveness of the process. Consequently this evaluation looks at the coherence of 
objectives between the donor and the implementing institutions and the donor’s ability to 
follow up on development results. With regard to the reconstructed program theory, this 
question corresponds to the results and outcomes level, addressing issues of effectiveness and 
sustainability. 
With a view to exploring the coherence of the donors development objectives, this 
evaluation question first explored to what extent the objectives of the donor were in line 
with those pursued by the implementing institutions. According to Commission sources, the 
EC was able to ensure consistency between its own objectives and the objectives of the 
recipient. The reasons for this were threefold. First, the donor was fully involved during the 
set up of the innovative RCF. Second, the donor used specific targets in the form of pre-
defined development results. This included earmarking its contribution to specific activities 
in a specific sector. In this case it earmarked the funds for Risk Capital in the SME sector, 
making sure that the use of the donor money was aligned with the strategies and priorities of 
its Private Sector Development Strategy. Third, the donor aligned its Private Sector 
Development Strategy with the South African government’s development strategy. The main 
objective of the donor’s strategy is thus to assist South Africa with employment generation 
in the SME sector, as outlined in the government’s economic development policy (DTI 
1995). 
The joint objectives and results pursued with the financing of the RCF were 
subsequently laid out in the Financing Agreement. The FA was a binding contract between 
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the South African government and the EC confirming their joint agreement to the objectives 
of the RCF.70 The justification for the FA and the objectives outlined in it was given in the 
preparatory documents and agreements, notably the feasibility study. The feasibility study is 
conducted in the formulation phase of the programme. The study highlighted that the donor 
wished to establish a dynamic partnership with an appropriate apex institution (i.e. the 
institution to act as the implementing agency) already active in the SME sector which is a 
parastatal organisation and has a strong business culture. On this basis, the feasibility study 
proposed the IDC as the best parastatal for this purpose, primarily due to its strong 
development finance track record in South Africa. However, this recommendation could 
also possibly have been directed by the South African government as it is indicated in the 
feasibility study.71 
Traditionally DFIs provide development finance to address market failures and so 
complement both government sources and market financing, as well as broader 
development policy objectives including the governments strategic growth plan. The IDC 
was set up to promote economic growth and industrial development. It provides finance for 
industrial development in South Africa and the Rest of Africa. Moreover, about 97% of new 
investment approvals in the IDC’s priority sectors are identified in the government’s New 
Growth Path (IDC 2012).72   
As per the Financing Agreement, the EC and IDC decided that the RCF would support 
the empowerment of HDPs through SME equity support.73 With regard to the first RCF 
financing cycle (RCF1), the pre-defined development objectives included the following:  
 
1) SME Support: Enhanced access to finance for SMEs and emerging entrepreneurs 
via the EUR 58 million grant through investments as equity or quasi-equity; 
2) Job Creation: RCF1 should create new jobs,74 with a focus on HDP women; 
                                                 
70For the RCF2, this support took place in alignment with the DTI’s Medium Term Strategy Framework for 
2005 to 2008 of contributing to a higher level of economic growth, creating employment and reducing levels of 
inequality in the economy. 
71Article 7.2 of organisation and implementation procedure in the RCF1 feasibility study. 
72The New Growth Path, adopted in 2010, is the South African government’s framework for economic policy 
and its job creation strategy. 
73As outlined in South Africa’s Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) act. 
74 The financing agreement does not stipulate the nature of the jobs, i.e. full-time or part-time. 
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3) HDP Empowerment: RCF1 should facilitate the transfer of technical, financial and 
management skills to members of historically disadvantaged communities; 
4) Financial Self-Sustainability: RCF1 should be revolving and self-sustainable. 
At the time when these targets were set, SMEs contributed 56% of private sector 
employment and 36% of the GDP (Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency 2002). With a view 
to addressing unemployment, income inequality and poverty in South Africa, promoting 
small business development via the RCF was therefore a highly sensible approach. 
For the second RCF financing cycle (RCF2), the sui generis approach was replaced with 
more specific and measurable performance targets. On the basis of recommendations 
following a review of the RCF1, the financing agreement for RCF2 laid out seven pre-
defined results and their related indicators:75 
 
1) SME Support: Approximately 70 SMEs should be funded from the EUR 50 million 
grant through investments as equity or quasi-equity. Simultaneously the investees 
would benefit from a business support services programme funded by a EUR 5 
million grant; 
2) Job Creation: The RCF2 should create 6000 new jobs, of which 30% are to be held 
by women; 
3) Financial Self-Sustainability: RCF2 should be revolving and self-sustainable; 
4) HDP Empowerment: The investee will have to achieve a 25.1% HDP ownership 
within one year from investment. It was also envisaged to achieve women 
empowerment through shareholding and possible access to management positions;76 
5) Business Support Services: Access and use of BSS should be implemented to 
improve effective assistance to SMEs; 
6) Environmental and HIV Awareness: Investees shall set up an environment and 
HIV/AIDS protection plan in accordance with the South African law; 
7) SME Support for Wider Africa: Fifteen investments shall involve SMEs active in 
the rest of Africa, to provide a minimum of 500 jobs. 
                                                 
75These were developed between the DTI, EIB and IDC on the basis of work/experience from the RCF1 
phase, taking into account of, inter alia, desired portfolio characteristics, and desired development objective in 
line with EC PSD strategy. 
76HDP shareholder is either: a. HDP Individual; b. In the case of a workers trust – number of HDP individuals 
participating in the shareholding; c. An entity that has 25+1 HDP shareholding (counted as 1 shareholder). 




Although these seven indicators ensure that the donor grant money would be used for 
development purposes, one IDC interviewee argued that some of the criteria were too rigid 
and led to delays in the implementation of the facility. The interviewee mentioned that 
“While some conditionalities were eventually relaxed, this took a long time, thus not allowing 
the IDC to adapt quickly to the market needs.77 
When confronted with this issue, the EC project officer explained that this was a result 
of the innovative nature of the risk capital financing and the inherent lack of documented 
guidelines available for decision makers at the donor level.78 Furthermore, interviews at the 
donor’s headquarters in Brussels suggested that although the EC has increased its focus and 
financing for blending related activities over the last couple of years due to a growing 
demand for catalytic aid, this has taken place largely on an ad hoc basis rather than as a 
clearly defined development strategy.79 This finding suggests that the EC needs to explicitly 
define its strategy when channelling aid to blending activities so as to ensure that the 
decisions to fund blending activities are motivated and based on formal guidance criteria. 
This includes specifying the objectives, characteristics and rules of EC blending. 
With regard to the European Investment Bank, coherence was streamlined since both 
institutions adhere to the development policy objectives defined in the European Consensus 
for Development and the EU Treaty. This was supported by EIB and EC officials 
interviewed, who reported that the two institutions are aligned on the objectives of 
development in general. What is more, the two institutions signed an EC-EIB Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) regarding technical assistance for the Programme. Consequently 
both partners pursued common objectives and results. 
Finally, when compared to the EU’s global PSD activities, the donor generally aligned its 
support with the national priorities with recipient countries (ADE 2013 p. 37). This was 
partially attributed to the Paris and Accra Declarations, which stipulate that donors should 
provide aid which is in synergy with national development strategies. While in some cases 
the EU did not align due to a lack of a national strategy in a recipient country, these were the 
exception. Consequently, in terms of coherence of objectives, the implementation of this 
                                                 
77 Interview conducted with Jorge Maia (Johannesburg, May 2011). 
78 Interview conducted with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
79 Interview conducted with Hannes Bahrenburg (Brussels, July 2011). 
 
 92 
innovative aid modality generally followed the global guidelines pursued by the donor for all 
of its aid interventions.  
The second element which this evaluation question addressed surrounded the ability of 
the donor to follow up on its grant financing. Here the evaluation explored the capacity of 
the donor to monitor the grant financing channelled to the innovative facility compared to 
its traditional aid interventions. The EC provided EUR 58.901 million for RCF1 and EUR 
50 million for RCF2. According to the EC Delegation staff interviewed, the EC has the 
capacity and manpower to follow up the use of these funds. At the Delegation level, there 
were three people involved with the RCF: (1) a Project Officer/Task Manager, who 
maintained a close relationship with the Programme involving following up on 
implementation, including attending Programme Steering Committee meetings on a 
quarterly basis; (2) a Head of Section who oversaw the Project Officer; and (3) the Head of 
Development Cooperation who oversaw the overall implementation of EC development aid 
in South Africa. Additionally there was also the Head of Finance and Contracts and 
subordinates who oversee all contractual issues (although their relationship to the 
Programme is a bit more distant). 
The key person at this level, however, was the Project Officer, who was responsible for 
the day-to-day management of the facility. The responsibilities of this person include 
following up on critical issues pertaining to the RCF on a timely basis, as well as 
coordinating with the relevant structures within the Commission. As part of this set up, the 
EIB technical assistant is instrumental in providing technical advice to the EC Project 
Officer, especially on how to address challenging issues.80 
At the donor headquarters level, the Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) unit was 
responsible for following up on the RCF performance.81 As part of the EC’s Project Cycle 
Management (PCM) guidelines, the ROM unit was responsible for conducting the evaluation 
and monitoring phase, which are a precondition for the release of subsequent grant finance. 
The EC commissioned a Medium Term Review (MTR) for RCF1 and RCF2 respectively in 
September 2003 and October 2009, with the results being communicated to EC 
headquarters in Brussels. For the RCF2, the MTR was a precondition justifying the payment 
                                                 
80 Evidence of interactions (notes, meetings, etc.) can be found in quarterly and annual reports since 2007.   
81 There is also a specific unit dedicated to Financing Instruments under the DG DEVCO. However they deal 
with the matter on a thematic level.   
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of the third tranche (EUR 13.5 million). That being said, while the reporting was available to 
task managers, interviews at EC headquarters in Brussels revealed that databases and 
information systems on blending mechanisms were and still are confronted with structural 
issues: they are not homogenous and there is no archive or database for providing overviews 
of the EUs global blending instruments. As a result EC staff has difficulties with the retrieval 
of adequate information on blending mechanisms. 
When compared to the donor’s global PSD interventions between 2004 and 2010, the 
follow up and monitoring of final impacts was also problematic. Whereas most PSD 
interventions reported successful completion of outputs, the subsequent impacts were often 
not monitored by the donor. This was particularly true for interventions that provided tailor 
made investment related activities, including supporting SMEs via intermediary organisations 
(ADE 2013 p. 97). Here evaluations commissioned by the donor faced difficulties with 
regards to a lack of baseline data, as well as uncertainty as to what should be measured. This 
was thus consistent with the evaluation’s findings related to the RCF. Consequently while 
the organisational structure at EC headquarters for blending mechanisms has not been 
sufficiently developed, the follow up and monitoring of results and impacts was equally 
problematic for the donor’s traditional aid interventions.  
Finally, at the IDC level the evaluation found that the managers at the implementing 
level communicated well and demonstrated effective transmission of the agreed monitoring 
documents. Furthermore, the EC project officer also noted that detailed monitoring reports 
were prepared by the IDC on a quarterly and annual basis. These reports demonstrate the 
evolution of the RCF unit to date and have provided assurance of the IDC's professionalism 
in managing the RCF. In addition, the EIB made presentations during the PSC meetings 
which demonstrate the quarterly and annual progress, and also prepared annual performance 
reviews reports reflecting on the IDC's management of the innovative facility. 
Ultimately the results presented above suggest that the EC generally ensured that its own 
objectives and those of the recipients were in line. While some of the RCF’s conditionalities 
proved overly rigid this was a result of the innovative nature of the risk capital financing and 
the inherent lack of documented guidelines available for decision makers at the donor level. 
Furthermore, the evaluation demonstrated that at the implementing level, the donor had the 
capacity and manpower to follow up the use of these innovative funds. Here the IDC and 
the EC Delegation were supported by the EIB. Yet while the RCF reported successful 
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completion of its outputs, the donor did not monitor the impacts. Moreover, evidence 
suggests that the follow up and monitoring of results and impacts was equally problematic 
for the donor’s traditional aid interventions. 
 
5.23 Development Results Achieved 
 
Evaluation Question 3: To what degree did channelling to this innovative facility contribute in a sustainable 
manner to achieving the intervention objectives the donor targeted when channelling its funds? How do the 
results compare to broader SME support in South Africa as well as the EU’s global PSD financing? 
   
The first objective of this evaluation question is to determine if the RCF achieved its own 
financing targets and to locate these financing efforts in the broader context of SME support 
in South Africa. Here the case study compares RCF support in the context of the IDC’s 
global lending portfolio as well as with data on financing extended to SMEs by other DFIs 
in South Africa, including private sector SME lenders. The second objective is to compare 
the RCF financing results to the EU’s global PSD financing results where possible.82 
With regard to the reconstructed program theory, this question corresponds to the 
results and outputs level, addressing issues of effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Indeed, 
this evaluation question is important in terms of measuring VfM as the degree of 
achievement of the results and impacts at the beneficiary level is the ultimate justification for 
providing development aid.  
The findings presented below are grounded in the data, interviews and reports facilitated 
by a number of institutions and companies.83 The results will be presented in accordance 
with the core themes of the private sector support provided by the innovative RCF and 
compared to broader SME support in South Africa as well as the EU’s global PSD financing 
where possible. This includes first, SME support, and second, job creation and socio-
                                                 
82This was deemed as appropriate since the LED KZN did not serve as counterfactual with regard to the 
ultimate beneficiaries, providing no comparable control group to measure against the RCF. 




economic support.84Additionally the evaluation will explore the financial self-sustainability of 
the blending facility financed and provide an in depth analysis of two investee clients funded 
by the RCF to demonstrate some of the benefits and constraints of the intervention at the 
micro level. 
First, with regard to SME support, access to finance is a key constraint for private sector 
development in developing countries. As Table 5.2 indicates, the RCF is not the only 
provider of SME financing in South Africa.85 Here the evaluation tried to compare the RCFs 
performance indicators to global IDC lending as well as broader SME support where 
possible.  
At the time of its inception, the RCF was unique in its targeting SMEs which were 
previously considered to be unbankable. 86  Indeed, at the beginning of the first RCF 
financing cycle in 2002, the Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA) had not yet been 
launched (this was only the case in 2012).87 SEFA, a subsidiary of the IDC, covers a large 
portion of the SME market, including micro-enterprises with a HDP focus. While the IDC’s 
global lending activities also offers SME financing, it focuses more on the medium segment 
of the SME market (IDC 2012). Similarly, Business Partners, a specialist risk finance 
company, provides financing to SMEs with a lower risk valuation than the RCF.  
 
Table 5.2 RCF Indicators in context of broader SME Support 
  




SME financing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Focal sector Agribusiness Agribusiness Service 
Metals and 
Mining Service 
Cost per job n/a ZAR 41,800 ZAR 48,031 n/a ZAR 10,001 
HDP focus Yes Yes Yes No No 
Investment in 
rural areas n/a 63% 67% 48% 50% 
                                                 
84While the RCF1 did not have predefined results, the financing agreement for RCF2 laid out seven pre-defined 
results and related indicators formulated on the basis of the experiences with the RCF1.  
85 The evaluation was not able to find comparative data for all of the indicators in table 5.2 (n/a indicates that 
data was not available). 
86 Eligible SMEs require any two of: Less than 200 employees; Annual turnover of less than ZAR 51 million; 
Total assets of less than ZAR 55 million. 
87 SEFA was established on 1st April 2012 as a result of the merger of South African Micro Apex Fund, Khula 




B-BBEE focus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Women 
ownership 17% 40% 39% 4% n/a 
Women jobs n/a 33% n/a n/a n/a 
Women 
management n/a 37% n/a n/a n/a 
Business 
Support No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Environmental 
and HIV 
support No Yes No Yes No 
SME support 
for wider Africa No 0 No No No 
Financial self-
sustainability No No Yes Yes Yes 
Impairments n/a 31% 30% 18.2% 6.8% 
Source: (EIB 2011, SEFA 2013, 2014, IDC 2011a, 2012, Business Partners 2012)  
 
With the creation of the RCF1 over 64 SME’s gained access to support, which, 
according to IDC officials interviewed, would not have been able to access finance 
otherwise. 88  These initial results indicated the RCF’s ability to reconcile social welfare 
support through grants and commercial sector support; something the donor could not have 
done via its traditional aid modalities.  
Following the positive experiences with the RCF1, the second financing cycle included a 
target of supporting at least 70 SMEs through its three investment channels. After some 
delay in the implementation of RCF2, by August 2011, 47 investments worth ZAR 295 
million had been approved through the Direct channel and Niche fund channel (IDC 2011). 
While the target number of 70 SMEs had not been reached, this should be seen in the 
context of the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, which brought about a general 
reluctance of SMEs to borrow due to uncertainty regarding the economic recovery. Despite 
these uncertain times, however, one interviewee highlighted that in contrast to traditional 
lenders, the RCF did not cut credit lines nor tighten its lending criteria.89 Ultimately, at the 
time of the evaluation EIB and IDC staff were optimistic that the facility would meet its 
targeted amount before the culmination of the programme. 
                                                 
88 Interview conducted with Jorge Maia from the IDC (Johannesburg, October 2011). 
89Interview conducted with Jorge Maia (Johannesburg, May 2011). 
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With regard to the sector distribution, Figure 5.6 demonstrates the RCF’s high level of 
investment in the agribusiness sector (nearly half of commitments). This is unusual when 
compared to the investment focus of the broader SME support in South Africa (see Table 
5.2). Business Partners, for instance, primarily finances SMEs operating in the service sector 
(36%), while agribusiness accounted for an insignificant amount of its lending (Business 
Partners 2011). What is more, according to IDC figures, agriculture and forestry accounts 
for only 3,9% of its global lending portfolio, while the metals and mining sectors dominate 
the portfolio with 20% and 23% respectively  (IDC 2011a). Despite this relative 
concentration, the IDC has made significant progress in diversifying its portfolio from 
resources to non-resource-based investments (IDC 2012). 
 
Figure 5.6: RCF2 Sector Distribution by Loan Volume 
 
Source: EIB (2011). 
 
With regard to the RCF, it thus seems that the SME sector to which it caters is 
characterised by a high level of agricultural related business ventures. While this 
concentration of risk could have an effect on fund viability, it was noted by IDC staff that 
this sector is desirable from a development perspective given agribusiness has the potential 
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to create knock on effects by promoting other local suppliers.90 That being said, the largest 
investee’s in this sector need to be managed closely as any negative performance will 
significantly impact the fund growth/sustainability. Diversifying its portfolio would limit the 
RCF’s exposure to factors beyond its control, such as market and labour volatility, while 
improving its ability to exercise its developmental mandate. 
In addition to support for the local SME industry in South Africa, the RCF’s Financing 
Agreement also outlined that 15 SMEs involved with operations in all of Africa should be 
supported by the RCF2, providing at least 500 jobs. As Table 5.2 indicates, this was an 
ambitious target even when compared to the broader SME support in South Africa. Not 
surprisingly, this target has been a failure, as no such investment has been committed so far. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that it is the opinion of the EIB staff interviewed that such a 
result is not achievable in the present environment, as HDP SMEs are generally too weak on 
the management side to extend themselves internationally.91 This suggests a general failure 
on part of the EC’s strategy documentation, given that a needs analysis prior to the RCF’s 
implementation was only conducted on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Table 5.3 Comparative Indicators RCF and Global PSD Support 
  RCF EU Global PSD 
SME Support 
Evidence of improved access to 
finance for SMEs 
Little evidence of improved access to 
finance for SMEs  
Business 
Support 
Business support was provided 
under the RCF2  
Technical assistance made up the 
largest share of global PSD support 
Job Creation  Evidence of job creation 
Linkages between EU support and job 
creation remained distant at best  
Development 
Conditionalities 
Rigid lending conditionalties tied 
to development targets 
Evidence of stringent development 
conditionalities  
 
Improved access to financing for SMEs was also one of the targets laid out in the 
European Commission’s Guidelines for PSD support (European Commission 2003a p. 11). 
Notwithstanding this target, the donor’s global PSD support demonstrated little evidence of 
improved access to finance for SMEs between 2004 and 2010. Based on an ADE (2013) 
                                                 
90Interview conducted with Meryl Mamathuba (Pretoria, May 2011). 
91Interview conducted with Francois Xavier Parant (Cape Town, April 2011). 
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evaluation, the Commission’s activities primarily supported beneficiaries at the macro level, 
with very limited support for SME credit lines at the micro level. The report notes that: 
 
Of the 20 EU Delegations responding to the EU Delegation survey that 
conducted access to finance activities, 65% (13) conducted activities aiming to 
improve the regulatory environment of financial intermediaries and 80% (16) 
conducted activities supporting intermediary organization. Indeed, very few PSD 
interventions acted at the micro-level, barring some cases of projects aiming to 
enhance enterprise ability to access finance (e.g. in Jordan). (ADE 2013 p. 130) 
 
The report further suggests that in the few instances where access to finance was a 
project objective, a lack of analysis and private sector consultation prior to project 
implementation led to considerable problems in terms of SME financing. These findings 
seem to suggest that in comparison the innovative RCF demonstrated far greater value. 
In addition to SME financing, the innovative blending facility also provided business 
support services to its recipients. While there was no Business Support for the RCF1, the 
EIB pushed for it as a necessary addition for RCF2. As a result, the IDC provided a EUR 5 
million grant for the provision of Business Support Access under RCF2. Consequently the 
financing agreement stipulates that this support must be used to improve effective assistance 
to SMEs either on an ex ante basis to improve feasibility studies or business plans of the 
investees, or on a ex post basis to support management in a number of domains such as 
finance or marketing. 
In the case of the RCF financed projects, BSS has had a low uptake. By August 2011, 
there had been 13 approvals worth ZAR 11.04 million in commitments (IDC 2011). Yet 
actual BSS disbursements stand at a low ZAR 220,780, including some grants paid to RCF1 
clients. This figure represents only a fraction (0.4%) of the total budget of EUR 5 million 
(ZAR 48.5 million) available for RCF investees. 
According to EIB sources, the main reason for the lack of use of BSS was related to the 
fact that the RCF provides it’s funding predominantly through subordinate unsecured loans. 
By not supporting the investees as a minority shareholder, the RCF does not provide 
support to the SME management, neither at the board level, nor at the executive 
management level. This “lender” approach and the non-compulsory nature of this support 
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provides no incentive to support the investees via BSS. Additionally, as will be discussed in 
evaluation question five, IDC management fees are set up in a way that prompts RCF task 
managers to maximize re-flows i.e. select good risks. As a result some of the projects 
financed by the RCF are not strictly “unbankable” and do not require BSS. Finally, it was 
also noted that there has been a lack of cooperation between the Business Support Services 
and the RCF Strategic Business Unit within the IDC. 
When comparing these results to broader SME support in South Africa, Table 5.2 
indicates that business support is general industry practice. SEFA, for instance, focuses on 
post investment support to manage the rate of impairments. As noted in their annual report: 
 
A post investment unit is now pro-actively providing business support and 
tailored mentorship services to SMME clients. Partnerships with private sector 
service providers have been established to provide tailored and industry specific 
business support and mentorship programmes, aided by effective workout and 
restructuring interventions (SEFA 2014 p. 30). 
 
Perhaps more significantly, business support via non-investment support (i.e. technical 
assistance) made up the largest share of global PSD assistance between 2004 and 2010 (see 
Table 5.3). While this sort of support was made available over a wide range of countries and 
a diverse range of aid modalities, the majority of it targeted the institutional and regulatory 
level with a view to building capacities at intermediary institutions (ADE 2013 p. 100). 
Furthermore, evidence suggests this type of support improved the institutional capacity of 
intermediary organisations without necessarily improving business support for enterprises. 
While there are thus parallels to the experiences with the RCF, blending facilities have the 
potential to significantly extend the availability of technical support at the micro level 
compared to traditional interventions. 
In addition to SME support, the evaluation explored the job creation and socio-
economic support results. When compared to its own targets, the RCF has been very 
successful at creating jobs. While the first round of financing did not involve explicit targets, 
for the RCF2 the job creating target was set at 6,000, with jobs created through the Direct 
Investment Channel not exceeding the cost per job ratio of ZAR 60,000 for a portfolio 
basis. By August 2011, the time of the last available figures, the RCF had created an 
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estimated 5,395 jobs through the direct investment channel and the niche fund channel, and 
was therefore well on track for reaching its target. The average cost per job stood at ZAR 
41,800 per job created and is therefore also well below the target of ZAR 60,000 (EIB 
2011).92  
In comparison, Table 5.2 indicates that the private SME lender Business Partners’ cost 
per job created was much lower, standing at around ZAR 10,001. Interestingly the average 
cost per job created by SEFA stood at ZAR 48,000 (SEFA, 2013). Given SEFA also has a 
HDP focus along with socioeconomic empowerment conditionalities, this dynamic seems to 
support the notion that the RCFs cost per job ration was aligned with its role in supporting 
high-risk sectors and businesses unattractive to commercial financiers. 
That being said, it is important to mention two caveats, notably the nature of the jobs 
created and the distribution across SMEs financed by the RCF. First, while there is no 
explicit mention of the nature of jobs to be created in the financing agreement signed 
between the donor and the IDC, the evaluation revealed that in some cases jobs created 
included part-time employment. This was particularly true in the agribusiness sector which 
represented the majority of RCF investments and which is characterised by seasonal 
employment. Second, the distribution of jobs created among the SMEs financed was 
skewed. Here the evaluation discovered that the six largest investees alone contribute to 
more than 50% of the expected jobs created and over 75% of expected HDP ownership. 
While some investees created a lot more jobs than others, this may be explained by the fact 
that many of the largest investees were active in the agribusiness sector. It thus seems that 
many of these jobs were of a seasonal nature.  
When comparing these results to those of the EU’s global PSD initiatives, this was no 
easy task, predominantly due to the fact that the EU’s global PSD initiatives rarely included 
explicit targets and indicators to measure (see Table 5.3). Indeed, the RCF is one of the few 
cases involving pro-active targeting and monitoring of employment related objectives. 
Conversely the evaluation found that for the EU’s global PSD interventions the linkages 
between EU support and job creation remained distant at best (ADE 2013). Interviews at 
the donor headquarters suggested that the EU’s PSD support lacked a systematic approach 
                                                 
92Taking the total RCF investment for a SME project and dividing it by the number of jobs created measured 
the total cost per job.  
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to integrating job creation as a key objective in aid modalities.93 Rather the donor often 
treated job creation as a separate objective from PSD support. Furthermore, while job 
creation did figure in several intervention objectives, it was rarely monitored. The RCF’s 
ability to push job creation in a previously disenfranchised sector was thus an effective tool 
at the micro level to create sustainable jobs in the context of PSD.  
In addition to job creation, the RCF also provided support for a variety of socio-
economic empowerment indicators (see Table 5.2). Based on the results obtained, the first 
financing cycles of the RCF led to the support for a significant number of HDPs. However, 
given there were no explicit targets for the RCF1, the results served primarily as a basis to 
formulate specific and measurable targets for the RCF2. To give an example, the figure of 
17% of female shareholding under RCF1 indicated that more needed to be done with a view 
to targeting women empowerment. Consequently, the target for the RCF2 was set at 30%. 
For the RCF2, socio-economic empowerment targets were pre-defined in the financing 
agreement between the donor and the recipient and largely benchmarked against the 
performance of the RCF1. This agreement envisioned increased HDP ownership at the 
SME level of a minimum of 25%+1 within one year from investment. According to EIB 
statistics, all but two transactions fulfilled this demand.94 While these are positive figures, it 
should be pointed out that 75% of all HDP ownership was made up by the six biggest 
projects financed by the RCF. This is consistent with the finding presented above, which 
demonstrated that the six largest SMEs funded were also responsible for a disproportional 
share of job creation.  
With regard to women empowerment, EIB statistics show that the target of 30% 
ownership, jobs, and management positions held by women have all been surpassed. In 
comparison, Table 5.2 demonstrates that SEFA also monitored women ownership as one of 
its financing targets. Of the SMEs financed by SEFA, 39% were women owned compared to 
the RCF’s 40%. In comparison, only 4% of the transactions financed by the IDC’s global 
lending activities were at least 30% women owned.  
A similar comparison can be drawn in terms of geographical bias. The RCF2 financing 
targets stipulated that at least 65% of investments should be made outside the economic 
hubs of the Western Cape and Gauteng. The RCF is close to its geographical spread target 
                                                 
93Interview conducted with Torsten Ewerbeck (Brussels, July 2011). 
94The same results were found by an independent review in 2009 (CHIKONAS 2009). 
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of 65% of investees outside the richest regions of Gauteng and the Western Cape 
(achievement was 63% in terms of volume). In comparison, 45% of IDC’s global lending 
activities took place outside the two economic hubs, while SEFA’s rural investments stood 
at 67% and Business Partners’ at 50%. The RCF’s focus on regional inequality within the 
SME sector was therefore an attempt at reducing the divide between the richest and poorest 
provinces of South Africa. 
Finally, the last socio-economic target set out by the financing agreement stipulates that 
all RCF investees must set up an environmental and HIV/AIDS protection plan in 
accordance with the South African law. While this is a sensible approach in theory, it was 
difficult for SMEs to implement in practice. According to 2010/2011 IDC monitoring 
reports, not all investees have such policies in place. In fact, only six larger investees have 
HIV/AIDS policies in place, while the majority of smaller investees have no formal policies. 
Furthermore, although HIV/ AIDS may be informally discussed amongst investee staff, 
thereby raising awareness on these issues, the investee does not drive these measures.  
With regard to environmental policies, all the investees adhere to environmental 
guidelines. That being said, two investees have experienced delays due to environmental 
certification. While the RCF should investigate the viability of co-funding HIV/AIDS policy 
development as well as environmental certification exercises, on the whole, the relevance of 
these conditionalities has to be questioned. Given most investees simply cannot afford 
implementing these measures, they represent an obstacle to the efficient implementation of 
the RCF.95 
Indeed, whether the amount of socio-economic conditionalities imposed was adequate is 
debatable. While some form of development oriented targets were necessary, the sheer 
number was excessive, leading to hold ups and a slow throughput of lending activities. This 
was made all the more evident when compared to the performance indicators of Business 
Partners, which was not constrained by these lending conditionalities (see Table 5.2). 
Interestingly, however, the rigidity of the RCFs lending conditions also played a role in 
facilitating the crowding in of additional lending activities within the IDC, as it led to the 
creation of similar funds within the IDC with less stringent lending conditionalities.96 
When compared to the donors traditional aid modalities, Table 5.3 indicated that global 
                                                 
95See case study example for ‘Cement Company Y’ below.  
96As discussed in the first evaluation question. 
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private sector development support generally involved stringent development 
conditionalities (ADE 2013 p. 87). Despite stringent indicators, however, the EU’s 2010 
guideline highlighted the importance of improving PSD evaluations by providing much 
more concrete guidance to implementing institutions (European Commission 2010a). This 
lack of concrete guidance in the early stages of aid implementation was mirrored by the 
experiences with the RCF. Given the lack of formal guidance on blending instruments, EU 
officials involved in drafting the RCF’s lending criteria chose to err on the side of caution, 
imposing a sizable number of socio-economic conditionalities. The implication is that in the 
future the donor needs to explicitly define its strategy when channelling aid to blending 
mechanisms so as to ensure that the decisions to fund this innovative aid modality are 
motivated and based on formal guidance criteria. This includes specifying the objectives, 
characteristics and rules of EC blending, and should be simple and flexible enough to deal 
with the market realities and dynamics of the private sector. 
In addition to the results presented above, one of the key objectives predefined by the 
donor was for the RCF to maintain its nominal value over time, which means a nominal 
Internal Rate of Return of zero percent post bad debts and fund management fees. As Table 
5.2 highlighted, at the time of the evaluation, the RCF was not yet financially self-sustainable. 
Establishing whether innovative blending facilities may in fact achieve financial self-
sustainability is relevant to the evaluation question as it would demonstrate significant value 
vis a vis traditional project aid. Indeed, in the case of the EU’s traditional aid delivery, 
projects often seize to exist once donor funding runs out.   
Whether the targeted 100% sustainability ratio of the innovative blending facility may in 
fact be achieved at the end of the twelve-year implementation period depends on the future 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) flows. While the RCF1 has not been revolving thus far, this 
has been attributed to the slow-through put of the new requests channelled to the RCF. That 
being said, EIB sources suggested that it is possible to calculate the viability of the fund on 
the basis of actual data and a number of assumptions.97 Consequently, an analysis of the 
future receivables indicates that the RCF will be sustainable by the end of its 
implementation. Table 5.4 below provides an overview of actual and forecasted portfolio 
data for the RCF1. 
                                                 
97See Appendix E for assumptions and a comprehensive overview of the RCF portfolio. 
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Table 5.4: RCF Portfolio June 30th 2011 (ZAR million) 
Direct and Niche Fund Channel Portfolio 
Number of transactions approved (net of 
cancellation) 
64 
Committed Funding (actual + forecasted) ZAR 277 million 
Actual Disbursements ZAR 269,4 million 
Write offs     31% 
Actual and Forecasted Reflows ZAR 461,5 million 
Actual and Forecasted Leakages ZAR 119,8 million 
Nominal IRR 3.4% 
Source: IDC (2011). 
  
As the table indicates, based on actual and forecasted reflows and leakages, the nominal 
IRR calculated on the current portfolio demonstrates a return of 3.4% (1.0% for the direct 
investment channel and 10.6% for the niche fund channel). The relatively low return on the 
direct fund channel is a result of the kind of high risk projects it facilitates. The high return 
on niche fund investments explains why this investment channel was able to attract 
considerable private capital. Overall the portfolio review suggests that the RCF1 will reach 
its targeted 100% nominal sustainability.98 
Like the RCF1, the RCF2 has not been revolving thus far, however was predicted to 
reach 100% financial sustainability at the end of its implementation phase. Based on the 
same assumptions as for the RCF1, Table 5.5 provides an overview of the actual and 
forecasted financial performance of the RCF2.99 
Based on actual and forecasted reflows and leakages, the nominal IRR calculated on the 
current portfolio indicates a return of 7.5% (4.2% for the direct investment channel and 
11.7% for the niche fund channel), suggesting that the RCF2 will reach its targeted 100% 
nominal sustainability. RCF write-offs also represent a small proportion of the overall 
portfolio (13% for RCF2).  
Referring to Table 5.2, the RCF’s level of impairments (36% for RCF2) is relatively high 
                                                 
98It should also be noted that an additional buffer to achieve the targeted nominal return can be derived from 
the fact that some re-flows are deposited on a interest bearing account, which might contribute to achieve the 
nominal sustainability, if not reinvested as planned. 
99As it stands, the Direct Channel and the Niche Fund Channel have been the only channels used under the 
RCF2, as still no investment has been realised under the Third Party Channel. 
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when compared to the broader support for SMEs in South Africa. SEFA, which also 
finances SMEs with an HDP focus, has an investee impairment level of 30%, while the 
IDC’s global loan impairments stands at 18.2%. 100  The IDC’s level of impairments has 
increased steadily over the past years, with the ratio of impairments as a percentage of the 
portfolio rising from 16.3% in March 2010 to 18.2% in March 2012. While this reflects the 
IDC’s growing appetite for risk, the IDC’s balance sheet continues to be dominated by large, 
mature, listed investments. 
 
Table 5.5: RCF2 Portfolio September 30th 2011 (ZAR million) 
Direct and Niche Fund Channel Portfolio 
Number of transactions approved (net of 
cancellation) 
47 
Committed Funding (actual + forecasted) ZAR 290 million 
Actual Disbursements ZAR 166 million 
Write offs    13% 
Impairments 36% 
Actual and Forecasted Reflows ZAR 748 million 
Actual and Forecasted Leakages ZAR 273 million 
Nominal Cash Flow ZAR 185 million 
Nominal IRR 7.5% 
Source: IDC (2011). 
 
Ultimately, the lowest level of investee impairments, unsurprisingly, was Business 
Partners with the ratio of impairments as a percentage of the portfolio standing at 6.8%. 
This divergence can be explained by two factors. First, it is a direct product of the kind of 
investments that the respective funds facilitate. The RCF and SEFA predominantly focus on 
funding early stage HDP projects and start-up operations. And second, many SMEs were 
challenged by difficult market conditions following the financial crisis.101  
                                                 
100As a percentage of the overall portfolio at the end of March 2012 (IDC 2012). 
101In light of this, investees believe that the RCF should be more perceptive to their development needs. 
Indeed, interviews suggested that they believe that in times of trouble, they are treated just as any other 
commercial investee. Interview conducted via phone with Joseph Ngoasheng, Managing Director of a Cement 
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While the figures above suggest that the portfolio investees are performing relatively 
well, the evaluation identified a concern relating to the financial sustainability of the RCF. 
Indeed, the financial sustainability of this innovative facility depends both on the ability to 
price its financial instruments accordingly, as well as the sustainability of the invested SMEs. 
Based on the interviews conducted, it became apparent that there was a problem concerning 
the loan duration of the financing instruments used by the RCF and its effect on the SME’s 
financed. The RCF predominantly used unsecured subordinate loans (these make up 85% of 
the number of investments). It was noted that most RCF subordinate loans have the same 
terms (i.e. duration, grace period, repayment schedule) as general, non-development oriented 
IDC loans. However, with an average duration of 5 years, RCF subordinate loans do not 
provide the long-term support that many of these investments require. The implication is 
that the short loan duration drains the cash flow of the recipient company at a time when the 
growth of its activities requires increased working capital and possibly new investments. 
Ultimately this will affect the sustainability of the SME’s financed and thus the RCF’s future 
receivables.102 
While ultimately the RCF should still reach its targeted financial sustainability, these 
findings suggest that it needs to improve its results in a number of ways. According to the 
investment guidelines of the EIB-IDC Memorandum of Agreement, the loan duration for 
RCF loans should be around 8-12 years. Hence, in keeping with the Memorandum of 
Agreement, the RCF should implement these guidelines to allow for loan repayments to start 
significantly after typical IDC loans repayments. This longer grace period should not 
aggravate the risk in a substantial way, since most write offs usually occur within the first five 
years. When pressed on this issue, however, RCF staff noted that the reasons for not using 
more equity finance with longer grace periods is threefold. First, they expressed the difficulty 
to recoup administrative expenses on small transactions. Second, they suggested that 
increasing the use of real equity financing would substantially increase the administrative 
burden. And third, they mentioned a lack of manpower at the RCF staff level to provide 
board level management support to all investee’s.103 
                                                                                                                                                 
manufacturing SME financed by the RCF (February, 2012). For further detail see case study examples at the 
end of Evaluation Question 3. 
102Another factor determining the sustainability of the projects financed is the use of business support services, 
as will be discussed later. 
103Interview conducted with Meryl Mamathuba of the IDC (Pretoria, May 2011.) 
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With a view to evaluating the ultimate beneficiaries of the RCF, this evaluation question 
also aimed to provide selected case study examples of SMEs supported by RCF funds. These 
two examples will provide a brief analysis of the background of the SME’s, an overview of 
their loan performance and development results, challenges faced, as well as the role of the 
RCF support with regard to the SME’s growth potential.104 
First, “Blueberry Farm X” is a start up operation which launched in 2008. It consists of a 
253 hectare blueberry farm located in South Africa’s poorest region, the Eastern Cape. The 
business plan foresees the company to eventually grow blueberries on 230 hectares under 
weather protecting nets.  
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shares 
IRR 8% 12/06/2007 
Source: IDC (2011a). 
 
While the farm has sufficient water supply, it is currently running one year behind its 
business schedule due to unforeseen problems. So far, 32 hectares have been planted, with 
another 18 hectares currently under preparation. According to their Director, “The berries 
harvested have been of good quality, being successfully sold to local retailers such as Pick 
and Pay and Spar.”105 However, he also noted that the planted area has yielded limited 
produce so far, given harvests tend to take place in the second and third year of operations.  
According to the RCF staff and the Investee’s Director, the use of preference shares to 
support the company was the appropriate instrument as it increases the borrowing capacity 
of the SME. While the return to the RCF will be delayed due to the one-year project 
implementation lag, the IDC anticipates its forecasted return to be met. That being said, it 
was pointed out that for the IDC, the projected return of ZAR 1.1 million on an investment 
                                                 
104Due to a non-disclosure agreement with the IDC, this thesis is unable to publish the real names of the 
investees.  
105Interview conducted with Philip Howes via phone in February 2012. 
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of ZAR 18.3 million was relatively low compared to other agricultural investees (see Table 
5.6). Here the IDC may need to amend its returns.  
 
Table 5.7 Blueberry Farm Perfomance Targets Overview 
Assessment area RCF Target Forecasted Achievement 
SME Size Any two of: 
 Less than 200 
employees 
 Annual turnover 
of less than R51 
million 
 Total assets of 





Job Creation -- 500 218 
Cost per Job ZAR 60,000 ZAR 47,000 ZAR 84,000 
Geographic Location 65 % outside Gauteng 
Province and the Western 
Cape 
-- Eastern Cape 
HIV Aids Policy Policy in place Yes Yes 
Environmental 
Certification 
RSA Certification n/a n/a 
HDP and Women 
Empowerment 
   
HDP Managers 30% 2 16 
BEE ownership At least 25% + 1  100% 100% 
Women ownership 30% 30% n/a 
Women jobs 30% 0% 65% 
Women management 30% 1 4 
Source: Source (IDC 2011b). 
 
Despite the implementation lag, this RCF investee has been quite successful with regard 
to job creation and development targets. Thus far, Blueberry Farm X has created 218 new 
jobs, the majority of which are part-time (see Table 5.7). 106  With another 200 hectares 
remaining to be planted and harvested, it is therefore still possible that at the end of the loan 
term the company will have significantly empowered people from very poor backgrounds by 
                                                 
106An important caveat here is that given the nature of the industry (berry farming), the majority of the jobs 
created were part-time rather than full-time jobs.   
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providing up to 500 jobs. What is more, the investee has implemented a HIV/AIDS policy 
which includes voluntary testing of staff members.  
Concerning HDP and women empowerment, the project has achieved its HDP 
shareholding percentage, being above the 25%+1 agreement target. Yet the number of HDP 
shareholders is still lagging behind due to the fact that the farm has not reached its full 
capacity. Nonetheless, the project is exceeding both the general HDP managers target as well 
as the female HDP managers target (16 and 4 respectively.) While the figures for female 
shareholding were not available, the project has created 142 female jobs. This number 
represents 65% of jobs created, meaning that the 30% female shareholding target has also 
been met. Finally, while the assessed cost per job of ZAR 84,000 is higher than the forecast 
of ZAR 47,000, IDC staff interviewed indicated that given the remaining capacity of the 
blueberry farm, it is very likely that with project maturity this target will also be met.  
Ultimately it seems that apart from the one-year implementation delay, this investee is 
performing well and is expected to achieve its overall performance targets. According to the 
managing director, the RCF funds have allowed the SME to become a profitable business, 
demonstrating clear growth potential. Prior to the support, the venture had been unable to 
take off due to the high costs of taking out a loan from private lending institutions. 
Consequently access to funds provided by the RCF allowed the company to take out 
additional loans and reduce its capital and interest repayments considerably. What is more, 
access to Business Support Services has enabled the SME to rework its repayment capability 
as well as optimizing plant preparation and disease management via professional 
consultation. According to the interviewee, the anticipated effect here would be the 
empowering of the workers at a quicker pace.107 
The second SME case study, “Cement Company Y”, was located in a township in the 
South Africa’s Northern Province and is a cement mixing production company. Following a 
two-year implementation delay due to technical problems with the installation of the plant, 
the company has been operational since 2009. Despite effective business operations and 
obtaining a South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) certificate for their product, this 
SME has been facing difficulties with RCF repayments, primarily due to a downturn in the 
construction industry. Furthermore, given the low barriers to entry in this market, the SME 
                                                 
107Interview conducted with Philip Howes via telephone (February 2012). 
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faces numerous competitors.108 As a result, the company had to approach the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry for additional grant financing of ZAR 1.6 million. This 
amount was granted, and a portion of it has been used to pay RCF arrears, with the rest of 
the grant being used for additional start up costs (in this case the purchase of a delivery van). 
 
























1,700,000 -- 1,700,000 1,000,000 Subordinate 
Loan 
IRR 6% 08/06/2007 
Source: Source IDC (2011). 
   
In terms of financial performance the company has not been very successful. The tough 
economic circumstances have contributed to lower than expected returns (see Table 5.8). 
The average revenues for this investee are currently estimated at ZAR 400,000 per month 
(ZAR 4.8 million for 2011). Yet this figure is far less than the ZAR 21 million it had 
forecasted by the year 2010 (even after taking into account the project delays). Despite 
capturing the additional government loan to pay IDC arrears, the fact that net profit margins 
remain low per bag of cement means that it would be difficult for the SME to improve its 
financial situation. While the use of a subordinate loan to finance this investee was seen as 
appropriate by the RCF, the use of equity with subsequent management support could have 
been more effective.109 
Unless this SME manages to implement a significant shift in its selling strategy, increase 
its profitability per cement bag, and captures a larger segment of the market, it is unlikely for 
the situation to improve anytime soon. Were it not for the grant from the DTI, this investee 
would battle to afford its current repayments. It is therefore anticipated that the RCF will 
not achieve its forecasted return for Cement Y. 
                                                 
108High competition has translated into falling prices, implying a loss of profitability. In such cases, profitability 
can only be increased by streamlining the value chain, i.e. transportation of input materials and delivery 
transportation. Indeed, interviews revealed that the more successful cement manufacturers have streamlined 
their operations as they own the input and output transport logistics (interview conducted with Joseph 
Ngoasheng via phone in February 2012).  




Table 5.9: Cement Company Performance Targets 
Assessment area RCF Target Forecasted Achievement 
SME Size Any two of: 
 Less than 200 
employees 
 Annual turnover 
of less than R51 
million 
 Total assets of 





Job Creation -- 50 20 
Cost per Job ZAR 60,000 ZAR 34,000 ZAR 113,000 
Geographic Location 65 % outside Gauteng 
Province and the Western 
Cape 
-- Northern Province 
HIV Aids Policy Policy in place Yes No 
Environmental 
Certification 
RSA Certification n/a n/a 
HDP and Women 
Empowerment 
   
BEE ownership At least 25% + 1  100% 100% 
HDP Managers (Male 
and Female) 
30% 4 5 
Women ownership 30% 30% 50%  
Women jobs 30% 30% 5% 
Women management 30% 30% 0% 
Source: Source IDC (2011b). 
 
With regard to job creation, the two-year delay and poor financial performance mean 
that the company has thus far only been able to hire 20 people, while the forecasted figure 
was a total of 50 jobs  (see Table 5.9).  
Given the low profitability and job creation of Cement Y at the time of evaluation, the 
analysis of the development performance indicators was a mixed bag. While this investee 
does not have an HIV/ AIDS policy, the project has achieved its HDP shareholding 
percentage (100%). It is also above the 25%+1 agreement target. Furthermore, the HDP 
manager target as well as female shareholding has been achieved (50%). Yet the project has 
no female managers, nor has it met the forecast HDP female jobs (1 assessed and 24 
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forecast). Lastly, the cost per job of ZAR 113,000 is significantly higher than the forecast of 
ZAR 34,000. Only if operations increase and financial performance improves will this target 
be met.  
Ultimately, although this SME is not engaged in a complex business, the low sales and 
profitability of the industry are a major impediment. While the SME was able to commence 
operations with the RCF loan, the company faces considerable input and output logistics 
costs. However, by not supporting the investees as a minority shareholder, the RCF does not 
provide support to the SME management, neither at the board level, nor at the executive 
management level. This “lender” approach and the non-compulsory nature of this support 
provides no incentive to support the investees with Business Support Services. This view 
was confirmed during an interview with Nazeem Martin (Director of Business Partners), 
who argued: “Our ability to behave like an equity investor rather than a lender means that 
our client partners have a funder that will stand by them when times are tough.”110 
While there is little that can be done about the market conditions, Cement Y has the 
ability to increase profitability (and consequently the donor’s development targets) by 
optimizing their supply chain. For instance, it could reduce its costs by bringing some of its 
cost components in-house, thereby improving the profitability. Here the RCF could 
considerably improve the SME’s situation by providing Business Support assistance in the 
areas of cost management, process streamlining, value chain streamlining, as well as coaching 
and mentoring. Consequently the RCF could and should play a more proactive role by 
providing real equity investment and subsequent technical assistance via its BSS grants.111 
Ultimately the evaluation found that the RCF generally achieved its own financing 
targets. When compared to wider SME support in South Africa it becomes clear that the 
results achieved were proportionate to the high risk investments which it targets; 
investments which would not receive financing by commercial financiers. The RCF 
represents the first comprehensive effort to support previously unbankable SMEs via risk 
capital financing in South Africa. In fact, a South African Venture Capitalist Fund manager 
                                                 
110Interview conducted with Nazeem Martin (Johannesburg, October 2011). 
111However given the use of subordinated loans will likely continue, it is vital that the grace period of the RCF 
loan be extended so as to cover, if possible, the accompanying senior loan repayment period of the DTI.   
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interviewed praised the very nature of this financing, stating that it represents a true added 
value in South Africa.112 
This also seems to hold true when comparing the RCF financing results to the EU’s 
global PSD financing results. The evaluation found that for the EU’s global PSD 
interventions the linkages between EU support, SME financing and job creation remained 
distant at best. Nonetheless, whether blending can become a substitute for traditional grant 
based PSD support remains contentious. 
 
 
5.24 Expertise and Flexibility 
 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent did engaging in Risk Capital Financing expand the EC’s 
development assistance expertise compared to the traditional LED KZN? 
  
This question aims to answer to what extent the donor was able to gain access to 
instruments and know-how with a view to improving the expertise of its development 
assistance. In terms of the reconstructed program theory, the question relates to the outputs 
level, addressing the issue of relevance (responding better to beneficiaries' needs) and added 
value, both for the donor (as it is expected to widen the range of what it can offer) and for 
the beneficiaries (as the intervention should allow a better response to their needs). 
With a view to answering this question, the evaluation first sought to determine whether 
the traditional aid intervention and the innovative blending facility allowed the EC to offer 
leading expertise and experience to the beneficiaries? Regarding the traditional LED KZN, 
the aid programme was structured in a way that the recipients of the grant funding were 
responsible for securing their own expertise to implement their specific programmes. In the 
case of the implementing institution, the South African Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism, the donor programme manager highlighted a severe and 
continuing shortage of professional expertise. Symptoms of this malaise became evident 
during the lifespan of the support programme, notably when the managers of the 
implementing institution appointed to liaise with recipients found themselves becoming 
                                                 
112Interview conducted with J.P. Fourie (Johannesburg, May 2011).  
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frontline administrators.113 Instead of pursuing their intended responsibilities, they often had 
to help to prepare municipalities’ submissions to the programme. Consequently the 
organisational structure of the LED KZN did not provide access to expertise which the EC 
would not have had available in house. Rather, an absence in a more fundamental 
professional competency in thinking about local economic development was exposed at the 
implementing level. 
Concerning the RCF, partnering up with the European Investment Bank and a local 
Development Finance Institution was necessary for the donor given the EC cannot directly 
engage in private sector lending. The reason for this is that the EC cannot generate reflows 
when channelling grant finance. Consequently the EC also had no in house expertise for 
instruments such as risk capital operations. 
In the case of the RCF, a local DFI was chosen as the implementing institution due to its 
ability to extend the necessary expertise and know how that the European Commission 
simply did not possess. The IDC’s solid track record was particularly important to the 
donor. Interviews revealed that the IDC was chosen as the implementing DFI for a number 
of reasons.114 First, it was deemed as appropriate for absorbing the donor’s grant financing. 
According to the EC’s project manager, the relative size and experience of the IDC in the 
South African context would allow for the swift disbursement of Commission grant finance. 
Second, the IDC is an organ of the South African state, being part of the implementation of 
the government’s economic and developmental policies, to which the EC has also aligned 
itself. Consequently channelling via the IDC facilitated alignment with government policy. 
Third, the thematic and national expertise of the IDC was important. The IDC’s capability 
and experience as a lending institution in South Africa has given it technical expertise in 
various sectors. Despite the IDC’s limited prior experience in small firm development, it had 
already embarked on providing risk capital funds in more established sectors and had a 
proven track record of being involved with private equity/venture capital. As a result it had 
created the necessary infrastructure to handle such an operation. What is more, directing 
funds via the IDC provided significant access to experience and country presence, where the 
EC is both not experienced enough and simply has too few human resources. Finally, the 
IDC’s compliance with international standards was important too. The IDC works in 
                                                 
113Interview conducted in Pretoria (May 2011). 
114Interview conducted with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
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accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and in the manner required by 
the Public Finance Management Act and the Companies Act of South Africa. This was 
backed up by a review by Independent Auditors in 2009, which found that the IDC’s 
financial statements compiled were in line with the relevant provisions of the Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999 and International Financial Reporting Standards, and that they 
presented fairly the results of the operation, cash flow and financial position of the 
corporation (Chikonas 2009). 
While the IDC essentially became the ‘trustee’ of the EC, it is the EIB, acting as a quality 
control for the DTI and the EC, which has provided the donor with a certain level of 
‘fiduciary comfort’. Here the evaluation revealed that the rationale for involving the EIB 
rests on the following factors. First, the EIB provided the donor with financial counter-
checking and discipline by tracking the financial outcomes of the facility. Indeed, interviews 
confirmed that the role of the EIB as a watchdog over the use of EC funds has an effect on 
the financial discipline of the IDC.115 This is reinforced by the fact that the IDC has no part 
in potential losses of the RCF, thus being subject to moral hazard.116 
Second, the EIB has the potential to increase the project quality by bringing technical 
expertise as an investment bank. As such, the EIB was instrumental to ensuring project 
quality by a) evaluating, approving or rejecting the investment proposals made by the IDC; 
b) overseeing, reviewing and monitoring the management, implementation and performance 
of the facility, ensuring that IDC manages RCF as per best practice; c) monitoring the 
performance of RCF funds on a quarterly and annual basis; and d) delivering an independent 
account of the performance of this innovative facility to the EC. 
Third, the EIB facilitated a knowledge transfer as its expertise lies particularly in the 
private and public sectors of "viable infrastructure", SMEs, and environment.117 Indeed, the 
EIBs presence has facilitated a transfer of its technical and economic know-how to the RCF 
managers, i.e. with regard to reviews of environmental studies and pricing. Finally, the EIB is 
                                                 
115 According to Milly Chesire, without the EIBs oversight, the IDC would probably behave differently 
(interview conducted in Pretoria, May 2011). 
116 “Moral Hazard” means that the parties might take undue risks since they profit from successful deals while 
not sharing in the potential losses. The EIB is not subject to moral hazard since it is a EU institution and 
supports EU development priorities and policies. 
117Additionally, the EIB already has a mandate of supporting infrastructure projects of public interest and the 
private sector in South Africa. As such the risk capital available under the RCF has to been as complementary 
to the EIB’s other operations in the country. 
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a EU institution (owned by EU member states) and supports EU development priorities and 
policies. Furthermore, it was noted that the EIB and the Commission share a common 
approach with regard to EU donor visibility.118 
Not only does the EIB contribute to the operational management by overseeing the 
RCF’s practices, it also has contributed with its financial and sectoral expertise and 
experience, allowing the IDC to directly benefit. With a view to demonstrating this expertise, 
the EC task manager gave the following example.119 As the interviewee pointed out, there 
used to be an issue surrounding the pricing of RCF loans, which, however, with the help of 
the EIB has now been resolved. According to the pricing model laid out in the IDC-EIB 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), the effective interest rate of the borrower was split 
into a monthly interest rate and a sweetener; the latter being linked to the turnover over a 
number of years during the life of the loan. Yet the problem with this set up was that the 
sweetener should be linked to the cash flow/profit and/or the value of the SME rather than 
the turnover, so as to closer resemble a share investment dividend or valuation. Upon 
realizing that the existing pricing mechanism was too high (initially targeted at RAT IRR of 
10%) to attract sufficient deals, the EIB developed a new model based on the actual discount 
of the estimated flows and of the principal repayments. This mechanism allowed for a more 
appropriate pricing, ultimately increasing the financial sustainability of the SMEs financed 
and the RCF itself.  
The second issue that this evaluation question addressed was whether the LED KZN 
and the RCF allowed the donor and its partner institutions to provide more flexible financial 
instruments for aid delivery? During the inception phase of the LED KZN, the programme 
coordinating unit and the contracting authority recognised that it was important to ensure 
that the framework established permitted a degree of flexibility. However the programme 
structure and the financing instrument used faced challenges throughout. While the LED 
KZN was not inherently inflexible, one interviewee pointed out that the program mirrored 
the generally risk-averse aid culture.120 As such it did not allow the donor to gain access to 
new financing avenues to support private sector development in the region.  
                                                 
118Based on interview conducted with Francois Xavier Parant (Cape Town, April 2011). 
119Interview conducted with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
120 Interview conducted with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
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In the case of the RCF, EC sources pointed out that the feasibility study was crucial in 
tailoring the facility to the recipients’ needs, as it served as the basis for providing an 
incentive structure to allow for financing to SMEs in South Africa. What is more, IDC 
sources confirmed the view that the donor grant money allowed the IDC to offer additional 
financing mechanisms, with more attractive conditions for recipients, as well as to finance 
operations too risky for traditional lenders. 
From the donor perspective, the idea of this innovative facility was to reconcile social 
welfare support through grants and commercial sector support through this funding 
mechanism, without distorting the market and providing undue windfall profit to the 
beneficiaries. Based on the interviews undertaken throughout the evaluation, none of the 
private sector representatives or RCF stakeholders complained about market distortion by 
the facility. Indeed, many were quick to point out that the RCF represented a market 
correcting initiative.121 Furthermore, EC officials interviewed collectively confirmed that in 
comparison to traditional aid and loans, this set up allowed a far more comprehensive and 
flexible response to the needs of partner countries. Consequently evidence suggests that the 
RCF facilitated a broader range of instruments and know-how, increasing the expertise of 
donor support in the process. 
Ultimately, based on the results presented above, the LED KZN did not provide access 
to expertise which the EC would not have had available in house, nor did it allow for flexible 
aid delivery, thus mirroring the generally risk-averse aid culture. This finding seems to be 
consistent with the EU’s global PSD support, as a 2013 report indicates that “The EU did 
not fully exploit its potential in terms of expertise and experience for PSD, which were not 
commensurate to the financial weight of the EU’s PSD support” (ADE 2013 p. 15). The 
report also notes that the Commission’s traditional aid modalities “lacked flexibility and 
agility to adjust to private sector actors and dynamics” (ADE 2013 p. 16).  
Conversely, evidence suggests that by combining expertise, fostering donor coordination 
and providing technical assistance, the RCF provided the donor with the know-how and 
experience that it could not have facilitated via its traditional aid modalities. Furthermore, 
the RCF allowed the Commission to offer a variety of instruments, thus increasing leverage 
and flexibility of its aid delivery. 
                                                 
121Interview conducted with J.P. Fourie (Johannesburg, May 2011). 
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5.25 Implementation Cost and Time 
 
Evaluation Question 5: To what degree did the donor grant financing to the RCF contribute to lower 
transaction costs and a swifter implementation than the LED KZN? 
   
The aim of this question is to verify how efficient the innovative aid modality of risk capital 
financing is compared to the Commission's traditional interventions with regard to 
implementation time and cost reduction. Consequently this question addresses the effectiveness 
and efficiency criteria at the results and outcomes level in our reconstructed program theory. 
With a view to comparing the RCF to the LED KZN, this evaluation question invokes both 
the delays in implementation as well as the transaction costs (management cost and time) 
incurred. 
In terms of implementation time, while the RCF1 took 18.5 months from project 
identification to project implementation, the RCF2 took 13.6 months from the Commission 
decision to extend the programme to the signature of contract implementation between the 
EIB and the IDC. However, as will be discussed below, the actual implementation of the 
RCF2 was extended a further three years. In comparison, the LED KZN, which covered 
only one financing phase, required 21 months from project identification to project 
implementation (see Table 5.10).  
 
Table 5.10: Delays in Implementation: RCF vs. LED KZN 
 
Assessment Area 
RCF LED KZN 
 
Time needed between 
project identification and 
project implementation 
 
RCF1: 18.5 months 
RCF2: 13.6 months + Riders 
 
21 months 
How much time did it take 
from first identification study 
of the project to the proposal 
decision? 
 
RCF1: 16 months 
RCF2: not applicable 
 
12 months  
How much time did it take 
from proposal decision to 
signature of Contribution 
Agreement? 
 
RCF1: 2.5 months 





How much time did it take 
from signature of 
Contribution Agreement to 
signature of contract for 
implementation?  
 
RCF1: 0 months 
RCF2: 11 months. 
 
6 months 
Were these delays in line with 
expectations? 
Yes.  Yes.  
Source: RCF Financing Agreements and Interviews (2011). 
 
With regard to the LED KZN, the final evaluation report for the project concluded that 
delays and hold ups in the implementation process could be attributed to the low project 
management efficiency of the implementing institutions at the municipal level. The report 
further concludes that these hold ups had to be compensated for by the EC staff responsible 
for the project. However, the same report also noted that the LED KZN still managed to 
disburse approximately 80% of its budget, deeming the overall efficiency for a programme 
of this nature and scale to be good. 
Concerning the RCF, EC staff interviewed 122  also suggested that the time between 
project identification and the funding agreement was more or less within the standard 
timeframe of Commission decisions, with minor hold ups related to the signature of the 
Financing Agreement (signed between the EC and the DTI), the EC-EIB Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) regarding technical assistance for the Programme, as well as another 
Memorandum of Agreement between the EIB and IDC regarding the management of the 
Programme (which is also the contract for implementation). In the case of RCF2, the 
Commission decision to enter a second phase of funding for the RCF was taken in 
December 2005 while the EC-DTI agreement was signed by the DTI in February 2006. 
With regard to the EC-EIB MOU and the EIB-IDC MOA, these two agreements took 
about 11 months to be signed after the signing of the EC decision in December 2005. 
According to the EC staff, this minor delay in the implementation of the RCF2 was a result 
of a number of factors. First, the design of the RCF2 was different from and more 
comprehensive than the RCF1’s. Here lessons learnt from RCF1 had to be incorporated in 
RCF2. Second, the RCF team had to develop a new pricing policy. And third, the increased 
                                                 
122Interview conducted with Richard Young (Johannesburg, May 2011). 
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monitoring and evaluation responsibilities bestowed on the EIB required more detailed 
contractual agreements between the implementing institutions (the IDC and EIB). 
For the RCF2, donor support was made available in three tranches. The original 
agreement foresaw the EUR 50 million grant being released over a period of three 
consecutive years. This, however, did not occur and the agreement has been revised twice 
through two different riders extending the project implementation period by three years.123 
Furthermore, the RCF2 experienced a further delay for the release of its third tranche due 
the depreciation of the South African Rand against the Euro. Due to the depreciation, more 
funds were available in local currency than originally envisaged, making it difficult for the 
IDC to fulfill a special condition for the release of the third tranche, namely that 80% of the 
funds transferred in the first and second tranches were committed. 
The evaluation also found that there were minor delays in the implementation of the 
RCF2 due to the stringent development conditionalities imposed by the financing agreement. 
Nonetheless, according to the RCF staff interviewed, despite the conditionalities, the donor 
avoided further hold ups by approving a number of riders to the financing agreement 
allowing for the release of all three financing tranches. 
Finally, despite the respective delays for the RCF and the LED KZN, EC staff pointed 
out that both these delays were in line with expectations and mirrored past experiences with 
EC funded programmes. Furthermore, given both aid modalities followed the formal EU 
implementation guidelines, the evaluation demonstrated that with the exception of some 
overly stringent donor conditionalities for the RCF, the reasons for the respective delays 
were largely based on hold-up problems in contractual agreements with the local 
implementing institutions, as well as issues with their implementation capacities. While 
interviews with EC staff suggest that the implementation of the RCF could have probably 
been expedited by the provision of a formal guidance document to assist EC task managers 
with decision making when channelling to facilities such as the RCF, it would be wrong to 
conclude that one modality has demonstrated greater efficiency in terms of implementation 
time.124 
                                                 
123Due to the depreciation, more funds were available in local currency than originally envisaged, making it 
difficult for the IDC to fulfill a special condition for the release of the third tranche, namely that 80% of the 
funds transferred in the first and second tranches were committed. 
124Interview conducted with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
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In addition to the implementation time, this evaluation question also compared the 
management cost for the innovative RCF and the traditional LED KZN respectively. Here 
evidence suggests that the RCF has significantly reduced the transaction costs of aid delivery 
for the European Commission (see Table 5.11).  
With regard to the traditional project aid modality, given the timeframe and scale of the 
programme, a relatively large number of EU staff were necessary for the implementation of 
the LED KZN. While the number of staff members varied during the lifetime of the 
programme, at the busiest time a total number of 26 full time experts were employed as part 
of the EU’s Project Coordinating Unit.125 Furthermore, EC documents indicated that the 
total implementation cost over the six-year span of the LED KZN amounted to EUR 9.2 
million, or 24% of the total project value. In comparison, the RCF required only one full 
time EC employee in the day-to-day management of the programme, and implementation 
costs amounted to EUR 5.2 million. This represented around 5% of the project value; a 
fraction of the cost incurred by traditional projects such as the LED KZN.126 
 
Table 5.11: Transaction Costs: RCF vs. LED KZN 
 
Assessment Area 
RCF LED KZN 
 




How many EC staff were 









management) and follow up 
cost? 
 
EUR 430 thousand per year128 
EUR 8,200 per week 
 
EUR 1.5 million per year129 
EUR 28,800 per week 
Hours per week that 
management staff spends on 
respective programmes (per 
person). 
 
5 hours per week. 
 
40 hours per week. 
                                                 
125The Project Coordinating Unit staff was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the programme.   
126Since the EC uses standard follow up and evaluation procedures, the costs incurred for the two respective 
Programmes were more or less the same.  
127At full capacity (varied over course of project). 
128Total cost divided by duration of Programme: RCF1: EUR 1.5 million; RCF2: EUR 3.7 million; Total: EUR 
5.2 million; Duration 12 years. Cost includes management fees of EIB and IDC. 
129EUR 9.2 million total; Duration 6 years.  
 
 123 
Implementation cost as a 







Source: European Commission (2005, 2006) and Survey Questionnaire (2011). 
 
According to the evaluation reports and EC staff interviewed, the reasons the RCF’s cost 
efficiency were three-fold. First, given that only one full time employee was responsible for 
the blending facility at the donor level, this aid modality lowered the management time 
significantly for the EC. Second, the management fees of the implementing institutions (EIB 
and the IDC) were low when compared to the donors in house management fees.131 Finally, 
the cost reduction was also credited to the expertise of the implementing institutions in the 
field of SME financing.132 
The evaluation did, however, reveal two concerns regarding the IDC and EIB 
management fees. First, with regard to the IDC, the management fees are computed on real 
yearly expenses and shall not exceed 10% of yearly re-flows. Hence yearly expenses can only 
be covered by yearly reflows. However, due to the time lag between investments and re-
flows (investments and expenses usually take place up-front, while reflows can take time to 
materialize), the effectiveness of this scheme has to be questioned. While RCF staff claimed 
that this is projected to change once the pushed back internal rate of return comes into the 
picture, at the time of the evaluation the yearly average amount of expenses incurred were 
much higher than the receipts. According to the EU delegations head of development 
cooperation in South Africa, this set up provides an incentive for RCF staff to maximise re-
flows, i.e. to select the least risky investments.133 Not only could this come at the cost of 
projects that need RCF financing the most, but it also represents a negative incentive in the 
way the RCF operates. Additionally, in several interviews it was pointed out that RCF 
investments provide a significant support to the IDC’s own commercial lending. The aim of 
the RCF was to push the IDC to lend to more risky investees, thus promoting development 
objectives shared by the donor. Consequently RCF funding should not be used for IDC 
                                                 
130Implementation cost taken as a proportion of normalized cost for project duration (i.e. RCF yearly cost of 
project EUR 108 million over 12 years.)  
131The management fees of the EIB were paid by the donor, while the management fees of the IDC were paid 
by yearly reflows of the RCF. 
132Interview with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
133Interview conducted with Richard Young (Johannesburg, May 2011). 
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mainstream commercial lending. While IDC and EC staff acknowledged that this was going 
on, it was pointed out that this is the exception rather than the norm. 
Second, there is currently no incentive built into the EIB management fees to facilitate 
the completion of the project. As it stands, the EIB receives a fixed monthly management 
fee of EUR 42,000 (with a maximum of EUR 2,5 million per financing cycle). Ideally, 
however, with a view to incentivizing the EIB management fees, the EIB should be charged 
a percentage equivalent to the write offs of RCF1 and RCF2 in excess of the targeted 30%. 
Furthermore, the fact that the EIB contract was delivered outside the usual competitive 
procedure, the EIB being a sister institution of the EC, does not facilitate assessing the 
market value of the EC – EIB agreement. 
Ultimately, while the results above demonstrate some delays in the implementation of 
the RCF and the LED KZN, these were generally line with the donors’ expectations. One 
interviewee pointed out that “whereas the multi-stakeholder nature of the RCF initially led to 
implementation delays and additional start up costs, these costs were ultimately augmented 
by low management costs and previous costs of non-cooperation.”134  Indeed, while the 
management fees in this blending arrangement could have been incentivised better, the 
administrative costs were considered very low by the EC staff interviewed. As a result all 
stakeholders interviewed agreed that on the whole, the RCF reduced the transaction costs of 
aid delivery for the donor in comparison to its traditional interventions, demonstrating 
considerable value for money of this innovative approach. 
  
                                                 
134Interview with Milly Chesire (Pretoria, May 2011). 
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6 Overall Case Study Evaluation Findings 
 
 
Donor agencies and governments, tax payers, partner country governments and citizens all 
want aid to work as well as it can. Aid budgets are limited and therefore need to be well 
targeted and managed. Having outlined some of the aid modalities in the constantly evolving 
field of development aid earlier in this thesis, the aim of this chapter is to provide overall 
findings and key lessons learnt with regard to the value for money of the RCF compared to 
its counterfactuals. While VfM cannot be the only factor in the decision to pursue one form 
of aid delivery over the other, and while the study results are by no means representative of 
all blending facilities, this methodological approach has been invaluable with a view to 
gaining an in-depth understanding of blending mechanisms. What is more VfM frameworks 
enable agencies to put forward a powerful narrative of the real impact and value of their 
work.  Consequently, prior to engaging the wider political economy considerations 
surrounding development financing, this chapter will tackle the question of whether this 
innovative aid modality provided more value for money than its traditional counterfactuals, 
and if so where.  
The ability to provide VfM is presented in the four groupings outlined in the 
reconstructed program theory, notably: inputs, outputs, results and outcomes. This addresses 
both the question concerning what was achieved that would not have been achieved 
otherwise and what the potential risks of this new aid modality are. Ultimately the chapter 
provides a summary of the overall VfM exerted. 
 
6.1 Value at the Input Level 
 
At the input level of the reconstructed program theory, the evaluation demonstrated that 
even though the RCF was not based on a specific EC strategy document, grant financing for 
the RCF took place in the context of growing support for blending and was done in 
compliance with the formal guidance criteria for the financing modality used. While some of 
the RCF’s conditionalities proved overly rigid this was a result of the innovative nature of 
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the risk capital financing and the inherent lack of documented guidelines available for 
decision makers. 
The decision to fund the RCF was taken at EC headquarters in conjunction with the EC 
Delegation and is a direct product of the donors Private Sector Development Strategy as 
defined in South Africa’s Country Strategy Paper. Hence RCF1 and RCF2 can to an extent 
be explained by the regional cooperation agreements. A more nuanced understanding, 
however, would argue that RCF funding has to be seen in the context of a more general 
trend: notably a growing demand for blending and multilateralism with implicit incentives. 
As was discussed earlier in this thesis, the resurgence of catalytic aid is driven by the 
fiscal pressures in donor countries and the desire to increasingly work with the private sector. 
Consequently the ability of blending to use more targeted solutions for working with the 
private sector and to use grant resources as effectively as possible by leveraging additional 
development funds has translated into heightened support for non-traditional aid modalities 
such as the RCF. 
With regard to the organizational structure at the input level, the RCF was structured in a 
logical and coherent manner and seems very relevant in the South African context. The three 
distribution channels facilitated the leverage of EU funds with the IDC and third party 
funds. What is more, the introduction of business support was an important contribution to 
the lending culture of the IDC as a whole. Given the EC could not directly intervene in the 
local SME market via traditional aid modalities, the channelling of grant financing via the 
IDC was the most appropriate way to facilitate the RCF. Furthermore, by involving the EIB 
in this set up, the EC was able to provide the necessary counter checking power to 
circumvent the potential for moral hazard given the IDC is not subject to potential losses. 
Finally, while the EC Delegation generally provided the Commission headquarters with 
credible and readily available information on its aid delivery through the RCF, what is still 
needed is effective interaction and data sharing within the Commission and other 
organisations involved. Evidence suggests that this was equally problematic for the donor’s 
traditional aid interventions. At the task manager level, the lack of strategic guidance from 
headquarters meant that most decisions at the intervention’s conception stage had to be 
taken on an ad-hoc basis. That being said, the RCF has in many ways the ability to serve as 
an example to future blending practices by the EC, not only because of its success in terms 
of financing results, but in terms of implementation and expertise. Indeed, the evaluation 
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hinted at the fact that blending mechanisms such as the RCF will play an increasingly 
important role in different fields of action including, inter alia, energy, environment, 
transport, climate change and private sector cooperation, and contribute to achieving the 
MDGs and supporting important political initiatives.135 
 
6.2 Value at the Output Level 
 
In terms of value at the output level, this section looks at operational lessons on the 
effectiveness of aid delivery through the RCF, notably on the attainment of results and the 
promotion of EU policies. This includes the question of what benefits and risks were 
observed compared to the implementation and follow up of the LED KZN and the EU’s 
global PSD support between 2004 and 2010. 
The operational benefits highlighted by the evaluation are as follows. First, innovative 
blending provides considerable value in terms of supporting private sector development in 
partner countries at the micro level. Despite some lag in implementation and the failure of 
the Third Party Channel, overall, the evaluation suggests that the RCF provided a particular 
added value in terms of financial leverage, SME financing and job creation compared to 
EU's global PSD activities. While there were caveats regarding the kind of jobs created, and 
how job distribution was divided amongst the SME’s financed, this was still a success when 
compared to the donor’s global PSD support. Indeed, interviews at the donor headquarters 
suggested that the EU’s PSD support lacked a systematic approach to integrating job 
creation as a key objective in aid modalities. Concerning SME financing, the donor’s global 
PSD support demonstrated little evidence of improved access to finance for SMEs between 
2004 and 2010.  
Second, by involving the EIB in this set up, the EC was able to provide the necessary 
counter checking power to circumvent the potential for moral hazard. Consequently, the 
combination of donor support with finance from financial institutions has the potential to 
enhance financial discipline of a project during the various stages of preparation, 
implementation and management (i.e. via risk sharing, notably making the partner institution 
contribute its own funds). 
                                                 
135As consistently reflected in interviews with policymakers throughout the evaluation. 
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Third, blending facilities reduce the administrative costs of channelling aid and allow the 
donor to take advantage of the loan provider’s project management expertise. Here the 
assessment of the RCF’s overall aid delivery costs against the traditional LED KZN aid 
modality demonstrated the extent to which innovative blending may promote efficiency, 
both for the Commission and the other stakeholders involved. This is also true for the EIB, 
demonstrating efficacy with regard to management time and transaction costs during the 
whole financing cycle (see Figure 6.1). Furthermore, traditional aid did not provide access to 
expertise which the EC would not have had available in house, nor did it allow for flexible 
aid delivery, thus mirroring the generally risk-averse aid culture. 
 
Figure 6.1: Efficiency of RCF Aid Delivery 
 
 
Fourth, blending can reduce the management time of aid interventions by using public 
grant finance and the market expertise of partner DFIs. While there were minor delays due 
Cost efficiency was enhanced due to: 
 
•Low IDC and EIB administration fees; 
•Reduced EC management time; 
•Reduced beneficiary transactions costs due to 
single set of procedures; 
•Harmonisation between donors; 
•EIB and IDC financial expertise; 
•Efficient RCF structure. 
Time efficiency due to: 
 
•Reduced EC management time; 
•Single set of procedures via lead finance 
institution. 
Cost efficiency was challenged due to: 
 
•Delays to implementation; 
•IDC and EIB management costs and 
incentive structure. 
Delays in time when: 
 
•Hold ups in reaching contractual agreements 
(ammendments/riders); 
•Implementation (stringent conditionalities 
and currency fluctuations). 
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to adjustments to the terms and conditions of the Financing Agreement 136  as well as 
unresolved issues regarding the incentive structures of IDC and EIB management costs, on 
the whole the RCF reduced EC management time compared to its traditional interventions 
and allowed for a swift and cost-effective implementation of its PSD Strategy in South 
Africa. By streamlining the RCF lending activities via a lead finance institution, all the 
stakeholders involved ultimately benefitted from common set of rules and procedures. 
Moreover, many DFIs lack the resources to provide fully-fledged technical assistance with 
every project. By providing subsidies for additional technical assistance, capacity building 
and project preparation will further enhance project acceleration. 
Finally, the multi-stakeholder approach of blending mechanisms has the ability to “pool” 
activities that would otherwise be pursued by donors or DFIs individually. Indeed, 
interaction with the EIB allowed for the advancement of common EU development policy 
and provided the necessary counterchecking expertise and fiduciary confidence that the EC 
could not achieve with its traditional aid modalities due to its lack of lending expertise. As a 
result, blending mechanisms address the principles laid out in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. Indeed, coordination among bilateral (and multilateral) donors and finance 
institutions avoids the duplication of efforts and has the ability to take advantage of the 
individual strengths of the financing partners, thereby increasing the efficiency of 
channelling aid (as well as increasing the financing volume and spreading operational risks). 
Moreover, improved donor coordination via blending mechanisms also has the ability to 
increase efficiency at the beneficiary level, given it reduces the contact points and 
administrative hurdles. 
While the operational benefits of blending mechanisms for donors are substantial, the 
evaluation results of the previous chapter also highlighted a number of operational risks. The 
first concern surrounds the realization that the success of blending mechanisms does not 
only rely on donor support and coordination. It is also subject to the will and quality of 
management at the beneficiary level. While the organizational structure was a success on the 
whole, the evaluation highlighted a number of concerns, notably: a) failure of the Third Party 
Channel; b) lack of real equity financing to SMEs; c) limited use of Business Support 
Services; and d) moral hazard. On the basis of the results presented in the previous chapter, 
                                                 
136It is understood that some adjustments to the terms and conditions of the Financing Agreement could have 
been modified more rapidly, and that issues with implementation led to further delays. 
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the underlying reasons for these concerns are twofold. First, the weak empowerment of the 
RCF account officers needs to be highlighted. The RCF Unit lacked the capacity and 
manpower to create a workable implementation model for the Third Party Channel. 
Furthermore, it’s over reliance on other IDC units and limited staff constrain the RCF’s 
ability to offer more equity financing with subsequent management support. 
Second, apart from capacity constraints, beneficiary institutions should also have been 
committed to ensuring transparent and effective implementation on their part. Here the 
RCF experience demonstrated that constraints may derive from the, sometimes, perverse 
incentives via management costs to support projects in the field of global public goods. IDC 
management fees are set up in a way that prompts RCF task managers to maximize re-flows 
i.e. select good risks. Not only could this come at the cost of projects that need RCF 
financing the most, but it also represents a negative incentive in the way the RCF operates, 
i.e. RCF staff will continue to select good risks and use financial instruments and loan terms 
that maximize reflows, rather than focus on development objectives. Furthermore, in several 
interviews it was pointed out that RCF investments provide support to the IDC’s own 
commercial lending, pushing IDC to promote more risky operations than would be 
warranted if the IDC did not benefit from increased loan operations. Considering that the 
IDC does not share in RCF potential losses, this behaviour represents another form of 
moral hazard. 
Ultimately, the main lesson in this respect is the importance and complexity of providing 
the right incentive structure via management fees and identifying the proper financial 
instrument to be used in the support of the financial needs of SMEs. While the decision 
making for the RCF was generally sound, lessons learnt ought to be made available in the 
form of a formal guidance document easily accessible to others. This was pointed out by the 
EC project officer for the RCF, who noted that while it was necessary to leave sufficient 
room for flexibility in decision-making, additional guidance documents concerning blending 
instruments would be helpful. Such a document should refer to the results of previous 
blending facilities, current good practices, as well as an over-arching strategy document. For 
instance, the RCF evaluation points to the importance of supporting RCF investees from a 
real shareholders’ perspective, which implies taking a strong management position through 
an empowered RCF unit. Ultimately sharing these experiences should serve as a basis for 
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providing EC project officers with a manual of instructions on how to manage blending 
facilities in the context of the project management cycle. 
The second concern relates to the possibility that donors may risk losing control and 
visibility of their support. By setting up joint financing structures there is a possibility that 
single donors may lose some visibility and control. For instance, EU blending mechanisms, 
although financed by member states, are to a large extent EU instruments. Decisions are 
largely made at the European level and such coordination enhances the visibility of the EU, 
not of its individual donors. While this is not a major risk, it may act as a disincentive for 
blending to be pursued more proactively at a multilateral level. 
Finally, although this was not the case for the RCF, another potential operational 
weakness of blending mechanisms comes with the complexity of coordinating multiple 
stakeholders. Here pooling of resources could lead to a slowdown in decision-making as 
coordination may be hampered by varying internal procedures and rules. Additionally, the 
form of development conditionality may also be a source of disagreement. That being said, 
while initial disagreement may lead to an increase in transaction costs in the short term, the 
experiences with the RCF demonstrated that the costs are ultimately augmented by previous 
costs of non-cooperation as well as subsequent economies of scale.  
 
6.3 Value at the Results Level 
 
At the results level of the reconstructed program theory, the evaluation highlighted a number 
of economic benefits and risks for the various stakeholders in terms of addressing market 
failures and project financing uptake. Additionally this section will discuss the financial 
benefits and risks at the results level, invoking the role of financial leverage effect and the 
ability of increasingly involving the private sector as a credible partner in development. 
As demonstrated in the results of the previous chapter, the economic benefits of 
blending can address issues surrounding market failures. Blending loans and grants has the 
ability to change the overall cost-benefit balance of development projects, thereby correcting 
possible market failures. More specifically, the provision of blended finance allowed projects 
to take off which would not have been able to without the delivery of this innovative 
support. This may include providing finance to projects that would not have received 
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finance otherwise due to the risk perception: i.e. costly or high-risk projects such as 
previously unbankable SMEs or municipal infrastructure projects. In the case of the RCF, 
innovative blending provided considerable value in terms of facilitating an adapted aid 
framework that provides incentives both for local financial institutions and the private sector, 
thus supporting private sector development in partner countries at the micro level.137 
Apart from project uptake, the RCF experience demonstrated that blending mechanisms 
also allow financing for projects with higher social than financial returns, i.e. where positive 
externalities (environmental and/or social benefits) outweigh the financial rate of return. As 
was outlined earlier in the thesis, this has become one of the key priorities of policymakers 
following the 2008 financial crisis. In this case the grant may be structured so as to “buy” the 
public good which is “produced” by the project, as well as compensating any extra expenses 
that are involved. Blending could therefore also be an important tool allowing projects to 
start up that do not raise user-charge revenue. This is particularly relevant for social projects 
that due to their financial viability are not attractive for private financial institutions. 
Alternatively, a grant element may also be used to internalize possible negative externalities 
associated with projects. For instance, the extra cost associated with redesigning a fuel power 
plant to a wind farm may be covered by the blending element.138 Hence blending has the 
ability to act as a corrective measure in case of market failure and the provision of public 
goods. 
While from an economic rationale the experiences with the RCF were overwhelmingly 
positive, there remain risks of blending mechanisms which should be pointed out. First, 
when deciding whether to provide blended finance, the possibility of crowding out other 
financing sources needs to be considered. For instance, in cases where sufficient financial 
resources are already available and the given project is bankable, providing concessional 
finance via blending should be avoided. This is all the more relevant in medium income 
countries with well-developed financial markets.  
Second, blending can lead to market distortions if certain projects or financial 
intermediaries benefit from an unfair advantage as a result of the donor support. While this 
was not the case for the RCF, donors have to make sure that they are provided with 
                                                 
137Here RCF grant elements also demonstrated the ability to reduce the overall cost and risk of SMEs financed, 
as well as reduce the interest repayments for the recipients of loans 
138However the provision of aid to private companies to mitigate their negative environmental costs has to be 
vigorously evaluated in line with the polluter-pays-principle. 
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sufficient information to assure that their support does not lead to any form of market 
distortion. This is true both at the micro and macro level. Indeed, Bulow and Rogoff (2005) 
and Klein and Harford (2005) argue that by disproportionally increasing the number and size 
of development loans there is a real risk of creating a development bias towards middle 
income countries, given that low income countries have a lesser capacity to service loans. 
While this is certainly also related to the increased availability of private investment in 
middle income countries, a report by the ECDPM (2011) argues that the risk of creating a 
development bias is limited for blending mechanisms given that measures could be put in 
place to control for such biases (i.e. at the strategic and operational level). This is supported 
by the fact that the share of EU funding currently channelled through these facilities is still 
modest. Furthermore, the report argues that blending mechanisms can offer a solution to 
this problem rather than exacerbating it. Indeed, if well managed, increased blending allows 
for a better division of projects into those that can only be financed exclusively by grants and 
those that are bankable. 
The RCF evaluation also confirmed considerable financial added value of blending 
compared to traditional aid. First, blending has the ability to combine limited donor grant 
money with loans, leveraging additional resources from partner institutions. Here blending 
has the ability to crowd in private investment by covering certain risks to make projects 
bankable. As outlined above, the financial contributions channelled to the RCF led to donor 
funds being been leveraged by 529% compared to 28% by the LED KZN. A large portion 
of this finance came from the private sector via the Niche Fund Channel. Furthermore, the 
RCF facilitated a crowding in effect for SME financing within the IDC (ZAR 1.4 billion).139 
As a result blending mechanisms allowed more projects to be financed than by pure grants 
alone. 
Second, as discussed above, blending has the ability to increase the uptake and lower the 
borrowing costs for SMEs that face high borrowing constraints. By providing the IDC with 
EC grant finance, the RCF was devised in a way to enable the use of a wide range of risky 
financial instruments which allowed for sizeable investments in a previously neglected sector 
(mostly via subordinate unsecured loans). This would not have been possible via traditional 
                                                 
139 While there is very little evidence to suggest that channelling through the IDC has increased EC ODA in the 
country, there is a general consensus that the ECs RCF channelling has led to a crowding in of development 
finance in various forms. 
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aid modalities such as the LED KZN. Additionally, blending facilities could make use of 
equity risk sharing in the form of guarantees, which can have positive impact on the credit 
quality of a project. To give an example, the ‘Europe 2020 Bond Initiative’ aims to structure 
their project financing so as to absorb the lack of cash being available to service the senior 
debt of a development project (due to risk perception), thereby raising its credit quality. 
Third, the RCF demonstrated its ability to offer tailor made solutions to the recipients’ 
needs, increasing the flexibility of development finance, and providing better incentive 
structures compared to its counterfactuals. Indeed, stand alone grants in the form of 
traditional ODA and loans may at times prove rigid and ill-suited to the local development 
needs. For example, one of the risks of excessive grant financing is its ability to distort 
market signals, thus undermining the effectiveness of project selection, as well as impeding 
the development of the private sector. In this context the RCF demonstrated the ability of 
this innovative aid modality to conform to the needs and demands of the recipient. 
According to the blending literature and the experiences with the case study, donors also 
need to consider a number of financial risks associated with blending, the first of which is 
relates to the possibility of moral hazard (Ferrer and Behrens 2011). As explained earlier, 
moral hazard describes a situation where someone who is shielded from risk behaves 
differently than he would if he was fully exposed to the risk. With regard to blending, the 
provision of donor grant financing could act as an incentive for a lender to go beyond the 
economically sensible and prudent limits of indebtedness. In the case study it was pointed 
out that in several cases RCF investments provided significant support to the IDC’s own 
commercial lending, pushing IDC to promote more risky operations than would be 
warranted if IDC did not benefit from increased loan operations. This behaviour represents 
a form of moral hazard. 
Additionally an ECDPM (2011) report notes that moral hazard is also likely when 
development projects are of strategic importance to individual donors or are being pushed 
by powerful domestic stakeholders in the beneficiary country. Such a situation could also 
lead to excessive concessionality when providing blended finance. Recognising their 
beneficial standing, beneficiaries may try and maximise donor support by playing off the 
different donors. It is therefore imperative that as in the case of the RCF, donor support is 
provided transparently, with the emphasis on the efficiency of project design in question. 
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Second, donors need to consider the possibility of insufficient risk provision. When 
blending involves covering risks that the private sector was unwilling or unable to take up, it 
is crucial that the risk profile is clearly defined and accounted for in the budgetary position to 
avoid unforeseen additional costs. Nonetheless, lending partners generally have to incur 
some risk when lending in developing countries. What is more, in the case of the RCF, the 
evaluation demonstrated the ability of blending mechanisms to reduce this risk to an 
acceptable level.  
Third, while the financial leverage effect is a critical donor objective, the measurement of 
financial leverage remains a contentious topic, with varying approaches among and within 
donor institutions. While the European Commission has recently implemented several 
blending instruments via its regional Investment Facilities, there is no uniformity on the 
measurement of financial leverage. For example, the EC’s Neighbourhood Investment 
Facility (NIF) calculates its leverage effect as the level of financing that grant elements have 
attracted for any kind of grants, technical assistance included. Using this definition the 
overall leverage effect of the NIF is 25 times the original investment (Ferrer et al 2011). Yet 
another investment facility run by the European Commission, the EU Africa Infrastructure 
Trust Fund (ITF), uses a more conservative approach and excludes technical assistance 
when calculating financial leverage. For the ITF, the total financial leverage is estimated at 
13.5 times the grant share. The problem is that depending on the facility in question, the way 
in which financial leverage is calculated can be misleading, i.e. when the grant element is 
mainly comprised by technical assistance. Hence there is a necessity to harmonise the 
calculation of ‘financial leverage’ across the facilities.  
Fourth, there exists an on-going dispute regarding the interface between blending and 
ODA. This thesis previously defined ODA as grants or loans to developing countries which 
are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and 
welfare as the main objective; and (c) at concessional financial terms of 25% or more 
compared to a 10% reference interest rate (35% for tied aid) (OECD 2014a). Yet loans from 
donor agencies must also fulfil the concessionality requirement set at below the competitive 
market rate. Given that interest rates have fallen since the 1970’s, blended finance with a 
grant element of 5% often meet the 25% concessionality criteria (ECDPM, 2011). Hence 
when blending loans and grants, the loan value of the particular project could be counted as 
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ODA (for qualifying funds), allowing donors to move towards their ODA targets by 
counting loan funds that were previously not recorded as ODA.  
According to the OECD, this could have the effect of lowering ambitions in terms of 
donor grant levels. As a result the OECD has a long-standing practice of putting an 
additional interest rate subsidy (IRS) on top of the concessionality requirements for 
accounting financial packages as ODA. Yet the EC is challenging this (ECFIN 2009). It 
argues that in practice, many non-IRS operations do not channel the full grant amount to the 
financial intermediaries, but rather separately to the beneficiaries. In these cases it is difficult 
to count the assistance, and the financiers loan may fail the concessionality criteria for ODA 
accounting. In addition, the implicit grants of member states embedded into the loans of the 
financiers are not well accounted for, again underestimating the total level of concessionality 
in a project. 
Finally, another contentious issue surrounding blending and ODA is whether funds 
provided by third parties to form parts of a blending package should be recorded as ODA. 
In the case of the RCF, the majority of the finance made available for SMEs ultimately came 
from the IDC and private investors. While single concessional loan funds can be recorded as 
ODA, they cannot when those funds are provided to a third party (i.e. European Investment 
Bank) and then re-combined in the blending package. Given the importance donors put on 
scaling up ODA efforts, this may act as a disincentive for future blending practices. 140 
Furthermore, the inclusion of capital reimbursements as negative ODA in the yearly 
statistics by OECD represents a substantive challenge and political limitation to the interest 
of blended loans in the context of ODA calculations. Hence the question whether blending 
mechanisms can contribute to an increase of the ODA depends on the on-going discussions 




                                                 
140This is assuming that donors are still aiming at maximizing ODA budgets to achieve the target of 0.7% of 
GDP. However given the trend is quickly changing towards Value for Money, this may no longer be the case, 




6.4 Value at the Outcomes Level 
 
At the outcomes level, the evaluation highlighted a number of strategic and policy benefits 
of blending mechanisms. As will be discussed below, these primarily address the benefits of 
targeting resources in a manner that is not possible via traditional aid delivery mechanisms. 
With regard to the strategic and policy dimension of donor support, the evaluation 
confirmed benefits with regard to policy leverage. Indeed, financial leverage was not the only 
and maybe not the most important impact of the RCF. On the basis of multiple interviews 
and the survey, the evaluation revealed that EC channelling led to policy leverage with regard 
to sector specific policies and projects. This means that blending mechanisms enable 
focusing donor resources on sectors and projects that are regarded as the most 
needy/important, consequently making important projects with large development impacts 
possible which may not have taken place otherwise.  
In the case of the RCF, EC funding itself facilitated the critical mass necessary for the 
SME support to take place in the first place. Using blending as a tool to leverage dialogue on 
policy and associated measures enables donors to influence the recipient’s policy in areas 
with priority, such as SME support, capacity training or the environment. In the case of the 
RCF, apart from the initial project uptake, the donor was able to facilitate policy leverage in a 
number of areas. First, it increased awareness and set a precedent for this kind of funding 
leading to a crowding in effect of similar kind of funds targeted at SMEs within the IDC 
(worth ZAR 1.4 billion).141 Since the creation of the RCF, the IDC now houses a few similar 
facilities. Like the RCF, these funds also target risky enterprises with a development impact. 
As such it has contributed to the evolution of the IDC towards SME financing, which was 
initially not part of its mandate. Not only has this demonstrated the IDC’s ease with working 
with such entities alongside its traditional target sectors, but it has also paved the way for the 
continuation of support for this marginalised sector in the future.142 
Second, the donor funded RCF has brought about the mainstreaming of business 
support, now catering to all lending activities in the IDC. While the business support uptake 
is still low, the fact that it is now available is likely going to lead to a much more hands on 
                                                 
141See Evaluation Question 1 for overview of SME funds set up within the IDC. 
142While the LED KZN findings suggest some policy leverage too, these were empirically less compelling. 
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lending approach within the IDC, ultimately increasing the effectiveness of IDC loans as a 
whole. 
Third, while the RCF did not facilitate cooperation within the donor institution, one of 
the strategic impacts of this project has been the improved cooperation between the various 
development institutions involved, fostered by the multi-stakeholder approach. To use a 
specific example, due to the RCF, the IDC and the EIB have improved cooperation in other 
areas of financial support granted by the EIB to South Africa through the IDC. What is 
more, the RCF has also fostered cooperation within the IDC itself and among other private 
and government supported SME institutions in South Africa (i.e. Business Partners and 
Khula).143 
Finally, by providing donor grant money via the IDC, the donor has been able to push 
its objective of furthering the capacities of a local financial intermediary. Indeed, housing the 
RCF has further developed the IDC as an institution and enhanced its capacities. With the 
RCF becoming a fully-fledged Strategic Business Unit, it has influenced the institution as 
whole. There are several examples that support this conclusion. First, the RCF facilitated the 
setting up of the Post Monitoring Business Unit, which also caters to other IDC activities. 
Second, the RCF was instrumental in the creation of the Business Support Programme, 
which is now applied to all of the IDC’s operations. Moreover, in addition to adopting actual 
departments initiated by this facility, the EIB’s presence has facilitated a knowledge transfer 
of its technical and economic know-how to the RCF managers, notably with regard to 
reviews of environmental studies and pricing. Not only did this enhance the capacity 
building of the RCF team, but it also provided opportunities for a closer cooperation 
between these two large development finance institutions. Lastly, the evaluation indicated 
that the implementing institution has shown a real commitment to the delivery of the best 
results, proof of the strong appropriation and ownership impact that the EC pursues via its 
aid modalities.144 
 
                                                 
143With regard to the in house cooperation, the IDC’s decision to regroup the various funds supporting SMEs 
under the RCF SBU umbrella increased coherence as well as the professionalism of the IDC account officers. 
Regarding other SME institutions in South Africa, increased cooperation can be exemplified by the 
appointment of a former senior staff member of the RCF as the managing director of Khula, a parastatal 
lending institution in South Africa.  
144 It should also be mentioned that the RCF was implemented at a time when few Venture Capital companies 
were professionally organized, which allowed for an appropriation of the Programme by the IDC. 
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6.5 Overall Value for Money  
 
In the 1990s catalytic aid was very much on the defensive, being replaced by broader efforts 
at financial sector reform. Today aid modalities such as the RCF provide evidence that a new 
form of financial intermediary aid is making a comeback. Indeed, the findings above suggest 
that innovative blending mechanism provided considerable VfM at various levels of aid 
delivery compared to the traditional aid delivery mechanisms.  
At the input level, the RCF demonstrated value in terms of its coherent and logical 
organizational structure and the ability of the EC delegation to monitor its aid delivery. 
While data sharing at the headquarters level was problematic, this was not specific to 
blending as it proved to be an overall shortcoming of the EUs aid delivery.  
At the output level, the evaluation highlighted several operational benefits of blending 
over traditional aid. Here the RCF reduced the transaction costs of aid delivery due to 
diminished management time and fees, and promoted synergies between public and private 
sector interventions, including finance. Moreover, the multi stakeholder financing structure 
fostered coherence and coordination, allowing for a pooling of activities that would 
otherwise be pursued individually or not at all.  
At the results level, the evaluation demonstrated a number of economic and financial 
benefits of blending over traditional aid delivery. Most notably, blending addressed an 
underlying market failure in the recipient country by providing an ‘exogenous incentive’ in 
the form of EC grant, pushing the IDC to engage in lending to a previously un-
bankable/disenfranchised sector and thereby enabling project uptake of projects with higher 
social than financial returns. Consequently the RCF is providing an important added value in 
terms of SME financing compared to EU's global PSD activities. 
Concerning the financial value of blending, the evaluation suggested that these are 
threefold compared to traditional aid. First, blending has the ability to combine limited 
donor grant money with loans, leveraging additional resources from partner institutions. 
Second, blending has the ability to increase the uptake and lower the borrowing costs for 
SMEs that face high borrowing constraints. And third, the RCF demonstrated its ability to 
offer tailor made solutions to the recipients’ needs, increasing the flexibility of development 
finance, and providing better incentive structures than traditional aid in terms of involving 
the private sector in development. 
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At the outcomes level, evidence suggests that blending has strategic and policy benefits 
over traditional aid. The evaluation showed that blending has the ability to lead to policy 
leverage with regard to sector specific policies and projects. By providing the critical mass of 
financing necessary for the SME support to take place in the first place, blending 
contributed to the evolution of the IDC towards SME financing, which was initially not part 
of its mandate. This included crowding in additional finance within the IDC as well as 
private investment. 
These findings suggest that blending has the ability to bring about transformative change. 
Indeed, as highlighted in the literature review at the outset of the thesis, donors are 
constantly in search of transmission mechanisms which deliver or support transformative 
change from the outside. And while conditionality has largely been discredited to provide 
that credible link between aid, growth and sustainable institutional change, the innovative 
blending mechanisms may provide an opportunity in terms of helping developing countries 
increasingly pursue change by themselves. Indeed, as our evaluation highlighted, while the 
role of the implementing institution, the IDC, was key in the success of the RCF, the 
organisational set up of the RCF also facilitated a knowledge transfer in expertise and 
experience to the IDC, one of the leading South African DFI’s. In a country where aid from 
abroad plays a relatively minor role, one EC interviewee argued: “The real value provided by 
aid (in South Africa) is not the finance itself but what comes with it: best practice, 
innovation, risk-taking, pilot programmes, systems development, capacity building, and 
above all skills and knowledge.”145 
While traditional donor institutions such as the EU will continue to ‘learn by doing’, and 
innovative financing is certainly not a substitute for all traditional grant based assistance, the 
results of the RCF ultimately indicate that innovative finance mechanisms have the ability to 
enhance the value for money of development assistance at various points, from initial 
mobilization to actual absorption. With a view to pursuing greater development effectiveness 
and ensuring that donor promises are kept, traditional donors should therefore make greater 
use of innovative modalities such as the Risk Capital Facility. 
 
                                                 
145Interview conducted with Richard Young (Pretoria, May 2011). 
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The aim of this chapter is to draw on the empirical findings to offer some conclusions 
regarding the ability of innovative finance to help overcome collective action problems and 
thus improve the effectiveness of development aid. The following conclusions surround the 
potential of new aid delivery mechanisms to provide not only more aid, but also better 
coordinated, more legitimate, predictable, and flexible aid. While the evaluation results 
indicate that innovative aid modalities have the ability to translate into higher equilibrium 
allocations for the donor in terms of aid delivery, this thesis could not empirically verify 
whether the provision of innovative finance mechanisms led to a reduction in welfare losses 
brought about by the collective action problems of aid.146 
 
7.1 Financial Commitments: Ability to Provide More Assistance 
 
For reasons of turf fighting and vested interests in donor countries, it would be reasonable 
to assume that little can be expected from traditional ODA channels to make extraordinary 
efforts to meet the 0.7% targets by 2015. This is all the more the case since the financial 
crisis and ensuing economic crisis will make it increasingly difficult to justify scaling up ODA 
budgets in the short term (with donor countries facing harsh budget constraints). 
It is within this context that innovative aid modalities such as the RCF may play a 
countervailing role. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the RCF incentivised a direct 
financial leverage effect as well as a crowding in effect of similar forms of development 
lending within the implementing institution itself. Here the potential of facilities such as the 
RCF to engage new partners and generate additional development funds is a clear point of 
departure in the context of the political economy discussion surrounding innovative 
                                                 
146This was not possible due to a lack of data on the impact of innovative mechanisms. In the future a 
noteworthy point of departure for further research in this regard would be the work of Steinwand (2012) who 
employed a model to explore if selective incentives related to trade, good governance, and diplomatic goals 
could help alleviate the negative welfare effects of free-riding losses. 
 
 142 
development assistance and ODA commitments. The findings presented in the previous 
chapter suggest two conclusions regarding the ability of innovative blending to scale up 
development assistance. 
First, innovative financing for development has the ability to leverage additional 
development resources from new sources allowing traditional donors to spend their aid 
strategically to maximise the resources currently at their disposal. Here the RCF 
demonstrated that donors may aim to strategically allocate existing ODA resources aligned 
with their objectives while taking advantage of the considerable leverage effect of this 
innovative aid modality. In addition to the experiences of our case study, a whole host of 
innovative mechanisms exist which have already leveraged additional and untapped sources 
of development finance. According to estimates by the World Bank (2009 p. 14), innovative 
fund-raising already accounted for around US$ 57.1 billion in official flows, or an estimated 
4.5% of total gross bond proceeds and official aid by International Finance Institutions 
between 2000 and 2008. Over the same period, financial flows supporting innovative 
financial solutions accounted for at least US$ 52.7 billion in official flows or 5.7% of total 
ODA to recipient countries (World Bank 2009 p. 9). On average these innovations grew 
10% annually in volume terms over the same period. 
The potential for innovative blending may be even greater. As the case study suggested, 
innovative blending mechanisms have the ability to raise additional and untapped resources 
which could make a crucial difference in ensuring that the development finance gap is closed. 
The rise of new financing modalities should prompt aid agencies to rethink the role of 
public-private partnerships in development cooperation and to increasingly consider the 
potential of catalytic mechanisms. The figures speak volumes: net private flows to the 
developing world increased from US$ 193.4 billion in 1998 to US$ 646.8 billion in 2006. 
While the figures dropped off substantially following the financial crisis in 2008, they were 
back at US$ 775 billion in 2012 (CONCORD 2013). In comparison, global ODA provided 
by the 22 members of the DAC was US$ 125.9 billion in 2012. Furthermore, the largest 
source of funds for development will eventually come from developing countries’ domestic 
resources (Gates 2010).  
In theory, the ability of innovative blending to tap into these funds allows donors to 
generate development finance which effectively bypasses strenuous and conflict-prone 
annual budgetary allocation decisions in national parliaments, subsequently overcoming the 
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implications of turf fighting in national budget allocations.147 This is warranted by the fact 
that other contributors such as private financiers operate outside the fiscal competences of 
donor countries. In the context of the reduction in aid following the financial crisis, this 
could play a crucial role in complementing wavering ODA commitments and disbursements. 
While in terms of sheer financing potential these forms of innovative ‘market based aid’ 
merit more attention, a possible caveat, however, is the ability to count these additional 
development sources as ODA. For instance, while the experiences with the RCF have 
demonstrated the potential to significantly scale up development resources for a particular 
development objective, these cannot be counted as ODA. What is more, leveraging 
additional development resources has no explicit impact on the vested interests and 
institutional turf fights constraining donors from scaling up ODA commitments. Yet while 
there may not be an explicit impact, implicitly the VfM that these new aid modalities offer 
could play a crucial role in allowing donor institutions to push for ODA commitments to be 
met. This brings us to the second conclusion, notably that the ability to scale up, or at the 
minimum maintain, ODA budgets in national parliaments can be indirectly induced by 
innovative mechanisms raising the benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs of defection 
for donor agencies. 
Given the overall political logic of aid provision and the institutional arrangements that 
govern it, chapter one discussed why aid is consistently undersupplied and thus considered a 
scarce resource. Until now, official donor aid allocations depend on constant negotiations 
between national ministries, whose budgets are generally decided on an annual basis, and 
whose strategies change according to policy objectives and priorities. This arbitrage is 
contingent on incentives originating from the scarcity of domestic resources available and 
the vested interests, turf fighting and bureaucratic inertia which govern the annual budgeting 
process (Vaubel 1986; Steinwand 2012). Furthermore the poor track record of aid 
mobilisation is also dependent on changeable political circumstances, such as electoral 
promises, and lobbying power of non-state actors. 
With fiscal consolidation in donor countries putting downward pressure on aid budgets, 
donor governments are increasingly starting to care about the costs of aid provision too. It is 
                                                 
147With the exception of mechanisms that would involve a re-channelling of ODA, and would thus need to be 
approved in donor countries parliamentary budget decisions. However, as will below, here the leverage capacity 
of innovative forms of ‘market based aid’ may directly offset this shortcoming.  
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within this context that innovative blending mechanisms may play a role in overcoming the 
above mentioned collective action problems. As was demonstrated in the evaluation, 
innovative blending can expose both the costs of non-cooperation between donors, as well 
as the high costs of traditional aid delivery. Indeed, if development aid is perceived to be 
effective and in the interest of the donor country, development agencies may forge alliances 
to win consensus in parliamentary budgeting procedures. An excellent example of this at the 
EU level was the initiation of the debate surrounding the implementation of a Financial 
Transaction Tax by France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and Germany’s Angela Merkel at the European 
Council meeting of June 17th 2010. Here, collective action problems were overcome by 
reducing the effective number of veto players to a few important figures who are able to 
shape the views of all other actors (Pollack 1997).  
Consequently, by demonstrating the VfM of innovative mechanisms, development 
ministries could ultimately influence policy too. In building on the work of Scharpf (2006) 
and Steinwand (2013), the findings of the case study suggest that innovative financing would 
allow donor agencies currently constrained by more powerful domestic actors to make a 
compelling case for more aid in national parliaments. By highlighting the potential that these 
mechanisms have in complementing traditional ODA disbursements as well as appeasing 
national constituencies such as investor lobbies, development actors could increasingly rally 
support around the issue. This would allow those actors who want to scale up ODA in 
national parliaments to make a compelling case for doing so, thereby reducing the effective 
number of veto players by rallying a general dynamic of support around aid in general, and 
blending in particular. In theory, this could forge a consensus in terms of increasing financial 
contributions towards blending, thus avoiding the implications of collective action problems 
for proposals to scale up ODA, or, at minima, avoid other actors from claiming their turf, 
i.e. by pushing for budget allocations to be diverted towards rival agencies and actors higher 
up in government.148 
 
 
                                                 
148Unfortunately the evaluation was unable to provide evidence of whether this is already happening in the EU. 
However, as was mentioned earlier, this could be an interesting area for further research.  
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7.2 Ability to Provide Better Assistance 
 
Apart from overcoming collective action problems to allow for more development 
financing, innovative financing modalities may induce better coordinated, more legitimate, 
more predictable, and more flexible assistance as well. In the context of the political 
economy discussion this allows for the formulation of a number of conclusions.  
First, innovative finance mechanisms can increase the coherence between donor 
approaches, avoiding non-coordination and duplication of efforts via their multi-stakeholder 
financing structures. As was discussed by Balogen (2005) as well as Frot et al (2010), the 
concept of coherence is an integral part in the debate surrounding how to increase aid 
effectiveness. Here innovative aid modalities may substantially improve donor coherence if 
pursued more proactively. Indeed, one of the direct impacts of the RCF has been the 
improved cooperation between the various development institutions involved, fostering a 
multi-stakeholder approach. By “pooling” activities that would otherwise be pursued by 
donors or DFIs individually, blending mechanisms subsequently tackle the principles laid out 
in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness on harmonization and coordination of 
procedures. This addresses the desired effects of increased aid coordination, donor 
alignment with country strategies, and cutting the ‘compliance burden’ on aid recipients. 
Furthermore, although not a direct effect, implicitly the increased focus on innovative 
mechanisms such as the RCF could induce enhanced networks within donor institutions 
which would share information, facilitate coordination, improve communications, and 
ultimately minimize unnecessary incoherence. 
Second, by demonstrating the VfM in terms of aid delivery costs, innovative blending 
may expose the costs of non-coordination through bilateral aid channels and induce donor 
governments to channel more aid multilaterally. Barder et al (2010) emphasize that more 
money needs to be channelled through multilateral agencies. This, however, may only be 
possible if vested interests at the national donor level are overcome. Indeed, as Olson’s 
theory suggests, the rational donor has little or no interest in the absence of selective 
incentives in voluntarily contributing to a collective action that is to produce public or 
collective goods. While this implies a difficulty in terms of scaling up aid, it also explains why 
aid continues to be so uncoordinated. Indeed, here free-riding of donors leads to the 
continued bilateralisation of aid efforts in the pursuit of own economic and strategic 
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interests and thereby incurs high transaction costs. 
Bigsten (2006) and Barder et al (2010) argue that national governments could in fact be 
induced to reduce their bilateral ODA share in exchange for more aid going to multilateral 
mechanisms if the costs of non-coordination and/or continuing bilateralisation were to be 
made transparent so that national decision makers can be held accountable by their taxpayers 
for the use of development funds. For innovative aid modalities this means that they need to 
be perceived as providing better value for money than traditional ODA. Hence similar to the 
potential ability to scale up ODA budgets by raising the benefits of cooperative solutions or 
the costs of defection for donor agencies, the selective incentives created by innovative 
blending mechanisms could play an important role here too.  
With a view to addressing the bilateral modus operandi of donor ODA, policymakers 
need to demonstrate the VfM of innovative facilities such as the RCF, emphasizing the 
ability of multi-stakeholder structures such as the RCF to lower the cost of aid delivery, thus 
increasing the costs of non-cooperation. Here donor institutions such as the European 
Commission could make use of their agenda setting powers to create informal forums of 
discussion around blending mechanisms, exposing the costs of non-coordination and/or 
continuing bilateralisation of traditional aid vis a vis blending. For instance, policymakers 
could demonstrate that compared to direct interventions, EC management time was 
significantly reduced under the RCF. What is more, the coordination functions of 
multilateral blending structures have the ability to decrease transaction costs of aid delivery 
for the donor and the recipient.  
Third, innovative blending ensures greater political legitimacy of development finance by 
mobilising a wide-ranging involvement and commitment of non-state actors in development 
cooperation, bolstering the input legitimacy of development finance. What is more, by 
focusing on results, the output legitimacy of development finance is strengthened. In 
applying the principle-agent framework to the aid architecture, chapter one shed some light 
on the sources of delegated authority and legitimacy of the aid system. Based on the work of 
Bardet et al (2010), OECD donor agencies invariably suffer from input and output 
legitimacy problems. Here the experiences with the RCF have reinforced the notion that 
innovative financing has the ability to increase the input and output legitimacy of 
development assistance. With regard to input legitimacy, the political economy discussion 
put forward the argument that since global challenges increasingly cut across donor, sector, 
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and national frontiers, an encompassing view needs to consider the legitimizing elements 
that non-traditional, innovative solutions bring to the table. Here the RCF demonstrated the 
ability of blending mechanisms to mobilise a wide-ranging involvement and commitment of 
non-state actors in development cooperation, bolstering the input legitimacy of development 
finance.  
With regard to the output legitimacy of a system, this was defined as its capacity to 
achieve the goals defined in its mandate. Drawing on the findings of the case study, the RCF 
has shown significant value for money while simultaneously offering more targeted solutions 
for recipients and fulfilling the donor’s development objectives. Indeed, by focusing on 
results, innovative financing has the ability to increase the output legitimacy of development 
finance. 
Fourth, innovative blending allows for more consistent and predictable financial flows, 
subsequently strengthening efforts of partner country administrations to plan and execute 
budget appropriations more efficiently. Indeed, predictability must be recognized as a key 
condition for increasing the impact of ODA. Bourguignon et al (2007) demonstrated that 
efforts to spur human development and poverty alleviation are principally based on 
recurrent expenditures in social services. Thus unpredictable variations in the transfer of 
resources to developing countries has a negative incidence on the effectiveness of aid since 
recipient governments experience difficulties in meeting financial commitments over a 
medium term budgetary perspective, eventually leading to an erratic stop-and-go policy and 
budget implementation. As mentioned above, in several cases innovative finance may either 
have the ability to circumvent or abate such political short-termism or mobilise additional 
sources of private money.  
While aid predictability is not a direct concern for MICs such as South Africa, the RCF 
has demonstrated how blending may induce sustainable support for public good initiatives 
by strengthening ownership and fostering sector policy leverage. Indeed, by encouraging 
ownership and accountability of donor funds via the involvement of partner DFIs, the RCF 
has crowded in additional domestic resources for the support of disenfranchised SMEs. 
Ultimately the transformative nature and the appropriation of this support by recipient 
institutions will guarantee predictable support beyond donor involvement and therefore has 
to be acknowledged as a crucial condition for maximizing the impact of ODA.  
Finally, innovative financing allows the flow of development assistance in a targeted 
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manner, involving new partners in development and channelling the funds more efficiently 
to implementing entities such as DFIs, governments, civil society, or private actors. 
Traditional aid channels are constrained not only in terms of financing, but also in terms of 
their ability to engage new partners for development and to deal with increasingly diverse 
development problems (Rogerson 2011). As consistently reflected in interviews with 
development practitioners throughout the research phase of this thesis, the role of the 
private sector in development is now seen as integral element for donor agencies. This, 
however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. For many decades private sector involvement in 
development was limited for ideological reasons, which shaped aid modalities in a way that 
they were often unable to work with new development partners, including the private sector. 
For instance, traditional aid delivery mechanisms such as project aid allow for large-scale 
infrastructure projects in recipient countries to be financed, but are unable to directly on-
lend to small businesses in these countries.  
Over the last decade, developing countries have thus started to demand both more 
finance as well as more effective financial solutions for development (Ratha 2008). A major 
driving factor in this development was the rigidity of traditional aid modalities and the 
understanding that there was no silver bullet for the increasingly wide-ranging development 
challenges. This led to the realization that what was needed was a broader menu of financial 
instruments tailored to the particular needs in question. In this context, innovative financing 
modalities could play a promising role. In building on the work of Ratha (2008), the case 
study demonstrated that innovative aid modalities can offer tailor made solutions to the 
recipients’ needs, increasing the flexibility of development finance, and provide better 
incentive structures. Here the RCF experience verified that donor agencies have the ability to 
harness the potential of the private sector in development, to optimize the timing of 
development assistance to better correspond actual development needs, to help actors 
address various types of risks, as well as to increase the concessionality of aid flows. 
Ultimately, based on the foregoing discussion, the role of innovative financing for 
development can play both an explicit and implicit role in enhancing the effectiveness of 
development assistance. In the context of the political economy discussion, however, it is the 
ability to provide selective incentives whereby it may address collective action problems that 
constrain traditional aid, such as free riding, vested interests, and institutional turf fighting 
which enables the donor to reach higher equilibrium allocations of aid allocation. 
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Consequently these innovative aid modalities represent a new beginning in the context of the 
evolution of ODA, offering donor institutions an effective complementary approach to 
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Appendix A: DAC Aid Performance 
Figure A. 1: DAC Country Aid Contributions 

















% change 2011 
to 2012 
DAC 
Countries             
Australia  5,440.0   0.36   4,983.0   0.34   5,436.0  9.1 
Austria  1,112.0   0.28   1,111.0   0.27   1,180.0  6.1 
Belgium  2,303.0   0.47   2,807.0   0.54   2,442.0  -13 
Canada  5,678.0   0.32   5,459.0   0.32   5,682.0  4.1 
Denmark  2,718.0   0.84   2,931.0   0.85   2,879.0  -1.8 
Finland  1,320.0   0.53   1,406.0   0.53   1,400.0  -0.4 
France  12,000.0   0.45   12,997.0   0.46   12,785.0  -1.6 
Germany  13,108.0   0.38   14,093.0   0.39   13,991.0  -0.7 
Greece  324.0   0.13   425.0   0.15   353.0  -17 
Iceland  26.0   0.22   26.0   0.21   27.0  5.7 
Ireland  809.0   0.48   914.0   0.51   860.0  -5.8 
Italy  2,639.0   0.13   4,326.0   0.20   2,823.0  -34.7 
Japan  10,494.0   0.17   10,831.0   0.18   10,601.0  -2.1 
Korea  1,551.0   0.14   1,325.0   0.12   1,557.0  17.6 
Luxembourg  432.0   1.00   409.0   0.97   449.0  9.8 
Netherlands  5,524.0   0.71   6,344.0   0.75   5,928.0  -6.6 
New Zealand  455.0   0.28   424.0   0.28   437.0  3 
Norway  4,754.0   0.93   4,756.0   0.96   4,773.0  0.4 
Portugal  567.0   0.27   708.0   0.31   615.0  -13.1 
Spain  1,948.0   0.15   4,173.0   0.29   2,101.0  -49.7 
Sweden  5,242.0   0.99   5,603.0   1.02   5,411.0  -3.4 
Switzerland  3,022.0   0.45   3,051.0   0.45   3,188.0  4.5 
United 
Kingdom  13,659.0   0.56   13,832.0   0.56   13,532.0  -2.2 
United States  30,460.0   0.19   30,783.0   0.20   29,907.0  -2.8 
TOTAL DAC  125,586.0   0.29   133,716.0   0.31   128,356.0  -4 
Average 
Country 
Effort  10,046.8   0.43   10,697.3   0.47   10,268.5  -3.9 




Figure A. 2: DAC Gross Bilateral ODA, 2011-2012, by Income Group (US$ million) 
Source: OECD (2014). 
Figure A. 3: DAC Gross Bilateral ODA, 2011-2012, by Region (US$ million) 
Source: OECD (2014). 
Figure A. 4: DAC Gross Bilateral ODA, 2011-2012, % by Sector  
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Appendix B: Overview of Innovative Finance Mechanisms 
Figure A. 5: Overview of Innovative Finance Mechanisms 
IFM Development 
Purpose  





and pro bono 
activities.  
Philanthropy, i.e. online 
microfinance platforms. 
In the USA it represents 
more than 1.5% of national 
income. 
SOLIDARITY MECHANISMS 




Funds for climate 
mitigation/adaptation. 
Only existing scheme is EU 
Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS). Here emission 
allowances are sold to 
emitters, raising revenue for 
donor governments. 
So far only Germany’s 2009 
budget allocated EUR 225 






micro tax (0.005%) on 
foreign exchange 
transactions.  
0.005% tax on major 
currency transactions for 
implementing governments. 




Raising funds to 




13 countries impose 
domestic tax on airline 
tickets. Funds are channelled 
to UNITAID platform.  







lottery intakes.  
Using lotteries to raise funds 
for public sector projects. 
Implementation of an EU 
wide charity lottery system 





Aims to foster an 
inclusive information 
society. 
Public or private bodies 
voluntarily donate 1% of 
digital procurement 
contracts.  
More than EUR 30 million 
allocated to 300 grantees 
since 2003. 
b. Innovative Uses of Solidarity Funds 
                                                 









Funds adaptation projects 
and programmes in 
developing country that are 
especially vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate 
change. 
Funded by 2% share of 
Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) issued 
for most Clean 
Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects. Value of 
CERs received to-date 





Additional IMF SDRs 
for developing 
countries for either: 1) 





Developed countries that do 
not need the additional 
liquidity could donate 
surplus SDRs to developing 
countries.   
Funds could be substantial, 
i.e. US$ 100 billion by 2020 




involve a form of debt 
forgiveness targeted at 
specific development 
efforts. 
Developed country creditors 
agree to cancel a share of the 
non-performing debt owed 
to them in exchange for a 
promise by the debtor 
government to invest the 
cancelled amount in 
approved projects.  
Less than US$ 1 billion per 
year.  
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 








for immunisation and 
health systems 
campaigns. 
Bonds are sold in the 
international capital markets 
against legally binding long-
term ODA commitments 
from 9 donor countries. 
Funds are then directed to 
Global Alliance for Vaccine 
Immunization. 
US$ 2.4 billion raised by 
2009. Aim is to raise a total 






Frontloads finance to 
climate related 
investments through 
the issuance of bonds 
on international 
financial markets. 
Bonds are sold in the 
international capital markets 
against legally binding long-
term ODA commitments. 
n/a 








Targeted debt titles 
issued by the public 
sector to raise finance 
and or fund specific 
projects or policies 
and help debtors 
hedge against risks 
originating from 
fluctuations of the 
index. 
Indexed bonds tie the 
performance (schedule or 
amount of payment of 
interest and/or of 
repayment of principal) to 
the performance of an index 
(i.e. currency, weather, 
GDP, etc). 
World Bank ‘Green Bond’ 
issued in 2008 has raised 




to raising bond finance 
and improving 
developing countries’ 
access to international 
capital markets. 
Securitization of future flow 
receivables via the bond 
market. In such a 
transaction, the borrower 
pledges its future foreign-
currency receivables (i.e., oil, 
remittances) as collateral to a 
special purpose vehicle. 
Difficult to estimate. One 
example has been the case 
of El Salvador, where 
remittance-backed 
securities were rated 
investment grade, two to 
four notches above the 
sub-investment grade 
sovereign rating. 






risk related to foreign-







Invests funds in emerging 
bond markets. Launched by 
World Bank together with 
private partners.   
US$ 5 billion local currency 
bond for investment in up 
to 40 emerging bond 
markets. 
CATALYTIC 
a. New Sources for Catalyzing PSD 
Climate 
Investment Funds 









channelled through 5 
multilateral 
development banks.  
Both funds have are 
comprised of a  Trust Fund 
Committee and sub-
committees. SCF finances 
pilot methods with prospect 
for scaling up. CTF funds 
the demonstration, 
deployment and transfer of 
low carbon technologies. 
Current pledges: CTF – 
US$ 4.8 billion.  SCF – US$ 
1.6 billion including USD 
735 million for Pilot 
Program for Climate 
Resilience, US$ 406 million 
for Forest Investment 
Program, and US$ 292 m 











developing countries.  
Projects receive credits 
(CERs) for verified emission 
cutbacks that are sold to 
entities in developed 
countries for compliance 
with Kyoto Protocol 
commitments.  
While the number of CERs 
issued and their market 
price is well known, 
amounts received by 
developing countries are 
not known. Annual flows 
estimated at US$ 3 to 10 
billion.  
b. Catalytic Uses at the Country Level 
Patent Solutions The idea is for donors 




and access in the 
developing world. 
Buying out or pooling 
together assets via patent 
pools and patent buy-outs.  
Patent Buy-Outs or Patent 
Pools are not designed to 
raise additional revenue. 
Rather, their additionality 








affordable vaccines for 
developing countries  
Donors commit funds for 
the purchase of a new 
vaccine, incentivising 
manufacturers to invest in 
vaccine development and 
production. Manufacturers 
commit to supply the 
vaccine at a lower, pre-
agreed price in the long 
term.  
US$ 1.5 billion pledged by 
5 donors and Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation 
for AMC for 
pneumococcal disease. 















Appendix  C: Evaluation Methodology Linkages 
 
With a view to reconstructing the program theory, a number of “if-then” statements 
comprise the linkages. Here the evaluation had to work backwards, starting with the 
identification of the overall objectives (global impacts) for the intervention to achieve, i.e. 
the overarching goals pursued by all the external aid activities of the Commission. These are 
derived from a number of mutually supporting and interlinked EU strategy documents. The 
following is an overview of these objectives and the respective documents in which they are 
outlined:  
 
i. Poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development (including MDGs) 
is one of the overarching objectives of the Commission’s external assistance. This 
includes the pursuit of the MDGs, as outlined in various official documents such as 
the EU Treaty, the Cotonou Agreement, partnership agreements, and reaffirmed in 
the European Consensus on Development (EU 2006).150 
ii. Delivery of global public goods, such as environment, peace and security, 
grounded in a rules based framework. This is a key objective of the EC as outlined in 
the Treaty establishing the European Union, as well as in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. Since it concerns global development challenges, this 
objective goes beyond the development objectives that can be pursued bilaterally. 
Article 11 of the EU Treaty clearly defined this to be an overall objective of the EU’s 
external relations.151 Moreover, it is reiterated in the European Consensus.152 
                                                 
150 §5 of the European Consensus on Development: “The primary and overarching objective of EU 
development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including 
pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals”. 
151“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign 
and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, 
independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to 
strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, (…); to promote international cooperation; to 
develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. (…).” 
152§ 107 of the European Consensus on Development: “The Commission will continue to contribute to global 
initiatives that are linked to the MDGs and to global public goods. Global initiatives and funds are powerful 
instruments for launching new political measures or reinforcing existing ones where their scope is insufficient. 
They are capable of generating public awareness and support more effectively than traditional aid institutions. 
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iii. Improving global governance is another key principle of the EU’s external 
relations, being affirmed in the Treaty establishing the Union (Art 177.3), as well as 
the European Consensus. Finally, it is also recognized in the Commission’s 
Communication on “The choice of multilateralism” (European Commission 2003). 
 
Next, determining whether the inputs and the operational objectives (outputs) contribute 
to overarching goals (global impacts) of the highest level in the objectives diagram is 
determined through a string of intermediate (outcomes) and specific objectives (results). 
First, as demonstrated in the diagram above, the third layer of the intervention model lists a 
number of specific objectives. These objectives were based on the documents governing the 
channelling of the donor grant, including the Communications from the Commission to the 
Council and the EU Parliament following the Monterrey Consensus and the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, as well as the Communication (European Commission 
2004) on the Monterrey Consensus and the Communication (European Commission 2006) 
on Financing for Development and Aid effectiveness. What is more, these objectives were 
later also reiterated in the European Consensus on Development.  
Finally, the intermediate objectives were key determinants behind the Commission’s 
decision to channel its funds. These objectives are supported by a series of high-level 
documents and international commitments, namely: 
i. Scaling up of development efforts: The Commission made a binding promise to 
scale up development assistance at the Monterrey Conference, followed up by a 
Communication on this commitment (European Commission 2004). Moreover, in 
2005 the G8 dedicated itself at the Gleneagles Conference to double its development 
aid by 2010.153 
ii. Enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Commission’s and 
international development assistance: The intermediate objectives relating to 
efficiency and effectiveness are clear goals of the international donor community and 
                                                                                                                                                 
This kind of aid should be aligned with national strategies, contribute to the dialogue with countries and aim at 
the integration of funds into their budget cycles.” 
153§ 27 of the G8 Gleneagles summit: “The commitment of the G8 and other donors will lead to an increase of 
Official Development Assistance to Africa of $25 billion a year by 2010, more than doubling aid to Africa 
compared to 2004.” 
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the European Commission. These commitments emerged from the sequence of 
roundtables and commitments on harmonisation: Washington, Rome, Marrakech, 
Paris. 154  What is more they are reaffirmed in the European Consensus on 
Development.155 
iii. Consolidating the multilateral system while upholding EU policies and 
priorities: This is a fundamental objective of the European Community’s 
Development Policy as stated in Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament (European Commission 2000), as well as in 
the European Consensus on Development. 156 Furthermore, this objective is 
reasserted by the EC Communication on “The choice of multilateralism” (European 
Commission 2003). 
The EQs also addressed the five evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, 
impact and sustainability) of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. The 
DAC definitions for these are outlined in Figure A. 6 below (OECD 1990, OECD 2010). 
 
Figure A. 6: DAC Evaluation Criteria 
a. Relevance 
  
The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, 
recipient and donor. 
b. Effectiveness 
  
A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. 
                                                 
154See §1 and §3 of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: “As in Monterrey, we recognise that while the 
volume of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals (MDGs), aid effectiveness 
must increase significantly as well to support partner country efforts to strengthen governance and improve 
development performance.” (§1) “We are encouraged that many donors and partner countries are making aid 
effectiveness a high priority, and we reaffirm our commitment to accelerate progress in implementation, 
especially in the following areas: (…) iv. Eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to 
make them cost-effective as possible.” (§3). 
155See § 25 of the European Consensus on Development: “As well as more aid, the EU will provide better aid. 
Transaction costs of aid will be reduced and its global impact will improve. The EU is dedicated to working 
with all development partners to improve the quality and impact of its aid as well as to improve donor 
practices, and to help our partner countries use increased aid flows more effectively.” 
156European Commission (2000 p.16): “The special features and value added of Community policy can be 
identified as follows in relation to the IFIs and other multilateral bodies: The Community’s competence is not 
only on financial and technical aid, but extends to trade, economic and monetary matters and to political issues. 





Efficiency measures the outputs (qualitative and quantitative) in relation to the inputs. It is an 
economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to 
achieve the desired results. 
d. Impact 
  
The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, 
intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on 
the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination 
should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive 
and negative impact of external factors. 
e. Sustainability 
  
Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue 
after donor funding has been withdrawn. 
  
 
To measure the VfM at the results level, the thesis used the seven pre-defined 
development targets and their related indicators, as agreed per the Financing Agreement 
between the EC and the IDC (for the RCF2). Given the EC aligns itself with the recipient 
government policy, these indicators are predominantly designed to support the 
empowerment of Historically Disadvantaged Persons (HDP’s) through BEE SME equity 
support (see Figure A. 7). 
 
Figure A. 7: RCF Performance Target 
1. SME 
Funding 
Approximately 70 SMEs should be funded from the EUR 47 million grant 
through investments as equity or quasi-equity. Simultaneously the investees 
would benefit from a business support services programme funded by a 
EUR 5 million grant from IDC. 
2. Employment 
Creation 
The RCF Programme should create 6000 new jobs, of which 30% are to be 
held by women. 
3.Self 
Sustainability 
The RCF should be revolving and self-sustainable. 
4. HDP 
Empowerment 
The investee should increase HDP empowerment through shareholding and 
possible access to management positions but also will have to achieve a 
25.1% HDP ownership within one year from investment. 
5. Access to 
Business 
Support 
Access and use of BSS should be implemented to improve effective 






Environment and anti HIV activities will be actively encouraged. Investees 
shall set up an environment and HIV/AIDS protection plan in accordance 
with the South African law. 
7. Expanding 
Reach 
Fifteen investments shall involve SMEs active in the rest of Africa, to 
provide a minimum of 500 HDP jobs. 
 
These linkages between, on the one hand, the five EQs and, on the other hand the five 
DAC criteria, as well as the seven predefined results, are illustrated in Figure A. 8 below (‘X’ 
for covered). 
Figure A. 8: Linkages Between Evaluation Targets 
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Appendix D: Description of South African SME Sector 
The SME sector in South Africa is considered crucially important to facilitating future 
poverty reduction and is regarded as having the largest potential for future growth and 
employment creation in the country. According to the DTI, SMEs are classified as outlined 
in Figure A. 9. 
 
Figure A. 9: South Africa SME Classification 
Sectors Classification Total Full time equivalent of paid employees  
(Less than) 



































Appendix E: RCF Portfolio Data and EIB Pricing Model 
Figure A. 10: Calculating the Financial Sustainability of the RCF (Assumptions) 
PERTINENT ASSUMPTIONS 
Fund performance based on actuals as per date (September 2011) 
Scenarios Chosen 
Exclude tax during forecast period Yes 
Exclude budgeted upside (% of turnover) Yes 
Exclude tax during cash flow period Yes 
Write-offs level 30.0% 
IDC management fees on reflows received 10.0% 
Include write off level in nominal cash flow Yes 
Include IDC management fees in nominal cash 
flow 
Yes 
Budgeted RATIRR Direct  Niche  
Loan 5.0% 10.0% 
Shares 5.0% n/a 
Upside (as % of capital 
disbursed) 
14.0% 14.0% 
Source: IDC (2011). 
Figure A. 11: RCF1 Portfolio Overview 
RCF1 PORTFOLIO (30 June 2011) 
Reflows  
Total reflows 131,127,205 
Interest 23,852,352 
Total  154,979,556 
Deductions  
IDC management fees 8,246,930 
Funds available post management fees 146,732,626 
Refund to RDP account 37,843,283 
SAIPF disbursements 13,552,874 
Net funds available 95,336,469 
CHANNELS 
 Direct Niche Combines 
Committed funding 213,400 63,634 277,034 
Disbursements 213,400 56,056 269,455 
Actual and 
forecasted reflows 
290,144 171,367 461,512 
Actual and 
forecasted leakages 
62, 654 57,233 119,887 
Nominal cash flow 14,091 50,500 64,591 
Nominal IRR 1.0% 10.6% 3.4% 
Source: IDC (2011). 
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Figure A. 12: Calculating the Financial Sustainability of the RCF1 
BUDGETED FUNDING (ZAR000) 
 Direct Niche Combined 
Uncommitted budgeted fund performance 
Budgeted 
disbursement 
112,242 22,521 134,763 
Budgeted reflows 184,906 139,928 324,834 
Capital repaid 112, 242 22,521 134,763 
Interest/Dividend 41,286 -- 41,286 
Final bullet 31,378 117,407 148,785 
Sweetener -- -- -- 
Budgeted leakages 68,415 51,773 120,189 
IDC fees on reflows 
received 
12,943 9,795 22,738 
Potential tax liability -- -- -- 
Write offs 55,472 41,978 97,450 
Nominal cash flow 4,248 65,634 69,882 
Nominal IRR 1.0% 17.4% 7.6% 
COMMITTED FUNDING 
 Direct Niche  Combined 
Aggregate fund performance to date 
Committed 
disbursement 
185,307 105,000 290,307 
Actual and 
forecasted reflows 
369,034 379,352 748,386 
Capital repaid 180,992 105,000 285,992 
Interest/Dividend 110,658 266,052 376,710 
Final bullet 77,309 8,300 85,609 
Sweetener 75 -- 75 
Actual and 
forecasted leakages 
132,771 140,055 272,826 
IDC fees on reflows 
received 
26,251 26,589 52,840 
Potential tax liability -- -- -- 
Write offs 106,520 113,466 219,986 
Nominal cash flow 50,956 134,297 185,253 
Nominal IRR 4.2 % 11.7% 7.5% 
Source: IDC (2011). 
Figure A. 13: Calculating the Financial Sustainability of the RCF2 
AGGREGATE FUND PERFOMANCE (21 Oct. 2011) 




297,549 127,521 425,070 
Actual 
disbursements to 





received to date 




553,940 519,280 1,073,220 
Capital repaid 293,235 127,521 420,756 
Interest/dividend 151,944 266,052 417,995 
Final bullet 108,687 125,707 234,394 




201,187 191,828 393,015 
IDC fees on reflows 
received 
39,195 36,384 75,578 
Potential tax liability -- -- -- 
Write-offs 161,992 155,444 317,436 
Nominal cash flow 55,205 199,931 255,135 
Nominal IRR157 3.4% 12.8% 7.6% 


















                                                 
157 Measured to 31 December 2030. 
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Appendix F: Sample Survey Questionnaire and Responses 
The questionnaire identifies five overarching Evaluation Questions (EQ), which are broken 
down into Judgment Criteria (JC) and Indicators (IC). The following is a sample of the 
responses received to the questionnaire over the course of the evaluation. 
  
Figure A. 14: Sample Survey Response 
EQ1  Did the channelling contribute to scaling up of aid? 
EQ 1 – SU EQ 1 Scaling Up 
Rationale for 
question 
The question aims at verifying critical aspects allowing an assessment of 
whether the channelling of EC funds has contributed to a scaling-up of aid, 
first by permitting the use of existing resources in such a way that takes 
advantage of the absorption capacity of the IDC, second by attracting other 
donors, third by mobilising additional (types of) financial resources and 
enabling more financing instruments, and finally by facilitating attainment of 




This question mainly relates to effectiveness and impact insofar as it aims at 
verifying the transformation of outputs (e.g. benefit of absorption 
capacity/attract financial resources) into results (achieve critical mass of 
funding) and ultimately intermediate impacts (scale up development efforts). 
JC1.1 Has the absorption capacity of the interventions facilitated the disbursement 
of EC funds? 
I-1 In your opinion, did the absorption capacity of the interventions facilitate the 
disbursement of EC funds? 
Answer: Yes, to some extent (referring specifically to RCF1).  This is because the 
disbursement of EC funds took longer than planned and involved the 
extension of implementation period of the Programme.  RCF1 commenced 
in Jan 1007 and its implementation should have ended in Dec 1009.  
However, the Programme had to be extended by two years and 
implementation now ends in Dec 1011 with closure expiring in Dec 1013. 
During the implementation of the Programme, we found that the absorption 
capacity of the IDC was constrained by various factors including: (1) the 
reliance by the RCF unit of IDC on IDC's mainstream business units for 
deals and no direct marketing by RCF to the target SMEs (of course with the 
exception of niche funds); (1) too many rigid criteria in the Financing 
Agreement and Investment guidelines which needed a long EC process to 
amend thus not allowing the IDC to adapt quickly to the market needs; and 
(3) the use of a channel (that is the 'third party channel' - working through 
other financial institutions) which turned out not to be feasible in the 
implementation of the Programme). This said, the full EC funds (3 tranches) 
have been fully disbursed following the very satisfactory performance by the 
IDC in terms of achieving the developmental indicators.   Indeed, RCF1 is 




JC 1.1 The presence of the EC/EIB has attracted/mobilised more resources? 
I-1 In your opinion, did the presence of the Commission encourage other 
donors to contribute? 
Answer: No, because RCF was set up as a ring-fenced fund which did not allow other 
donors to participate.  It might have been a good idea but it would involve 
amending the Financing Agreement. 
I-1 In your opinion, did the Commission's grants allow for the mobilisation of 
other types of funding (e.g. loans, interest rate subsidies…)? 
Answer: Yes, the presence of the Commission's grants provided the flexibility for the 
IDC to use a wide range of risky financial instrumentals.  Recall that RCF 
contributes up to 50% of the financing on a particular deal and this is 
normally not secured with collateral etc.  The IDC is entitled to use the most 
appropriate deal to enable suitable investments to take place provided that 
the deals are for BEE SMEs and look promising in terms of empowerment 
for HDPs (historically disadvantaged persons especially women). 
JC 1.3 EC contributions facilitated attainment of the critical mass necessary for the 
interventions? 
I-1 In your opinion, has Commission funding made a difference? 
Answer: To a high degree as confirmed by the MTR and the 1010 results oriented 
monitoring (ROM) report.  The developmental indicators (jobs, women, 
HIV-AIDs, HDP managers etc) are progressing very well.  But more 
important is the culture shift that has taken place at IDC due to the presence 
of RCF: RCF has led to the RCF's business unit specialization in 
marginalized funds and the unit is now managing four of these types of 
funds including the 'Transformation and Entrepreneurship Scheme (TES) 
etc thanks to RCF.  In addition, RCF introduced the culture of Business 
Support Services (BSS) which has now been mainstreamed into IDC.   
I-1 In your opinion, would the critical mass necessary for the interventions have 
been reached without the EC contributions? 
Answer No, without the EC funding, the deals made by RCF would not have taken 
place as IDC would have been averse to taking these risks (typically banks 
prefer to give senior secured lending).  The key value added of RCF is to 
enable investments which would  not normally take place due to perceived 
high risks, high transaction costs etc to take place.  Recall that RCF funding 
is unsecured. 
JC 1.4  ODA has been scaled up since the channelling took place? 
I-1 Briefly outline the evolution of Commission channelling to South Africa. 
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Answer Difficult to answer but note that the Commission has been present in SA 
since 1995 (after independence) and has increased its budget resources to SA 
through its various Multi-annual Indicative Programmes (MIPs).  A key 
challenge in SA is the need to reduce the wide inequality between the rich 
and the poor vis a vis employment, service delivery etc. In terms of private 
sector and specifically RCF, the EC's Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for SA 
1000-1001 saw the development of the SME sector as a key focal area for 
support.  A key challenge in the private sector was noted as being to reduce 
the gap between the country's first world economy and the third world 
economy.  SME development in particular for HDPs is seen as an important 
instrument for employment creation. Subsequent SA CSP's have maintained 
the overriding priority of employment creation including the development of 
the private sector in particular SMEs. 
I-1 Is there any evidence that channelling through the IDC has increased ODA 
in the country? If so please indicate. 
Answer Not sure, although I am aware that various donors are working jointly with 
the IDC as it is a key and successful DFI in SA.  KfW, AFD and EIB all 
work jointly with IDC. 
EQ2 Did the donor ensure coherence of development objectives pursued 
and was he capable of following up on results when providing grant 
finance to the RCF? How did this compare to the provision of the 
EU’s global PSD financing? 
 
EQ 2 – IR EQ 2 Follow Up and Coherence 
Rationale for 
question 
The question aims at verifying the existence of clearly-identified expected 
results and their coherence with those of the channelling instrument; - the 
capacity of the Commission Services that channel the funds to follow up 
their use, and effective follow-up by the Commission Services of the use 
made of the funds by the partners; - the existence of information on the 
results achieved. The question is fundamentally one of the effectiveness of 
the process since the existence of information on materialisation of results 




The question aims at providing insights in terms of monitoring of the 
channelled funds. With regard to the reconstructed program theory, this 
question corresponds to the results and outcomes level, addressing issues of 
effectiveness and sustainability. 
 
JC2.1 The objectives the Commission aimed to achieve via a specific intervention 
were explicit and coherent with those of the channelling instrument selected? 
I-1 Please indicate any evidence that the Commission subscribes to the overall 
objectives of the intervention (documents, etc). 
Answer The Financing Agreement (FA) is a binding contract between the SA 
government and the EC confirming their joint agreement to the objectives of 
the agreement. 
I-2 Was a justification given in the preparatory documents and agreements? 
Answer Yes, see my afore-mentioned comments regarding the feasibility study. 
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I-2 What was the amount of funds earmarked and impact on channelling 
instruments' objectives? 
Answer RCF1 - EUR 58.901 million and RCF2 - EUR 50 million. The provision of 
EUR 100+ million (approx. ZAR 800 million) allowed for a sizeable 
investments into the BEE SME sector leading to significant job 
creation/empowerment in this sphere.  The fact that IDC co-finances RCF 
deals increases the leverage of RCF and enhances aid effectiveness. 
JC 2.2 The Commission Services which channel the funds have the capacity, 
resources and information needed to follow up their use? 
I-1 Please indicate the resources in manpower and time allocated to these 
functions. 
Answer Yes indeed. At the Delegation, there are 2 people closely involved in RCF: 
(1) Project Officer (myself) who maintains a close relationship with 
Programme involving following up on implementation, including attending 
Programme Steering Committee (PSC) meetings on a quarterly basis; (2) a 
Head of Section (Berdos) who oversees the Project Officer; and (2) the Head 
of Development Cooperation (Richard Young) who oversees the overall 
implementation of EC development aid in SA. Indeed there is also the Head 
of Finance and Contracts and subordinates who oversee all contractual 
issues.  But their relationship to the Programme is a bit more distant. 
I-2 Did the managers of the channelling instruments demonstrate effective 
transmission of the agreed monitoring documents? 
Answer Yes, detailed monitoring reports are prepared by the IDC on a quarterly and 
annual basis in line with PSC meetings.  The reports demonstrate the 
evolution of the Programme to date.  The reports provide assurance of the 
IDC's professionalism in managing the Programme. In addition, the EIB 
makes presentations during the PSC meetings which demonstrate the 
quarterly and annual progress. In addition the EIB prepares annual 
performance review reports reflecting on the IDC's management of the 
Programme. 
JC 2.2 The Commission Services who channel the funds effectively follow-up the 
uses of the funds by the managers of the channelling instruments and 
interact with these managers? 
I-1 Does an internal follow up reports in the relevant Commission Services 
exist? 
Answer Yes, the Project Officer follows up on critical issues on a timely basis and 
coordinates with the relevant structures within the Commission.  The EIB 
TA is instrumental in providing technical advice to the Project Officer (PO) 
especially on how to address 'challenging' matters. 
I-2 Please indicate any evidence of interactions (notes, meetings, etc.) with the 
managers of the channelling instruments on the evolution of the activities 
funded. 
Answer There are quarterly and annual reports since 2007.  Please indicate if you 
wish to see these reports. 
JC 2.4  Information on the results achieved is available at the Commission 




Answer Yes, an MTR was conducted in Oct-Nov 2009 for RCF2.  The results were 
communicated to BXL as part of the payment analysis justifying the payment 
of the third tranche (EUR 12.5 million). The MTR was a precondition for 
the payment of the third tranche. In addition, the results of the ROM are 
always communicated to BXL, e.g. for the 2010 ROM. Lastly, a MTR and 
final evaluation of RCF1 were also conducted and communicated to BXL. 
EQ3 EQ3: To what degree did channelling to this innovative facility 
contribute in a sustainable manner to achieving the intervention 
objectives the donor targeted when channelling its funds?  
 
EQ 3 – IR EQ 3 Impacts and Results 
Rationale for 
question 
The question aims at verifying whether the intended results and impacts 
from the intervention supported with channelled funds have materialized 
and, moreover, whether they have done so in a sustainable manner. More 
specifically the question aims at verifying whether the RCF generated in a 
sustainable manner the results and impacts the Commission expected when 
contributing to the intervention. The question is of the utmost importance 
for the evaluation since the extent of the results and impacts at beneficiary 
level is the ultimate justification for channelling aid. It is also an extremely 
difficult question to answer and it will be addressed stepwise through the 
various judgment criteria. These will verify: - the existence of information on 
the results achieved; - the adequacy of the observed results in relation to 
expectations; - the coherence between the objectives of the intervention  and 
the Commission's overall policies. The question is fundamentally one of 
effectiveness and impact but cannot avoid an analysis of the process since 
the existence of information on materialisation of results depends 




The question concerns mainly effectiveness, impact and sustainability and 
deals with the two highest layers of the intervention model diagram.  
JC 3.1 Information on the results achieved is available at the Commission 
I-1 Are evaluations conducted and their results communicated to the 
Commission Services? 
Answer Yes, an MTR was conducted in Oct-Nov 2009 for RCF2.  The results were 
communicated to BXL as part of the payment analysis justifying the payment 
of the third tranche (EUR 12.5 million). The MTR was a precondition for 
the payment of the third tranche. In addition, the results of the ROM are 
always communicated to BXL, e.g. for the 2010 ROM. Lastly, a MTR and 
final evaluation of RCF1 were also conducted and communicated to BXL. 
JC 3.2 The Commission's objectives for the intervention have been sustainably 
achieved 
I-1 Please indicate any documentary evidence on degree of sustainable 
achievement of the Commission’s objectives. 
Answer Please see the MTR report and the ROM report which indicate positive 
progress of RCF2 objectives.  I can also share with you the quarterly report 




I-2 In your opinion, what are the views of stakeholders (project managers, 
beneficiaries, other donors, partner countries) on the achievement of results? 
Answer Very positive, see the aforementioned reports. 
I-2 Is there any evidence of overall positive impact on beneficiaries? If so, please 
indicate. 
Answer It is still too early to measure impact at this stage.  When investments are 
made by IDC, they calculate expected jobs, women managers etc.  But it is 
only with time that one can verify the actual impact.  IDC aims to conduct 
annual monitoring missions to each investee to measure actual impacts.  One 
mission was conducted in 2010 but it was not to all investees, hence the 
information is not too reliable.  Another mission is planned in 2011 which 
should cover all investees. 
JC 3.3 Are the overall set of objectives of the intervention (on paper and in reality) 
are in line with the Commission's policies? 
I-1 Please indicate any outstanding questions to be raised on alignment of 
interventions with Country and Regional Strategy Papers? 
Answer N/A. 
I-2 Please indicate any outstanding questions to be raised on overall objectives 
of the intervention vis-à vis Commission's overall policies? 
Answer N/A.  The intervention is in line with Commission development objectives. 
EQ4 To what extent did engaging in Risk Capital Financing expand the 
EC’s development assistance expertise compared to the traditional 
LED KZN? 
EQ 4 – E EQ 4 Expertise 
Rationale for 
question 
The question aims at verifying the extent to which the channelling of funds 
has allowed the Commission to gain access to specific expertise or 
instruments so as to better respond to the needs of beneficiaries. Indeed, it is 
expected that channelling allows the Commission to contribute to offering 
expertise which would not be readily available in-house. This also applies to 
the capacity of channelling to provide, for instance through a combination of 
grants and loans, a mix of the specific expertise of different donors that 




The question relates to three evaluation criteria: relevance (responding better 
to beneficiaries' needs); the 3Cs (the channelling as a means of combining 
the comparative advantages of donors); and added value, both for the 
Commission (as it is expected to widen the range of what it can offer) and 
for the beneficiaries (as the intervention should allow a better response to 
their needs). 
JC4.1 Channelling through the IDC enables the Commission to provide leading 
expertise and experience to beneficiaries? 
I-1 In your opinion, to what extent does the IDC possess technical/sector 
leadership in area of intervention? 
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Answer The IDC is a proven leader in the area of development finance in SA. As a 
matter of fact, the two most important DFIs in SA tasked with leading 
development in the country are IDC and DBSA.  The RCF feasibility study 
further confirmed IDC as the best parastatal to manage RCF due to it: 
Having as a primary objective the generation of balanced, sustainable 
economic growth in SA; Having a strong business culture (regarded as the 
strongest of the funding parastatals) and historically a proven commercial 
track record; Already having embarked on providing risk capital funds and 
having created the infrastructure to handle this; and As an organ of the State 
being part of the implementation of the Government's economic / 
developmental policies. Having a proven track record and the fact that it 
operates nationally, is already materially involved with SME finance and 
Private Equity / Venture Capital. 
JC 4.2 Channelling through FIs enables the Commission to have access to readily 
available know-how required to intervene in situations of emergency? 
I-1 How many years of experience does the IDC have in the country and/or 
expertise in the field? 
Answer Not sure, but I think about 100 years. 
JC 4.3 Channelling through IDC enables the Commission and the partner to 
provide more flexible and comprehensive (financing) instruments? 
I-1 What is the number of financial instruments that the Commission alone can 
provide? 
Answer N/A 
I-2 What is the number of financial instruments that the IDC alone can provide? 
Answer N/A 
I-3 What is the number of financial instruments that the Commission and IDC 





To what extent did the Commission's channelling of funds contribute 
to swifter implementation and lower transaction costs? 
EQ 5 – IC EQ 5 Implementation/Cost 
Rationale for 
question 
The question verifies whether channelling through local institutions such as 
the IDC is an effective and efficient alternative to the Commission's own 




The question relates to effectiveness and efficiency in implementation of 
projects and programmes, and to efficiency in terms of reducing transaction 
costs. Through these two aspects it also addresses value added, notably for 
the beneficiary but also for the Commission. 
JC5.1 Time needed between project identification and project implementation 
I-1 How much time did it take from first identification study of the project to 
the proposal decision? 
Answer Not sure exactly how much time it took.  But from the records, I note that 
the feasibility study for RCF1 was finalised in June 2000 while the 
Commission Decision was taken on 27th December 2001 (which is 1 12 
years).  That is more or less the standard timeframe between identification 
and/or formulation and the Commission Decision. 
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I-2 How much time did it take from proposal decision to signature of 
Contribution Agreement EC-IDC? 
Answer There is no EC-IDC agreement.  The Financing Agreement is signed 
between the EC and the DTI (representing the government of SA).  In the 
case or RCF1, the Commission Decision was taken on 27th Dec 2001 while 
the EC-DTI Agreement was signed by DTI on 9th March 2002 (about 2 ½ 
months gap).  In the case of RCF2, the Commission Decision was taken on 
14th December 2004 while the EC-DTI Agreement was signed by the DTI 
on 28th February 2006 (2.4 months gap). NB: when the Commission takes 
the Decision, it signs the Financing Agreement (FA) the same day.  Hence 
the Commission Decision date is synonymous with its signature of the FA. 
  There is another EC-EIB MOU regarding technical assistance (TA) for the 
Programme and another Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the 
EIB and IDC regarding management of the Programme.  The latter two 
took about 11 months to be signed after the signing of the EC decision (EC 
decision was taken on 14 Dec 2004 and the two agreements were finalised in 
November 2006). 
I-3 How much time did it take from signature of Contribution Agreement to 
signature of contract for implementation? Was this in line with expectations? 
Answer See previous answer.  Contract for implementation is between the IDC and 
EIB and this was signed in Nov 2006, 11 months after the Commission 
Decision.  Not sure if it was in line with expectations but past experience 
within EC proves such a time lag between Commission Decision and actual 
start of implementation. 
JC 5.2 Transaction costs are reduced for the Commission and the beneficiaries 
I-1 How do interventions involving channelling through multilateral 
development banks vs. direct interventions measure up with regards to  
management costs for the Commission? 
Answer In the case of RCF, management costs for EC are negligible as we work 
through an existing expert institution (IDC) in collaboration with an 
international leader (EIB).  The latter was chosen by the Commission with a 
view to utilizing the EIB's wide experience in handling small scale financing 
operations in the commercial sector outside the EU. Working with the IDC 
and EIB and using Sector Budget Support (which necessitates the use of 
government procedures) has been the most cost effective and efficient way 
of managing the Programme.  In the case of RCF2, this way of 
implementation has enabled the use of the bulk of EC grants (EUR 47.23 
million compared to the total package of EUR 40 million) to fund SMEs.  
EUR 2.4 million (negligible amount) is allocated to EIB TA while the rest 
(about EUR 400,000.00 goes to evaluations). 
JC 5.3 The channelling entity uses procedures that are in line with the 
Commission's expectations 
I-1 Was the project cycle to deliver aid through the channelling entities done on 
the basis of an existence of appropriate rules and procedures (e.g. framework 
and administration agreements)? 
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Answer The channelling through IDC was done on the basis of fulfilling the Sector 
Budget Support eligibility requirements which includes the existence of 
sound financial management systems at DTI and IDC.  Also, see my 
aforementioned comment in Section 1.3 regarding the 4-pillar and 6-pillar 
assessments. 
I-2 Were/are the terms of the framework and administration agreements 
respected? 
Answer N/A. 
    
JC 5.4 The intervention has been implemented at a reasonable cost 
I-1 What is the assessment of efficiency of the interventions in monitoring and 
evaluation reports? 
Answer Not sure, perhaps IDC can answer.  I understand that the monitoring 
requirements in terms of quarterly and annual reports etc, which are 
beneficial for the Commission, are a bit overwhelming for the IDC. 
 
 
 
 
